War in the 21st Century and Collected Works by unknown
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs
Volume 5
Issue 1 War in the 21st Century and Collected Works
April 2017
War in the 21st Century and Collected Works
ISSN: 2168-7951
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and School of International Affairs.
Recommended Citation
War in the 21st Century and Collected Works, 5 Penn. St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. (2017).
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol5/iss1/1
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
 
2016 – 2017 
 
FACULTY EDITORIAL BOARD 
 
Faculty Advisor 
Beth Farmer 
 
Larry Backer 
John A. Kelmelis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managing Editor 
of Articles 
Cammann Piasecki 
Johannes W. Fedderke 
Sophia McClennen 
 
 
STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD 
 
Editor-in-Chief 
Roger Z. Bollman 
 
Managing Editor 
of Communications 
Neeraj Kumar 
Scott Sigmund Gartner 
Catherine A. Rogers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managing Editor 
of Student Work 
Nick Weiss 
 
Articles Editors 
Thomas F. Brier, Jr. 
Elizabeth Kramer 
Nicholas A. Maskrey 
Britton Shields 
 
 
 
Tammi Blackburn 
Bridget Brainard 
Christian R. Burne 
Andrew Carroll 
 
 
 
Rachel-Rebekah Brown 
Carlos Briggs Camandang 
Todd J. Ciancarelli 
Timothy J. Cloud 
Tyler J. Dunphy 
Brian Finneran 
Prajakta R. Gupte 
John G. Himes 
Managing Editor 
of Research 
Tanner Beck 
 
 
EDITORIAL STAFF 
 
Senior Editors 
Max Greer 
Mary A. Philippus 
 
 
 
 
Associate Editors 
Christie Huang 
Anthony J. Jensen 
Catherine S. Kellogg 
William J. Klena 
Andy Low 
Ben McGiffin 
Allison Muck      
Elva Perales 
Student Work Editors 
Ryan Dickinson 
Angelo E. Mancini 
Cierra Vaughn 
 
 
 
 
Rachel Sherman 
Chris Striker 
Jordan H. Washam 
Kaitlyn R. Utkewicz 
 
 
 
Ayona Riley 
Joseph Ruth 
Daniel J. Sawey 
Kate Tierney 
Brian Finneran 
Chelsea Wilson 
Julie Wortham 
Mara Zrzavy 
DOCUMENT2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2017 VOLUME 5 NO. 1 
THE CYBER LONGBOW & OTHER 
INFORMATION STRATEGIES: 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
CYBERSPACE  
Gary D. Brown* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Gary D. Brown is a retired U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate. He served as 
U.S. Cyber Command's first senior legal counsel. 
 
DOCUMENT2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
2 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 3 
II.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 3 
III.  RIVAL APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE ............................. 5 
A.  China ..................................................................................... 5 
B.  ISIS ........................................................................................ 7 
C.  Russia .................................................................................. 13 
IV.  A WAY FORWARD .................................................................... 20 
V.  CHALLENGES ........................................................................... 23 
VI.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENT2 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Brown 5:1 
3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is struggling to effectively contest its adversaries in 
cyberspace. It would seem natural for the U.S. to be the leader in 
every aspect of internet operations, after all, the internet was invented 
in the U.S., and the U.S. is dominant in many areas. However, there 
are regions of cyberspace in which the U.S. is not the leader, perhaps 
because of a misapprehension about the nature of cyberspace.1  
This paper will provide a definition of cyberspace suitable for 
national security strategy discussions and address how the U.S. 
should approach cyberspace operations to engage its adversaries in 
the most effective manner. Historically, the U.S. has been a 
champion at leveraging soft power. Cyberspace has become an 
essential way to increase the reach and penetration of soft power, yet 
the U.S. appears on some levels to be losing in cyberspace to non-
state groups like ISIS and to other State actors such as Russia. 
This paper suggests that it would be more effective to think 
of cyberspace as a combination of infrastructure (the internet) and 
the information and ideas that move across the infrastructure (the 
ideosphere, as defined below). This model of cyberspace helps 
increase the emphasis on engaging with the actors and information 
using the internet in ways counter to U.S. national interests. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Cyberspace is an unprecedented national security challenge. It 
doesn’t align with standard U.S. government organizational 
constructs, which are generally either geographic or defined by 
specific functionality. Although it is hosted on physical infrastructure 
that has a physical location, it’s often not helpful to think of 
cyberspace in geographic terms. Additionally, it’s not straightforward 
to characterize it functionally because cyber capabilities support every 
                                                 
1 At least one author rejects the notion that cyberspace can even have a 
nature. This may reflect the definitional problem discussed below. See Lawrence 
Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). 
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agency and activity, and enable adversary activities, as well as being 
the primary focus of some adversary missions. 
U.S. strategy seems to put less emphasis to acting on 
information, rather, focusing on the physical elements of 
cyberspace.2  Concentrating on the hardware and operating systems 
– basically the internet – rather than other elements of cyberspace 
requires confronting specific operational issues. The internet is, well, 
the internet. 
Disabling or destroying hardware in one location may have 
transnational effects. It can raise sovereignty concerns for allies and 
others, and restrict the ability of the U.S. to operate, in addition to 
compromising intelligence equities. Perhaps most vexing though, 
disabling or destroying hardware raises questions of how to attribute 
those activities to individual actors. Engaging on content rather than 
infrastructure can limit these issues. To some extent the U.S. has begun 
to realize this, undertaking at least some discussion about engaging 
ISIS on both its ability to use the internet to communicate, and about 
changing the communications to alter the message.3 
Infrastructure-focused strategy also represents a lost 
opportunity. Cyber operations aren’t a particularly good method for 
asserting national interests directly because of the ancillary effects set 
out above, and because they tend to be packets of boutique 
capabilities that don’t easily translate to large-scale operations. 
However, cyberspace is an ideal medium for the exercise of soft 
power.4  Spreading ideals of freedom of speech, economic principles, 
and democratically-driven culture, for example, supports U.S. 
national security interests. As noted below, U.S. adversaries have 
                                                 
2 Infra. 
3 Sanger, U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-
cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&cl 
ickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.na 
v=top-news&_r=1. 
4 Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction and 
persuasion rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power (2004) 
[hereinafter “Nye”], pp. 5-8. 
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been more effective at using this aspect of cyber power to maximize 
their interests, which often run contrary to those of the U.S. The U.S. 
should do more to close this divide. 
III. RIVAL APPROACHES TO CYBERSPACE 
Although the U.S. is skilled in cyber activity, its focus has 
been on espionage and, to a lesser extent, on military activity aimed at 
disrupting or damaging internet infrastructure. Focusing on cyber 
infrastructure for non-intelligence operations has placed the U.S. 
behind some of its rivals in important aspects of cyberspace. Set out 
below are three examples of approaches to the strategic use of 
cyberspace that largely focus on the content rather than the 
infrastructure, along with suggestions regarding how the U.S. might 
glean lessons from each. 
A. China 
The modern Chinese economy was built on commercial 
espionage.5  The Chinese government has even gone so far as to 
formalize the strategy of stealing intellectual property to advance its 
economy, developing a branch of the PLA, Unit 61398, dedicated to 
cyber espionage. By stealing industrial secrets to advance its 
economic might, China is following a strategy modeled in the early 
days of the U.S. The U.S. has protested, but it is hard to ignore the 
historical irony of the situation. It was national policy in the early 
days of the American republic to acquire European technology by 
any means available, a policy that resulted in the U.S. emerging as the 
world’s industrial leader.6 For example, in 1789 Samuel Slater 
emigrated to the U.S., bringing with him an intimate knowledge of 
the Arkwright spinning frames that had transformed textile 
                                                 
5 Joshua Philipp, Hacking and Espionage Fuel China’s Growth, EPOCH TIMES 
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1737917-investigative-report 
-china-theft-incorporated/. 
6 Doron Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American 
Industrial Power (2004); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 
5, 1791), http://www.constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf. 
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production in England. Using this knowledge, Slater set up the first 
water-powered textile mill in the U.S. Two decades later, the 
American businessman Francis Cabot Lowell talked his way into a 
number of British mills, and memorized the plans for the hi-tech 
Cartwright power loom.7  
The U.S. and China agreed in 2015 not to engage in 
commercial espionage against each other, but there is doubt China 
will uphold its end of the bargain. If China violates the agreement the 
U.S. government may respond with economic and political action, 
but there is little that can be done by the U.S. to directly prevent 
Chinese commercial espionage. Attempts to defend against espionage 
have been less than completely successful. The U.S. government 
could respond in kind, stealing intellectual property and other 
commercial information from China through cyberspace – although 
U.S. industry is generally advanced compared to Chinese industry – 
so that course of action provides little gain. 
For the U.S., the closest effective equivalent to Chinese 
action might be to remove the barriers for private citizens to strike 
back with cyber means as a response to being victimized by this type 
of action. Often called “hacking back,” many companies have 
expressed frustration with ineffective government action in the area, 
and noted a willingness to use their own cyber expertise to retrieve 
stolen data, render it unusable, or simply to punish perpetrators by 
disrupting their networks. Government officials consistently note the 
dangers in this type of action.8 If the U.S. decided to change course 
and allow self-help activity, it would have to consider amending 
several statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to both computers 
and data, at rest and in transit.9 However, there seems to be little 
                                                 
7 James Surowiecki, Spy vs. Spy, THE NEW YORKER (Jun. 9 & 16, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/09/spy-vs-spy-3. 
8 Craig Timberg, Ellen Nakashima & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Cyberattacks 
trigger talk of ‘hacking back,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/cyberattacks-trigger-talk-of-hacking-
back/2014/10/09/6f0b7a24-4f02-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html. 
9 These statutes include the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 
§1030; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 and the 
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2701. CFAA, in particular, is considered by 
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appetite for this in Washington, and the U.S. has aggressively pursued 
criminal action for what might be seen as relatively minor violations 
of computer security statutes.10 
B. ISIS 
A non-state actor that has been active in cyberspace is ISIS.11 
ISIS has been successful at using social media to promote its message 
of violence and recruit members. Al Hayat, ISIS’ media department, 
has released carefully choreographed, ideology-focused videos that 
have been called “Jihadi infomercials.”12 These videos present a 
message encouraging would-be Jihadists and foreign fighters to 
answer the call of duty. The videos feature foreign fighters appealing 
to their brothers to reject Western values and join the fight. This 
message provides a strong moral pull, appealing to the estranged and 
isolated, particularly in Western Europe and in the U.S. 
ISIS spreads its message using a variety of social media, the 
most popular being Twitter and web forums. As ISIS advanced in its 
territorial acquisitions, it posted pictures of hundreds of massacred 
Iraqi soldiers on Twitter. The photos inspired horror and fear, which 
appeared to be the intended result. ISIS videos of beheadings and 
executions have been posted for maximum visibility. In a YouTube 
video uploaded in August of 2014 an Iraqi police chief was beheaded. 
His head was placed on his legs, and ISIS tweeted the picture with 
the words, “This is our football, it’s made of skin.” The photo 
included the hashtag #WorldCup, causing it to pop up in the news 
                                                 
some to be overly broad. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa. 
10 Mark Jaycox & Lee Tien, Obama's Computer Security Solution is a Mishmash of 
Old, Outdated Policy Solutions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/obamas-computer-security-solution-
mish-mash-old-outdated-policy-solutions; Doe, FBI raids dental software researcher who 
discovered private patient data on public server, DAILY DOT (May 27, 2016), 
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/justin-shafer-fbi-raid/. 
11 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is also referred to as IS, ISIL, 
and Daesh. 
12 Jesse Singal, Why ISIS Is So Terrifyingly Effective at Seducing New Recruits, 
N.Y. MAGAZINE (Aug. 18, 2014), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/how-
isis-seduces-new-recruits.html. 
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feeds of those following the hugely-popular soccer tournament in 
Brazil, ensuring millions of views.13 ISIS also has foreign recruits use 
their personal Facebook and Twitter pages to report positive 
experiences about the movement, posting pictures of themselves 
apparently living wealthily in extravagant houses, showing the 
material upside to joining ISIS.14  
The U.S. has tried to engage on social media, but at least with 
publicly disclosed programs, it has generated more embarrassment 
than success.15 As a nation, the U.S. has generally been good at using 
soft power, even if it most often has been a happy byproduct of 
American business success rather than a planned government activity. 
During the Cold War, for example, East Germans were able to listen 
to American punk rock and dissident announcements on Radio 
Glasnost, which was run by private citizens.16 This was an example of 
combining the natural attractiveness of Western culture with the 
power of private citizens to tailor the narrative to suit U.S. national 
security goals. 
 
                                                 
13 Tomlinson & White, This is our football, it's made of skin #World Cup: After 
posting sickening beheading video of Iraqi policeman, ISIS boast of slaughtering 1,700 soldiers, 
DAILY MAIL (Jun. 13, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2656905 
/ISIS-jihadists-seize-two-towns-bear-Baghdad-U-S-tanks-helicopters-stolen-fleeing 
-western-trained-Iraqi-forces.html. 
14 Deborah Richards, The Twitter jihad: ISIS insurgents in Iraq, Syria using social 
media to recruit fighters, promote violence, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
(Jun. 20, 2014), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-20/isis-using-social-media-
to-recruit-fighters-promote-violence /5540474. 
15 Such as trumpeting the decision to deploy more U.S. troops to Iraq when 
that is one of the primary concerns of Muslims in the region. Elizabeth Cohen & 
Debra Goldschmidt, Ex-terrorist explains how to fight ISIS online, CNN (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/health/al-quaeda-recruiter-fight-isis-
online/. 
16 Esme Nicholson, The Cold War Broadcast That Gave East German Dissidents 
a Voice, NPR (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/ 
08/361160675/the-cold-war-broadcast-that-gave-east-german-dissidents-a-voice. 
Radio and television from West Germany was quite effective at educating East 
German audiences on the benefits of the non-Communist world. Esther von 
Richthofen, Bringing Culture to the Masses: Control, Compromise and Participation in the 
GDR (2009), p. 103. 
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The diverse population of the U.S., the production and 
international distribution of films and television programs, American 
domination in the music and sports scenes, and the availability of 
U.S. higher education to foreigners have all helped build an 
impressive machine for the U.S. to wield soft power.17 Although this 
may not translate directly into advancing U.S. national interests, it 
does show the potential for spreading U.S.-based information 
effectively. This attraction to popular cultural has helped the U.S. 
achieve important foreign policy goals, such as reconstruction after 
WWII and victory in the Cold War.18  
Unfortunately, the relative ability of the U.S. to project soft 
power seems to have diminished in the past several years. The U.S. 
has reduced its credibility in the Middle East by engaging in multiple 
conflicts there and demonstrating little cultural understanding.19 The 
internet-enabled lower barrier to entry for news channels and 
information distribution has increased competition for the attention 
of the masses, and decreased the ease with which the U.S. can project 
its values. Official outlets in other States are more trusted by foreign 
countries, while U.S. official outlets are less trusted abroad than 
unofficial U.S. outlets. 
To regain its soft power mojo, the U.S. must evolve, learning 
to use information to its advantage. It’s easy to see, for example, how 
some stories could present a favorable contrast between the 
adversary’s cause and Western values, e.g., reportage on ISIS killing 
male European jihadists who arrive in theater, and subjecting females 
who arrive to sexual slavery.20 There is some hope on this front, as 
                                                 
17 Nye, supra FN. 4, at Chap. 2. 
18 Nye, supra FN. 4, at 49-53. 
19 President George W. Bush’s announcement of the “war on terror” and 
call for democratization of the Muslim world, for example, failed to engage with 
the local population and damaged U.S. soft power reserves. Nye, “The Future of 
Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Soft Power and US Foreign Policy (2010), pp. 4-
7. 
20 Nadette de Visser, ISIS Eats Its Own, Torturing and Executing Dutch Jihadists. 
Or Did It?, DAILY BEAST (1 Mar. 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 
2016/03/01/isis-eats-its-own-torturing-and-executing-dutch-jihadists-or-did-
it.html; Sam Webb, “‘'A living hell': The grim fate that awaits British teenage girls 
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the U.S. Secretary of State met with Hollywood executives to discuss 
the impact on groups like ISIS of how the U.S. is portrayed in 
movies.21  
In the absence of an effective U.S. government response to 
terrorist successes in cyberspace, and under pressure to do something, 
private companies have begun to step up their game. Notably, 
Google has developed a capability to redirect searches for terrorist 
information to pre-existing anti-terrorist material on YouTube.22 It’s 
too early to determine how effective the program will be. 
This issue remains on the radar of strategic thinkers in the 
U.S. government, as well. Recently, the State Department began a 
new campaign to help slow recruitment efforts from extremist 
groups like ISIS. For example, under the new campaign, the U.S. has 
been shifting away from directly sending messages to potential ISIS 
recruits through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC), as it proved to be ineffective.23 The CSCC 
approach was ultimately abandoned after being reviewed by a team 
comprised of non-governmental individuals. The reviewers 
undoubtedly observed that it wasn’t very effective to counter an 
organization that operates under the notion that Western 
governments are illegitimate with official statements from one of 
                                                 
believed to be joining ISIS,” Mirror (Feb. 21, 2015), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/a-living-hell-grim-fate-5203372. 
21 Ryan Faughnder, John Kerry meets with Hollywood studio executives to talk 
Islamic State, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment 
/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-john-kerry-hollywood-isis-20160216-story.html. 
22 Jack Detsch, How Google aims to disrupt the Islamic State propaganda machine, 
PASSCODE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/ 
0907/How-Google-aims-to-disrupt-the-Islamic-State-propaganda-machine?cmpid 
=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2809-07-2016%29&utm_source=Sailth 
ru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160907_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_t
erm=Daily. 
23 Executive Order 13584, Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications Initiative (Sept. 9, 2011); Simon Cottee, Why It’s So Hard to Stop ISIS 
Propaganda, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.or 
g/archive/2016/April/Pages/USProceedingwithNewStrategy toCounterISIL.aspx; 
Hayes Brown, “Meet The State Department Team Trying To Troll ISIS Into 
Oblivion,” Think Progress (Sept. 18, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/ 
09/18/3568366/think-again-turn-away/. 
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those governments. One of the reviewers noted that ‘“it’s not the 
U.S. government that’s going to break the [Islamic State] brand. It’s 
going to be third parties.”’24  
Reloading, the Department of State has now created the 
Global Engagement Center (GEC), which is designed to enable 
partners in countries with a majority Muslim population to act as 
messengers, rather than the State Department delivering information 
directly.25 The GEC is supposed to be the single entity in charge of 
coordinating social media engagement to counter terrorist 
organizations like ISIS. It promises to engage in “rigorous research 
and modern data analysis” as well as “create, develop and sustain 
effective positive alternative narratives consistent with U.S. policy 
objectives.”26 Unfortunately, while these are appropriate objectives, 
they seem inconsistent with maintaining rapid-fire engagement like 
that undertaken by motivated individuals supporting ISIS, who 
appear to receive little guidance from higher headquarters, but have 
managed to control the narrative.27  
Favorable facts must reach the targeted populations quickly 
to make a difference, however: “Falsehood flies, and the Truth 
comes limping after it.”28 Information programs encumbered by a 
cautious bureaucratic process will never be timely enough to make 
much of a difference. Crowdsourcing appears to be superior to 
government in every aspect of internet engagement.29 However, it is 
                                                 
24 Greg Miller, Panel casts doubt on U.S. propaganda efforts against ISIS, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panel-casts-
doubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-against-isis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e5-
94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html?postshare=901449106173651&tid=ss_tw. 
25 E.O. 13721, Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center To Support 
Government-wide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad (Mar. 14, 
2016), http://www.jurist.org/documents/executiveorders/13721.php. 
26 Id. 
27 Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone, SPECIAL WARFARE (Oct.-Dec. 2015 (p. 
22), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2804/October%202015%20 
Special%20Warfare.pdf. 
28 Attributed to Jonathan Swift (1710). 
29 Ariana Eunjung Cha, What Yelp can tell you about a hospital that official ratings 
can’t, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-
your-health/wp/2016/04/05/going-to-the-hospital-read-the-yelp-reviews-first/. 
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not clear that the State Department understands the importance of 
nongovernmental involvement. 
An additional issue with government agencies disseminating 
information involves the restrictions setforth in the Smith-Mundt Act, 
which prohibits the domestic distribution of public diplomacy 
information.30 Smith-Mundt has been interpreted broadly inside the 
government as prohibiting the dissemination of information by 
means that might be seen by Americans.31 This creates a difficult 
standard when the material is online and anyone in the world could 
potentially see those materials. The federal government shouldn’t be 
attempting to influence U.S. audiences, but when this type of 
guidance is broadly interpreted it ignores the reality of cyberspace. 
The result renders U.S. information efforts impotent and cedes the 
field to terrorists who then control the narrative, unopposed. 
Even though Smith-Mundt was amended in 2013 to address 
this issue, it remains unclear how the law will be interpreted going 
forward.32 There appears to be residual resistance to distributing 
information by cyber means because of the potential exposure of 
American citizens.33 As a fully realized democratic society, the U.S. is 
especially concerned about maintaining a reputation for truthfulness 
in the government. That is not true of every U.S. competitor. 
                                                 
30 Matt Armstrong has written extensively on Smith-Mundt, for example at 
Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 Introduced in House, MOUNTAINRUNNER (May 
17, 2012), https://mountainrunner.us/2012/05/smith-mundt-modernization-ac/. 
31 It’s unclear at this point whether or when practice will change to match 
the change in the law. 
32 Mick West, Debunked: 2013 NDAA Thornberry amendment, domestic 
propaganda, disinformation, METABUNK.ORG (May 21, 2012), 
https://www.metabunk.org/debunked-2013-ndaa-thornberry-amendment-
domestic-propaganda- disinformation.t592/. 
33 Nafeez Ahmed, Your Government Wants to Militarize Social Media to Influence 
Your Beliefs, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 14, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/ 
your-government-wants-to-militarize-social-media-to-influence-your-beliefs. 
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C. Russia 
The Russians are masters of using cyberspace to advance 
their information agenda. Russia leverages disinformation on an 
industrial scale, for example, by spreading misleading claims about 
Sweden’s stockpiling of nuclear weapons, stating that nuclear 
weapons on a Turkish base were at risk, by persistently denying the 
presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, and most recently, by leading 
a misinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election.34 In addition, they have been comfortable allowing, even 
encouraging, private citizens to engage in offensive cyber activities 
when they coincide with national interests.35 
Russia’s willingness to engage the private sector in this 
fashion is one reason that it has been able to remain at the forefront 
of cybersecurity operationally and diplomatically. Other States have 
been less willing to take this step. In fact, despite Russia’s success 
with this tactic, the U.S. and other Western countries do everything 
they can to prevent private actors from engaging in offensive cyber 
activities. This is reminiscent of continental Europe’s reaction to 
England’s mastery of the 14th century’s super-weapon, the longbow. 
England adopted the use of the longbow early in its history. 
From the beginning, it was clear the longbow’s range and penetration 
power was superior to those of other weapons of its time. Longbows 
put crossbows to shame, being only a fraction of the cost, with a 
much greater firing speed and range. It was a perfect, inexpensive 
                                                 
34 Neil MacFarquhar, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29 
/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=1; Shane Harris, “Clinton 
Foundation: Those Hacked Files’ Aren’t Ours, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2016), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/ articles/2016/10/04/clinton-foundation-those-
hacked-files-aren-t-ours.html; U.S. was reportedly more prepared for Russian cyber attacks 
than disinfomation campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://venturebeat.com/2016 
/12/20/u-s-was-reportedly-more-prepared-for-russian-cyber-attacks-than-
disinformation-campaign/. 
35 See Allen & Leeson, infra note 33; Levi Maxey, Cyber Proxies: A Central 
Tenet of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, THE CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/cyber-proxies-central-tenet-russias-
hybrid-warfare-1092. 
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weapon for peasants, as it was basically a stick of wood. Masses of 
peasants armed with longbows were so critical to the defense of the 
realm that Edward I prohibited all manner of sport among the 
peasantry except archery, and Edward III made weekly archery 
practice obligatory, banning other forms of competing activities.36 
Henry VIII compelled longbow ownership and also prohibited 
activities that competed with the mandatory longbow practice.37 The 
result of making archery the only lawful recreational activity for 
decades was a large mass of superbly capable “special forces” 
available to the king. England’s domination in this field was 
complete. 
England basically maintained its monopoly on longbow use 
for one hundred and fifty years. This wasn’t because wood and 
peasants were in short supply elsewhere, nor because other rulers 
didn’t know how effective the longbow was, but because other 
kingdoms lacked the political stability to trust such a powerful 
weapon in the hands of the rabble.38 England was favored with the 
political stability that gave it confidence to encourage a talented and 
armed population. The opportunity to “crowd-source” longbow 
techniques and skills significantly improved England’s military 
capability. Currently, Russia is employing a similar strategy in the case 
of hacking skills. 
Although it may not be the most stable State in the world, 
Russia has enough national coherence that it has allowed a number of 
private citizens to practice with powerful cyber tools. Russia’s level of 
comfort with its political stability and unity has allowed it to leverage 
the power of private citizens to perfect the use of a powerful weapon. 
This hasn’t given Moscow a monopoly on cyber weaponry, but has 
provided a different element to its cyber strategy, meriting 
                                                 
36 Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, Institutionally Constrained Technology 
Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle, THE J. OF L. & ECON. (2015) [hereinafter “Allen 
& Leeson”] p. 683, 688, http://www.peterleeson.com/Longbow.pdf. 
37 Allen & Leeson, p. 689. 
38 England’s longbow dominance lasted from about 1332-1428. Allen & 
Leeson, pp. 683-684. 
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comparison with the English longbow model.39 Cyber criminals are 
allowed to hone their hacking skills and their hacking tools, using 
both for the advancement of outward-directed criminal enterprises. 
Russia allows this broad access to a powerful means of warfare, 
resulting in the development of a trained cadre of cyber operators 
with ever-improving tools. While Russia must accept the inherent risk 
that this cyber capability could be turned against the regime’s interest, 
it can also avail itself of this force when the nationalist sentiment can 
be employed to in advance State interests. The Kremlin is in a 
position to purchase the loyalty of these groups by acquiescing in the 
commission of cyber crime, creating a shared interest.40 
In addition to leveraging patriotic feelings and private cyber 
expertise, Russia actively manipulates social media for its national 
security purposes, both internally and abroad. For example, people 
are hired to post negative comments about anti-Russia articles online, 
and do the opposite for pro-Russia articles, with the intent to 
overwhelm rational discourse on Western media sites.41 These 
Russian professionals have also used Twitter falsely to report an oil 
spill and an Ebola outbreak in the U.S., perhaps testing a capability to 
manipulate public opinion and create confusion and mistrust.42  
Even if these false messages reach only a relatively small number of 
people, social networks have an extraordinary power to convince 
people and manipulate opinion.43  
                                                 
39 Trend Micro increasingly observes hackers’ relationships with official 
authorities and their participation in conflicts. Max Goncharov, Russian Underground 
2.0, TREND MICRO (2015), http://www.trendmicro.fr/media/wp/russian-
underground-2-0-wp-en.pdf. 
40 Mathew J. Schwartz, Russian Cybercrime Rule No. 1: Don't Hack Russians, 
BANK INFO SECURITY (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/russian-cybercrime-rule-no-1-dont-hack-
russians-p-1934. 
41 Daisy Sindelar, The Kremlin’s Troll Army, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-kremlins-troll-
army/375932/. 
42 Adrian Chin, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jun. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html?_r=0. 
43 The Social-Network Illusion That Tricks Your Mind, MIT TECH. REV. (Jun. 30, 
2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538866/the-social-network-illusion-
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The U.S. might learn from Russia’s use of both social media 
and private actors. The distinction between the way ISIS uses social 
media and the way Russia does is that ISIS reports its activities, 
however mortifying they are, and attempts to spin its own situation 
to look enticing to recruits. Russia uses social media outlets to 
manipulate public opinion in ways that aren’t apparent, and using 
means that aren’t easily attributable to Moscow. There is evidence 
that U.S. companies manipulate the news to benefit their perceived 
interests, as well, so it isn’t as if this technique is unknown inside the 
U.S., it just doesn’t appear to be used by the government.44  
Although the U.S. has been reluctant to employ the “cyber 
longbow” like the Russians have, there are plenty of examples of 
private citizens performing useful national security work merely as an 
unplanned collateral result of acts of conscience or activism. People 
around the globe have joined to oppose ISIS online, both as 
individuals and as part of groups like Ghost Sec.45 Some are actively 
engaging; others are taking good citizen-type actions such as 
                                                 
that-tricks-your-mind/; Sean Gallagher, Air Force research: How to use social media to 
control people like drones, ARS TECHNICA (Jul 17, 2014), 
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/air-force-research-how-
to-use-social-media-to-control-people-like-drones/. 
44 Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed 
Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/former-
facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006; Reena Flores, 
Hillary Clinton Google suggestions accused of favoring candidate, CBS NEWS (Jun. 11, 2016), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-google-suggestions-accused-
favoring-candidate-election-2016/. As noted in the article, Google denies 
manipulating the results. 
45 Shashank Shekhar, Desi hackers join cyber war on ISIS: 'Hacktivist' group 
Anonymous says 1,000 Indians are sniffing out jihadi Twitter accounts and websites, DAILY 
MAIL INDIA (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3334089/Desi-hackers-
join-cyber-war-ISIS-Hacktivist-group-Anonymous-says-1-000-Indians-sniffing-
jihadi-Twitter-accounts-websites.html; Jack Smith IV, Anonymous Divided: Inside the 
Two Warring Hacktivist Cells Fighting ISIS Online, TECH.MIC (December 04, 2015), 
http://mic.com/articles/129679/anonymous-vs-isis-how-ghostsec-and-ghost-
security-group-are-targeting-terrorists#.tEWnKSnXD. 
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reporting Twitter accounts that support terrorist activities. Terrorist 
attacks in Paris motivated many online to strike back at ISIS.46  
Individual actions aren’t limited to opposing terrorist groups. 
Hackers have lashed out at China in support of pro-democracy 
protesters in Hong Kong.47 The hacker group Anonymous released 
information about drug-related corruption in Mexico, after finding 
government action there ineffective.48 Anonymous also decided to 
support protests in support of democracy in Hong Kong, taking 
down thirty government sites.49 Additionally, a group called the Elves 
works to counter Kremlin trolls who spread propaganda and 
disinformation about Lithuania.50 Child pornography has also become 
                                                 
46 Andrew Blake, #OpISIS and #OpParis: Anonymous hacktivists to retaliate 
against ISIS after Paris attacks, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/16/opisis-and-opparis-
anonymous-hacktivists-to-retali/; Swati Khandelwal, “#ParisAttacks — 
Anonymous declares War on ISIS: 'We will Hunt you Down!,'” Hacker News (Nov. 
16, 2015), http://thehackernews.com/2015/11/parisattacks-anonymous-isis.html; 
David Goldman & Mark Thompson, “Anonymous blocks jihadist website in 
retaliation for Charlie Hebdo attack,” CNN (Jan. 12, 2015) 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/11/technology/security/anonymous-charlie-
hebdo/. 
47 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to 
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-government-
websites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069. 
48 Rodrigo Bijou, Governments don't understand cyber warfare. We need hackers, 
TED 
(Dec. 2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_bijou_governments_don_t_ 
understand_cyber_warfare_we_need_hackers/transcript?language=en. 
49 Mary-Ann Russon, Anonymous brings down 30 Chinese government websites to 
support Hong Kong protesters, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/anonymous-brings-down-30-chinese-government-
websites-support-hong-kong-protesters-1496069. 
50 Michael Weiss, The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian Trolls, DAILY BEAST 
(Mar. 20, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/20/the-baltic-
elves-taking-on-pro-russian-trolls.html. The group has been compared to the 
resistance fighters in the region during WWII. 
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a target of citizen hacker groups.51 These are all indications that some, 
at least, see hacking as a legitimate form of citizen action.52  
To emulate the success of the Russians, the U.S. may have to 
trust the public with the cyber longbow. Private companies have 
employed hackers to their advantage, even going so far as using such 
hackers in the fight against U.S. adversaries. There are some 
indications the U.S. government might permit private citizens with 
cyber capabilities to use them wisely in certain circumstances.53 When 
the FBI was unable to access the iPhone of the terrorists who killed 
14 people in San Bernardino, California – and Apple refused to assist 
– the Bureau reportedly paid hackers to accomplish the task.54 The 
government has also shown signs it will work with hackers to 
advance national defense, with programs like “Hack the Pentagon,” 
in which it offers a bounty to hackers who find and report 
vulnerabilities in DoD computer networks.55  
                                                 
51 Anonymous Hacktivist Group Now Gunning for Powerful Pedophile Networks, 
SPUTNIK NEWS (Jan 26, 2016), 
http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150124/1017301478.html#ixzz48LNRiLjF. 
52 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, A Notorious Hacker Is Trying to Start a 
‘Hack Back’ Political Movement, MOTHERBOARD  (May 23, 2016), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/notorious-hacker-phineas-fishers-is-
trying-to-start-a-hack-back-political-movement. 
53 Katie Moussouris, Hackers Can Be Helpers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/30/should-hackers-help-the-
fbi/hackers-can-be-helpers; Nichole Hong, U.S. Revamps Line of Attack in Social-
Media Fight Against Islamic State, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-revamps-line-of-attack-in-social-media-fight-
against-islamic-state-
1472415600?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Defense
%20EBB%2008-29-16&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief. 
54 Shane Harris, Did the FBI Just Unleash a Hacker Army on Apple?, DAILY 
BEAST (Mar. 29, 2016), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/29/did-the-fbi-just-unleash-a-
hacker-army-on-apple.html; Kevin Pousen, Double Cross, WIRED (May 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/maksym-igor-popov-fbi/. 
55 Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on DoD’s Hack the 
Pentagon, CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE PRESS OPERATIONS (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-
View/Article/684106/statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter-cook-on-dods-
hack-the-pentagon-cybe. 
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Of course, hackers tend to be independent thinkers and 
actors who have their own conception of right and wrong. One of 
the bigger challenges presented by these groups includes using their 
skills to interrupt lawful discourse. For example, groups have acted to 
prevent a candidate from running for public office and hacked a 
newspaper because it published information that they didn’t agree 
with.56 While it’s certainly true that most private groups come with 
significant baggage, there simply is no substitute for crowdsourcing.57 
The opportunity to leverage the efforts of millions of people around 
the globe to invent, solve, and improve is perhaps cyberspace’s 
greatest strength. No government effort can compete with the results 
of this type of massive collaboration over the long haul, even if it is 
as unsavory in its methods as hacking ISIS Twitter accounts with 
pornography.58 And, surely no government agency would have rick-
rolled ISIS, unleashing the devastating Rick Astley on potential ISIS 
recruits.59  
The U.S. has tended to shy away from citizen groups like 
Anonymous because the groups’ often offensive behavior, and, 
because they sometimes act against the U.S. government’s perceived 
interests. Sometimes the obnoxious activities can’t be ignored, but 
most hacker groups seem generally to be in favor of democratic rule 
and freedom, so there ought to be much common ground with the 
                                                 
56 Id.; Catalin Cimpanu, Anonymous Warns US Sen. Ted Cruz to Leave Presidential 
Race, or Else, SOFTPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2016), 
 http://news.softpedia.com/news/anonymous-warns-us-sen-ted-cruz-to-leave-
presidential-race-or-else -502009.shtml; Waqas Amir, Hacktivists Shut Down Donald 
Trump Hotel Collections Website, HACKREAD (May 21, 2016), 
https://www.hackread.com/donald-trump-hotel-collections-website-down/. 
57 Dai Davis, Hacktivism: Good or Evil?, COMPUTER WKLY. (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Hacktivism-Good-or-Evil. 
58 Jacob Bogage, This hacker is fighting ISIS by spamming its Twitter accounts with 
porn, WASH. POST (Jun. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/06/14/this-hacker-is-fighting-isis-by-spamming-its-twitter-
accounts-with-porn/?utm_campaign=Defense%20EBB%206-15-
16&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Sailthru. 
59 James Geddes, Hacking Group Anonymous Using Rick Astley Video to Rickroll 
ISIS, TECH TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/110795/20151128/hacking-group-
anonymous-using-rick-astley-video-to-rickroll-isis-video.htm. 
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U.S. government. The benefits of exploiting the commonality could 
be enough to outweigh the negative. The general resistance to 
cooperating with the government creates an obvious barrier to 
working with hacker groups, and the challenges shouldn’t be 
underestimated, but the potential is so great the government ought to 
make an effort. The U.S. should search for those areas of overlapping 
interests, subtly encouraging, or at least not discouraging, private 
action in these areas. 
Russia appears to have found a way to keep the groups that it 
works with under control, and the U.S. must do likewise if it intends 
to make better use of this resource. Russia enjoys the benefit of 
working with groups motivated by money. Wealth is a 
straightforward way to secure the cooperation of these groups. Less 
concrete goals of groups like Anonymous – increased freedom? more 
free speech? – present a greater, but not insurmountable, challenge. 
IV. A WAY FORWARD 
One thing that might be preventing more creative U.S. 
national security activities in cyberspace is how the U.S government 
defines the actual term “cyberspace.” Rethinking that definition 
should be the first step in any U.S. rebalancing efforts.60  
The U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace uses the terms 
“digital infrastructure” and “internet” throughout as stand-ins for 
cyberspace.61 Similarly, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines 
cyberspace as, “A global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
                                                 
60 The word cyberspace is a bit of a historical accident. Novelist William 
Gibson is credited with coining the term. He wanted a “really hot name” to use in 
his novels, and recognized the value of cyberspace because it was evocative of 
much but “meant absolutely nothing.” 
https://www.brainpickings.org/2014/08/26/how-william-gibson-coined-
cyberspace/. 
61 International Strategy for Cyberspace (May, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy
_for_cyberspace.pdf. 
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infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers.”62 Both of these terms suggest an 
approach focused on the physical aspect of cyberspace, largely 
ignoring the people and thoughts (content) that make cyberspace 
important. 
A more useful approach looks at cyberspace as “the internet 
plus the ideosphere.” Taking the terms separately, the internet is the 
global communication network that allows computers to connect and 
exchange information, consisting of hardware such as servers, 
routers, cables, and switches, as well as the software necessary for the 
hardware to operate. 
The ideosphere, on the other hand, is the “place” where 
ideas are created and grow. It’s where thoughts and theories are made 
and evaluated.63 As ideas interact, often instantly on a global scale 
only possible through cyberspace, they change form. The evolution 
of ideas is in some ways like the evolution of living organisms, but 
much faster. Ideas fuse, recombine, and evolve rapidly. The basic 
element of replication in the ideosphere is the meme, which serves in 
a role analogous to the gene in physical reproduction.64 There are 
many aspects of the ideosphere, but it may be simplest to define it as 
“the universe of ideas.”65 It is here where U.S. adversaries excel, and, 
as a result, where the U.S. needs to focus. 
If strategic thinking about cyberspace were guided by a 
framework of cyberspace as the internet plus the ideosphere, strategy 
would be less likely to focus on infrastructure, and more likely to 
concentrate on engaging with the content in cyberspace. Jim Lewis, 
Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
puts it this way, “The problem in the US is we’re very militarized, so 
                                                 
62 JP 1-02, DOD DICTIONARY (Feb. 15, 2016), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
63 Douglas Hofstadter, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE 
ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN, 50 (1987). 
64 Google defines meme as “a humorous image, video, piece of text, etc. that 
is copied (often with slight variations) and spread rapidly by Internet users.” 
65 Hofstadter, at 50-51. 
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we tend to think about attacking infrastructure. The Russian 
approach is much more political and about trying to manipulate 
public opinion.”66 A disadvantage of focusing on infrastructure is that 
everyone has an interest in keeping the internet functional, and that 
significantly limits engaging with the infrastructure itself.67 It’s the 
information and ideas that U.S. adversaries are using to their 
advantage, and information should be a priority for U.S. national 
security efforts. At least one U.S. ally has taken steps in this direction. 
Britain’s NSA equivalent, GCHQ, apparently engages with terrorist 
internet content to discredit and embarrass leadership, in addition to 
issuing false orders to individual terrorists (or potential ones).68  
Focusing engagement on content rather than infrastructure 
has the added benefit of avoiding one of the thornier problems of 
waging cyber-war – attribution. The U.S., for obvious reasons, seeks 
to avoid negative effects on infrastructure owned by its political allies. 
Information, on the other hand, can be weighed by reference only to 
the information itself. Sophisticated technical operations are required 
to determine whether engagement is appropriate. If information is 
helpful to an adversary it can be addressed regardless of the source 
and without effect on infrastructure.69  
                                                 
66 Jack Detsch, In aftermath of the DNC hack, experts warn of new front in digital 
warfare, PASSCODE (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Passcode/2016/0810/In-aftermath-of-the-DNC-hack-experts-warn-of-
new-front-in-digital-warfare?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%280 
8-10-2016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=201 
60810_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily. 
67 Taking down connected networks quickly decreases the utility of the 
other networks, as well. Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a network is 
proportional to the square of the number of users, a concept whose implications 
for military operations will have to be explored elsewhere. 
68 Forno & Joshi, America is ‘dropping cyberbombs’ – but how do they work?, THE 
CONVERSATION (May 11, 2016), https://theconversation.com/america-is-
dropping-cyberbombs-but-how-do-they-work-
58476?mc_cid=a6d6f926a2&mc_eid=3284b6aba6. 
69 Consistent with Constitutional protections, which tend to be applied to 
everyone regardless of nationality. 
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V. CHALLENGES 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech may 
be the single most important right that defines what it means to be an 
American.70 A key component of the exercise of free speech is the 
ability to communicate freely without government interference. 
Distinguishing protected speech from impermissible speech will 
always be an issue in the U.S.71 A particular complicating factor is that 
often, speech is permissible under some circumstances but not 
others. Fiction and satire are examples of vehicles that can protect 
normally unlawful speech. On the other hand, shouting “fire” when 
there is none could be a lawful (albeit not very funny) joke, but may 
be unlawful if that same joke resulted in injury or harm for people 
trying to escape the building in which the joke was made. 
An illustration of how challenging putting all this together 
can be is Microsoft’s policy on dealing with “terrorist content.” 
Microsoft’s approach includes definitions of prohibited speech 
(which includes “. . . endorses a terrorist organization or its acts …”) 
and an exclusion for its search engine, which will still be allowed to 
return content responsive to searches for terrorist content.72 For the 
government to engage aggressively to remove content that is 
damaging to national security (i.e., terrorist recruiting, lethal 
knowledge like bomb making skills, or offensive propaganda) it must 
find a way to determine when unpleasant or undesirable speech 
crosses the line from constitutionally protected to legally 
impermissible, based on content or context. Microsoft’s approach 
isn’t perfect, but it’s an example of a corporate citizen taking up the 
cyber longbow on its own. 
                                                 
70 “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein” West Virginia 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943). 
71 Matthew Weybrecht, Free Speech in an Era of Self-Radicalization, LAWFARE 
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/free-speech-era-self-radicalization. 
72 Microsoft’s Approach to Terrorist Content Online (May 20, 2016), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/05/20/microsofts-approach-
terrorist-content-online/#sm.0000g8l17to0xdtzrca20pluw755v. 
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The involvement of private entities in national cyber security 
is particularly important because they can act in ways the government 
cannot, and act with information they already have in the course of 
business or from open sources. Many government activities would 
require accessing online information, yet proposals that make it easier 
– or even appear to make it easier – for the government to access 
private information are instantly condemned.73 The 2013 revelations 
of Edward Snowden caused a firestorm of protests against the NSA’s 
surveillance activities, even though the spying programs were lawful 
under U.S law. The passing of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act (CISPA)74 in 2013 and Protecting Cyber Networks 
Act (PCNA)75 in 2015 also caused public outrage.76 There simply 
seems to be a consensus, at least among politically active citizens, that 
the government should not be allowed to access and monitor large 
quantities of citizens’ data, even to better ensure the security of the 
U.S.77  
 
                                                 
73 Sorcher, Digital activists begin broad, grass-roots battle to fight anti-encryption bill, 
PASSCODE (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode 
/2016/0415/Digital-activists-begin-broad-grass-roots-battle-to-fight-
antiencryption-bill?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%2520Newsletter%2520%2804-15-
2016%29&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20160415
_Newsletter:%20Daily&utm_term=Daily. 
74 CISPA directs the federal government to conduct cybersecurity activities 
to provide shared situational awareness enabling integrated operational actions to 
protect, prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/624. 
75 This amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and promulgate procedures to promote: (1) 
the timely sharing of classified and declassified cyber threat indicators in possession 
of the federal government with private entities, non-federal governmental agencies, 
or state, tribal, or local governments; and (2) the sharing of imminent or ongoing 
cybersecurity threats with such entities to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560. 
76 https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2885-coalition-letter-from-
55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-and-academics-opposing-
pcna/Coaltion%20Letter%20Strongly%20Opposing%20PCNA.b24d1869025848c
b96385603d8208dea.pdf. 
77 Deena Zaru, Dilemmas of the Internet age: privacy vs. security, CNN (Mar. 29, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/04/politics/deena-zaru-internet-privacy-
security-al-franken/. 
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Even the FBI’s request for Apple to crack the encryption on 
the iPhone belonging to the San Bernardino shooter has generated 
outrage in a large segment of the population.78 U.S. citizens have an 
increasing fear of governmental violations of privacy. A majority of 
the American people don’t trust the government, and are concerned 
that the government’s access to private information will result in 
violations of privacy and free speech.79  
From the FBI’s perspective, this was an easy call. The 
phone’s owner was dead, along with the privacy interests, and his 
phone may have contained information to help stop other terrorist 
attacks. Although Apple didn’t have the ability to crack the phone’s 
encryption, it seemed the corporation would be best positioned to 
develop the capability to assist in the case.80 The privacy community 
(and Apple) saw it differently, however. 
Apple asserted that developing the technique would set a 
dangerous precedent and would create a threat to the data security of 
its customers.81 In the end, Apple refused to budge and the FBI 
contracted with an information security company that was able break 
the encryption on the phone so the FBI could access the 
information.82 
                                                 
78 Kim Zetter, Apple’s FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going On, 
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-
complicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/. 
79 A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center found that only 19% 
of Americans trust the government. Henry Gass, How do Americans view government? 
Survey finds both distrust and hope, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/1123/How-do-Americans-view-
government-Survey-finds-both-distrust-and-hope. 
80 See Zetter, Apples FBI Battle is Complicated. Here’s What’s Really Going on, 
WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-is-
complicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/. 
81 Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/. 
82 Julia Edwards, FBI paid more than $1.3 million to break into San Bernardino 
iPhone, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-
encryption-fbi-idUSKCN0XI2IB. After the FBI reported it had accessed the 
phone, Apple demanded that the FBI tell it about the vulnerability used so the 
weakness could be patched. Conner Forrest, Apple demands to know how FBI cracked 
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Constitutional protections have given U.S. citizens the 
freedom to take risks and be creative, and the ability to push back 
against government programs that implicate privacy or personal 
property. This arrangement greatly facilitated the success of the U.S. 
economy and, as a result, U.S. international relations. Of course, the 
irony in the situation is that the very freedoms that facilitated the U.S. 
rise to superpower status in the physical world now impair U.S. 
efforts to be similarly dominant in cyberspace. By contrast, 
cyberspace has given U.S. rival States and groups another chance to 
be dominant, and some of them are seizing it with both hands. The 
lack of freedom may have limited rival States’ innovation and 
progress previously, but the same set of circumstances allow their 
leadership to push forward in cyberspace, unconstrained by concerns 
over privacy and other constitutional rights. There must be a middle 
ground that would permit U.S. activities in the area to advance 
national security and still provide appropriate protections, even if not 
absolute dominance, for citizens’ privacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cyberspace is constantly shifting as new nodes are added and 
others disappear. Locations of interest move (a network address can 
change) and are concealed (a network address can be spoofed) with 
ease. National security laws and strategy were conceived with physical 
boundaries in mind, but national borders in cyberspace are porous 
and uncertain.83 These factors increase the complexity of cyber 
operations. Defining cyberspace more accurately as two separate 
elements, infrastructure and content, may help to refocus U.S. 
strategy going forward. 
                                                 
San Bernardino iPhone, TECH REPUBLIC (Mar. 30, 2016), 
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/apple-demands-to-know-how-fbi-cracked-
san-bernardino-iphone/.When and if the government has an obligation to disclose 
vulnerabilities is another fascinating debate that is beyond the scope of this article. 
83 Miller, Brickey & Conti, Why Your Intuition about Cyber Warfare is Probably 
Wrong, SMALL WARS JOURNAL (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13573. 
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The success of others in the ideosphere, particularly Russia 
and ISIS, is frustrating, because it is precisely the type of thing 
Americans are typically good at. Generally, the U.S. does well in the 
ideosphere (freedom, culture, etc.), but is not as successful as other 
actors in driving towards specific goals. If the U.S. hopes to operate 
more successfully in cyberspace it needs to look at things differently. 
There will be occasions where engaging on cyber infrastructure will 
be the best tactic, certainly when it is in conjunction with armed 
conflict. In other cases, maximum effectiveness will be found in 
taking on the adversary in the ideosphere. Examples may include 
debating issues, undercutting positive adversary information, 
manipulating information and the trust placed in it, and preventing 
the efficient flow of that information.84  
England’s dominance in 14th century military affairs wasn’t 
due to a secret weapon that no one else could obtain. Rather, 
England’s military reigned supreme in the era because its adversaries 
feared empowering the public to fully participate in national security. 
The dominance endured until England’s rivals decided the rewards of 
extending capability beyond the elites to the population outweighed 
the risks. America’s adversaries have successfully weaponized social 
media.85 How long will it be before the U.S. unleashes its own cyber 
longbow, employing non-traditional assets for the on-going clashes in 
cyberspace? 
Rather than remaining merely another of the “weary giants of 
flesh and steel,” there is a need for the U.S. to engage in “the new 
home of Mind.”86 U.S. leadership in cyberspace is vital to ensure it 
remains a powerful, albeit flawed, force for progress and creation. 
                                                 
84 Maybe sending comedians to engage with ISIS, as the band U-2’s Bono 
suggests, would help solve the problem. Or maybe not. Bono: send Amy Schumer and 
Chris Rock to fight Islamic State, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/13/bono-send-amy-schumer-
chris-rock-fight-islamic-state-isis. 
85 Emerson T. Brooking & Peter W. Singer, War Goes Viral, THE ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goes-
viral/501125/. 
86 John Perry Barlowe, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-
independence. 
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Competing will require employing citizens in the protection of the 
nation, primarily addressing the information that represents human 
interaction and all the inherent risks and rewards, with the physical 
components of the internet playing a supporting role. 
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I.  SECTION 1 
A. Introduction 
A lot of recent media attention and an enormous amount of 
taxpayer dollars have been focused on issues surrounding cyber 
security. Problems arise because many people mean many different 
things in referring to cyber security, and different groups have 
different, often conflicting or even mutually contradictory goals, in 
pursuing such policy. Some companies and users privilege security; 
the government places a premium on surveillance, and users vary in 
their concerns regarding privacy, often not fully understanding the 
relationship between personal and technical aspects of the term. 
Much of the debate around cyber security has generated more 
heat than light, especially in the wake of the Snowden revelations, 
often because those who know a lot about the technical aspects of 
cyber issue know little and care less about government concerns, 
while those in the policy arena are often willfully unaware of the 
technical aspects of the domain they are expected to regulate. 
Everyone can agree that no one wants a foreign country to infiltrate 
their infrastructure or compromise their financial, transportation, 
medical, utility or nuclear weapons systems. And everyone agrees that 
cyber-crime and exploitation are common problems that need to be 
addressed. But very few know how to go about it. 
Many of the discussions around cyber security seem to go 
around in circles with very little forward progress, in part because the 
decision-making that generates such policy remains poorly informed 
and systemically hindered. Here we hope to begin to improve 
decision-making by providing a theoretical rubric for understanding 
the underlying factors that influence decision-making across different 
levels and fields of discipline. In addition, we hope to highlight some 
of the inherent difficulties in developing successful policy within each 
step and between areas of inquiry. We then offer a research agenda to 
guide research into improving decision-making going forward. 
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1. Levels of Analysis. 
By the term ‘cyber security policy’, we refer to policy 
interventions that coordinate and direct resources toward improving 
cyber security. Improving cyber security involves protecting 
computer networks and systems and the users of these technologies 
(including people and organizations) against physical and financial 
loss. Decision-making contributes to the formulation of policy 
interventions at four levels: international, national, organizational, 
and individual. 
Interventions differ across levels. For instance, treaties or 
agreements are used at the international level, laws and regulation at 
the national level, and internal policies or codes of conduct at the 
organizational level. 
 
 
 
 
 
[Table 1 on following page] 
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Table 1: A conceptual framework for cyber security policy decision-
making 
Level Entities Factors 
influencing 
decision making 
Common 
policy 
interventions 
International  Nation state, 
international 
fora and 
organizations 
Lack of 
institutional 
structure for non-
state actors 
Diffusion of 
power 
No enforcement 
mechanism 
Rigidity 
Agreements 
Treaties 
National National 
government, 
legislative or 
executive 
branch 
No national 
strategy 
Dispersed 
responsibility 
 
Law 
Regulation 
Organizational Private 
enterprise or 
governmental 
administrative 
agency 
Lack of evidence 
base 
Rigidity 
Lack of technical 
knowledge 
Lack of 
coordination and 
communication 
between technical 
experts and 
policymakers 
Company 
policy 
Code of 
conduct 
Contracts 
Individual Individual 
person 
Loss aversion 
Uncertainty/infor
mation asymmetry  
Heuristics 
Hacker 
culture 
Decision 
making 
norms 
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At an international level, the system for mediating relations 
between nation states is not built in a way that allows for inclusion of 
non-state actors, which are inherent to any issue connected to digital 
technologies and the Internet. This, coupled with the dispersion of 
power among states, individuals and non-state actors, makes 
enforcement of international treaties or agreements difficult, even if 
they are agreed upon and enacted.  
At a national level, the lack of national strategy and dispersed 
responsibilities for cyber security policy lead to contradictory policy 
proposals and unintended consequences that ultimately reduce 
overall cyber security. There is often a lack of communication and 
integration between the public and private sector, both of which 
operate in this space simultaneously. In addition, governments and 
technology firms may have entirely antagonistic goals in certain areas, 
including those involving privacy, security and surveillance, as the 
confrontation between the FBI and Apple over unlocking the San 
Bernadino shooter’s iPhone so richly illustrates. 
At an organizational level, deficiencies in the information or 
evidence base with which to make decisions mean that ‘good’ 
programs are not identified and ‘bad’ ones are not eliminated. This 
problem is coupled with, and compounded by, a chronic lack of 
technical knowledge in those organizations with responsibility to 
respond to cyber security matters, and a simultaneous lack of 
understanding of policy needs and processes within the technical 
community. 
At an individual level, loss aversion in a situation that is 
inherently uncertain systematically restricts optimal decision making 
by encouraging individual leaders to revert to automatic and natural 
psychological strategies and procedures in decision-making. These 
strategies and procedures may not be well suited for the complex 
problems or challenges they confront. Risk can be mitigated through 
processes, such as insurance, in ways that uncertainty cannot. 
Uncertainty tends to make people more cautious, especially in the 
wake of potential catastrophic failure; this puts defenders at a 
disadvantage relative to attackers.  
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Dean & McDermott 5:1 
35 
The decision-making by entities at each of these four levels 
are influenced by various factors, not all of which work in the same 
direction. Various incentives and disincentives, constraints and 
heuristics or biases influence the way in which policy mechanisms are 
developed, or the ways in which people behave in response to policy 
interventions. Some of these factors are unique to one level and some 
apply to many (e.g. lack of information, rigidity, dispersed power). 
It is our contention that the development and deployment of 
policy interventions are influenced by various institutional, 
organizational, human psychological and behavioral, economic and 
political biases or heuristics. These influences become encoded in the 
decision-making mechanisms themselves, which in turn, push those 
who are subject to the interventions to behave or react in ways that 
mirror the biases or heuristics or the designers of the interventions 
themselves.  
The cyber security field is in constant flux, and issues related 
to decision-making are inherently multidisciplinary, which 
necessitates timely, ongoing and integrated research to keep our 
societies as productive and secure as possible. In listing the factors 
that influence decision-making, we draw on the disciplines of 
international relations, economics, organizational behavior, cognitive 
and behavioral sciences, psychology and public policy. 
 
How then can we make better decisions in cyber security 
policy? Section one provides an overview of the obstacles to effective 
decision-making in cyber security policy at the international, national, 
organizational and individual levels. A number of interventions might 
be instituted to try to begin to overcome the various factors that 
negatively influence decision-making in cyber security policy. In the 
third section, we propose some specific examples linked to the 
systemic factors we identify as influencing decision-making in section 
two. The last section offers a research agenda designed to support the 
development of the proposed interventions we discuss in section 3.  
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II.  SECTION 2 
This section provides an overview of the obstacles to more 
coherent and coordinated cyber security policy across levels 
(international, national, organizational and individual) by discussing 
issues within each level, describing what has been done in the past 
and in some cases describing the past limitations to success. 
A. International 
1. Lack of Institutional Architecture to Deal with Non-State Actors. 
 Within international relations theory, the realist school of 
thought characterizes the international system as anarchic. It is one in 
which individual states each act in their own self-interest, unable to 
cooperate out of mistrust of one other. The international system is 
one comprising Westphalian nation states. This model has prevailed 
since the treaty for which the system owes its name in 1648. The 
liberal school of international relations theory called for the creation 
of a set of international organizations and norms to manage the 
relations between states in this otherwise anarchic international 
system.  
The Internet, as a network of networks, is not bound strictly 
by national boundaries in law or in practice, since communication 
across borders in this system is constant. Cyber-security thus presents 
a problem that an international system comprised of nation states is 
ill equipped to solve. So-called ‘non-state’ actors fill the ecology of 
cyber-security, from private companies that develop the software and 
hardware, private Internet service providers, organized criminal 
outlets and individual ‘hackers’, not to mention both business and 
personal users of the Internet. While there is some interaction 
between state and non-state entities, such as relationships between 
Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies with organized 
criminal groups,1 and between the Chinese military and semi-
autonomous hacking groups, these non-state interests are not present 
                                                 
1 See BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION (Sourcebooks, Inc., 2014). 
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within the delegations representing the respective nation states in 
international organizations and fora.  
A patchwork of international agreements and treaties are 
linked to cyber-security.2 One multilateral agreement, drafted under 
the aegis of the Council of Europe, is The Budapest Convention on 
Cyber Crime. Signed in 2001, it is open to non-European signatories 
and has the objective of pursuing, “a common criminal policy aimed 
at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting 
appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”3 The 
Budapest Convention has attracted 50 signatories. However, it is still 
criticized as being outdated and has not gained the support of key 
countries in cyber security such as Brazil and Russia.4   
On a bilateral level, a number of recent agreements have been 
created with the intention of curbing cyber-espionage between the 
United States and China,5 between China and the United Kingdom,6 
China and Germany7 and between China and Russia.8 Questions have 
been raised as to whether or not the bilateral agreements, particularly 
                                                 
2 See Jonathan Clough, The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Is 
Harmonisation Achievable in a Digital World?, MONASH U. (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/2013-
isoc/presentations/clough.pdf. 
3 See Council of Europe (COE), CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME, 
(Nov. 23, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Displ 
ayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081561 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
4 Brian Harley, A Global Convention on Cybercrime?, COLUM. SCI & TECH. L. 
REV. (Mar. 23, 2010), http://stlr.org/2010/03/23/a-global-convention-on-
cybercrime/. 
5 Colin Lecher, US Reaches Economic Cybersecurity Agreement with China, THE 
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/25/9399187/obama-
china-cyber-security-agreement. 
6 Danielle Correa, China and the UK Sign Cyber-Security Agreement, SC MAG., 
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/china-and-the-uk-sign-cyber-
security-agreement/article/448578/. 
7 Kevin Sawyer, Germany and China Reach Agreement to End Commercial 
Cyberwar, NAT’L MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2015), http://natmonitor.com/2015/10/29/ 
germany-and-china-reach-agreement-to-end-commercial-cyberwar/. 
8 Lee Munson, Russia and China Sign Cyber Security Pact, Vow Not to Hack 
Each Other, NAKED SECURITY (May 11, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2 
015/05/11/russia-and-china-sign-cyber-security-pact-vow-not-to-hack-each-
other/. 
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the one between the United States and China, can actually be 
enforced and thus will achieve their stated goals. Moreover, the 
agreements leave out other vital organizations such as civil society 
organizations, critical infrastructure, and the government, military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations of the respective 
countries.9   
Finally, attempts have been made to include ‘Internet-based 
surveillance systems’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral 
agreement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies. The proposals to extend the Wassenaar 
Arrangement have been criticized on the basis that, in the long run, it 
would undermine cyber-security by criminalizing the very security 
research activities that result in the identification and correction of 
vulnerabilities in software and hardware.  
2. Diffusion of Power. 
One of the megatrends identified by the National Intelligence 
Council in its report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is the 
increasing diffusion of power globally.10 In this increasingly 
multipolar world, power shifts to networks and coalitions made up of 
non-state actors such as private enterprises and individual threat 
actors such as hackers. Ironically, this diffusion and dispersion of 
power is partly driven by vast improvements in communication 
technologies. These conditions make it difficult to implement and 
enforce international agreements even when there is general 
consensus and agreement on a specific cyber security policy at the 
international level.  
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe”, is a quote 
commonly misattributed to Henry Kissinger in reference to the 
difficulty in international relations and negotiations when dealing 
                                                 
9 Richard Bejtlich, To hack, or not to hack?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 28, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/28/to-hack-or-not-to-hack/. 
10 See Generally Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE COUNS. (Dec. 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/ 
organization/global-trends-2030. 
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with a dispersed entity that has no single representative. The quote 
nicely encapsulates the current problem facing cyber security policy at 
an international level between nation states: there is simply no one 
body or entity to call or to convene major stakeholders to address 
cyber security threats or challenges. 
The international diplomatic system has trouble integrating 
the views of entities outside of the Westphalian system of nation 
states. The Internet is a decentralized network of networks that 
involves privately owned entities in almost all countries. In this 
aspect, the Internet’s greatest strength inherently incorporates its 
greatest weakness; designed to survive a nuclear conflict, redundancy 
is baked into its very structure but at the expense of the ability for 
central administration. As with the nation state system itself, there is 
no central controlling actor or actors capable of forcing compliance 
on all participants. International negotiations require the participation 
of these private entities, yet the international system is not built to 
incorporate such actors, and so remains unable to include them in 
ways essential to the success of any treaty in this domain. And yet 
without the inclusion of such groups and individuals, any 
international agreement is doomed to failure from the outset.  
In fact, this diffusion of nation state power is compounded 
by the very ‘empowerment of the individual’ that the Internet itself 
facilitates. This term refers to the way that digital technologies invert 
traditional power dynamics. Now individuals, with very few 
resources, are able to influence the actions and behavior of 
governmental or multinational organizations many times their own 
size. Suicide bombers provide a dramatic example of this 
phenomenon. The influence of individual non-state actors is 
particularly relevant in cyber security. Many of the threat actors in 
this field are organized criminal outfits, in many cases backed 
explicitly or tolerated by the state in which they reside. Widespread 
availability and adoption of commercially available information 
communication technologies grants individuals capabilities to access 
and amplify information previously only available to nation states. 
And destructive effects are not limited only to organized groups, but 
can reside within the reach of individual hackers themselves as well.  
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Effectively controlling such a system through a slow moving 
and rigid set of decision-making rules, procedures and processes, 
such as those that characterize the international system, is an 
immensely difficult task. Even were binding agreements to be 
reached, actual implementation of these agreements presents a whole 
new set of difficulties. And enforcement proves harder still, especially 
in the fast-moving technological landscape. These is a deep and 
persistent, perhaps unfathomable breach, between the speed of 
government and bureaucratic action, and that of technological 
innovation. In such a contest, technology is bound to circumvent 
particular restrictions long before those constraints can be 
implemented. And this is likely to be true for the foreseeable future.  
B. National 
In organizations there are at least four reasons why planners 
tend to fail when attempting to address complex problems.11 First, 
people tend to oversimplify the process of problem solving to save 
time and energy.12 Second, people are overconfident in their own 
abilities, and thus try to repeat past successes.13 Third, people have 
trouble quickly absorbing and retaining the large amounts of 
information necessary to understand dynamic, ever-changing 
processes.14 Finally, people tend to focus on immediately pressing 
problems at the expense of considering longer term or more distant 
challenges or the unintended consequences and problems that 
solutions can create.15  
These four characteristics of poor decision-making help us 
understand why the current approach to cyber security policy making 
at a national and organizational level is failing.  
                                                 
11 See DIETRICH DÖRNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND 
AVOIDING ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS (Basic Books 1989). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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1. No National Strategy. 
In the United States, there is no national strategy and no 
long-term strategy for cyber security policy. This creates a vacuum of 
responsibility and an absence of direction and constraint which leads 
to contradictory policy. This inevitably generates the emergence of 
turf wars over the rapidly expanding Federal funds available for 
programs nominally meant for ‘cyber’ purposes, but often directed 
toward other only tangentially related interventions by agencies which 
seek to co-opt these funds for other purposes. 
This is not a new problem, nor one restricted solely to the 
domain of ‘cyber’ for that matter. In 2013, the Government 
Accountability Office released a report entitled, ‘National Strategy, 
Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively 
Implemented’.16 Specific problems identified with the cyber security 
policy approach include: few milestones or performance measures in 
government strategy documents; the assignment of high-level roles 
and responsibilities but important operational details being left 
unclear; and wide variance across cyber security strategy documents 
in terms of priorities and structure, how they link to or supersede 
other documents, and how they fit into an overarching national cyber 
security strategy.17 Little has changed to improve these deficits in the 
intervening years.  
The Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy, perhaps the 
longest standing national strategy document, provides a set of 
strategic goals but lacks fine-grained, operational details that are 
publicly available.18 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative was released in 2013 and came with 12 initiatives but did 
not come with an operational plan on how these initiatives should be 
                                                 
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-187, 
CYBERSECURITY: NATIONAL STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO 
BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED (2013). 
17 Id. 
18 The DOD Cyber Strategy, THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf. 
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implemented and operationalized.19 The Cybersecurity National 
Action Plan came with a set of actions, like setting up a Commission 
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, and creating a Federal Chief 
Information Security Officer position, and allocated $19 billion in 
funds across a plethora of activities, but did not include tangible 
outcomes and metrics for determining cost effectiveness or ‘success’. 
This is a combination tailor-made for inciting misuse of government 
funds. 
The responsibilities for portions of cyber security policy are 
spread out across dozens of Federal agencies, the Department of 
Defense and intelligence community, regulators and other ancillary 
bodies (like Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs). 
This dispersed responsibility, coupled with no overarching strategy, 
creates situations where agencies pursue cyber security policy goals 
that match their organization’s interests but, in many cases, contradict 
the cyber security concerns of other organizations, sectors, and 
people, or produce unnecessary, wasteful, or even deleterious 
redundancies, often even without awareness of such duplication. 
Lack of fully transparent communication between these divisions 
within the government serves to further complicate problems 
associated with disaggregated policy planning and implementation.  
A recent example is the push by FBI Director Comey for 
laws that would mandate backdoors to be placed in encryption 
standards. Were this policy to be successfully implemented, it would 
have the effect of weakening overall cyber security (including the 
cyber security of other government agencies), not to mention the 
ability of foreign actors to access sensitive American materials.  
Another example is the National Security Agency, which has 
a dual mission that in practice is contradictory. The Signals 
Intelligence mission requires that the agency acquire the 
communications of foreign governments (espionage). The second 
mission of the NSA, the Information Assurance mission, tasks the 
agency with safeguarding the information of government agencies, 
                                                 
19 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
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corporations and individuals in the U.S. The approach is summarized 
as ‘keep our information safe, get theirs.’ 
The Signals Intelligence mission requires that key information 
technology infrastructure, hardware and software, be weakened and 
exploited. These technologies, in many cases are the same ones used 
by government agencies, corporations and individuals in the United 
States itself. The weakening of these technologies puts these entities 
in the U.S. at risk (the revelation in 2016 of back-doored Juniper 
routers, which are used by many U.S. Federal government 
departments, is a case in point). Add to this the fact that US Cyber 
Command, which is the military’s designated organization for 
safeguarding its networks and information, is led by the same person 
that leads the NSA, and we have a muddled set of responsibilities 
with little coordination.  
C. Organizational 
1. Lack of Evidence Base. 
Evidence-based policy making is an approach where policy 
decisions are based on the collection and interpretation of objective 
evidence relating to the policy issue at hand and the performance of 
the policy option implemented. Its intellectual roots lie in evidence-
based medicine, where randomized controlled trials are used to assess 
the policies or treatments that contribute most toward the resolution 
of a particular condition or ailment. This etiology embodies an 
important corrective; fixing one problem in the human body often 
causes another because systems are enmeshed in ways that are not 
always obvious, clear or systematic. Similarly, in a network design like 
the Internet, focusing on simple, easy-to-measure outcomes can 
quickly become a version of the drunkard’s search. Just as lowering 
cholesterol does little to change overall risk of coronary artery 
disease, although the ability to do so with statins makes billions for 
Big Pharma every year, reducing the number of hacks may not 
necessarily mean the overall system is safer. After all, body counts in 
Vietnam did little to provide an accurate indicator of how well the 
United States was doing in that war. Effective decision-making in 
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complex environments requires knowledge about the structure of a 
system and the outcomes of the decisions made in relation to the 
goals that are being pursued.20 Without this knowledge, an 
organization may implement interventions that ultimately exacerbate 
the very problems that it seeks to mitigate. 
In cyber security policy, there is a dearth of reliable, verifiable 
data on the financial scale of the losses, the sources of threats and 
risks, and the potential positive and negative impacts of policy 
decisions. While figures on the number of cyber incidents are 
released annually by the Computer Emergency Response Team (US-
CERT), such figures are methodologically questionable – for instance 
- much of the increasing incidence figures could be chalked up to 
better detection methods and companies have incentives to hide 
serious breaches - and thus give very little in the way of policy-
relevant guidance.  
Where there are metrics available, there is no guarantee that 
they will be actionable, relevant or useful. For instance, since 2003 
the Department of Homeland Security has been operating an 
intrusion detection system, formerly called the National 
Cybersecurity Protection System, now called the EINSTEIN 
program.2122  After over a decade of operation, and $6 billion in 
investment, “none [of the metrics developed by DHS] provide 
insight into the value derived from the functions of the system.”23 An 
estimated $19 billion was allocated to cyber security measures in the 
2017 White House budget proposal, representing a 35% increase 
                                                 
20 See DÖRNER, supra note 11. 
21 It is of great concern therefore that the Cybersecurity National Action 
Plan calls for the Department of Homeland Security to enhance Federal 
cybersecurity, “by expanding the EINSTEIN and Continuous Diagnostics and 
Mitigation programs”. 
22 Aliya Sternstein, US Homeland Security’s $6B Firewall Has More Than a 
Few Frightening Blind Spots, DEFENSE ONE (Jan. 29 2016), 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/us-homeland-securitys-6b-
firewall-has-more-few-frightening-blind-spots/125528/. 
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-294, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: NHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE PLANNING, AND 
SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION 
SYSTEM (2016). 
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over the previous year.24 However, it was not clear where all these 
funds were going because there was no definition for what actually 
constitutes a ‘cyber security program’.25 Even data on research and 
development (R&D) spending on cyber security, the release of which 
is required by law, have only been made available as recently as 
2013.26  
The lack of reliable evidence is due to a number of reasons. 
There are strong incentives for corporations and government 
agencies not to disclose whether an information security failure has 
occurred, facilitated in part by patchy data breach notification laws, 
which are set at a state level in the United States, and differ 
substantially in their requirements.  Companies may not want 
competitors to know their weaknesses, and corporations as well as 
the government may not want the public to lose faith that their 
personal financial, medical, or social information is safe when they 
interact with them. This of course assumes that the company is aware 
of a failure in information security having even taken place, which is 
far from guaranteed. 
Where there are data and studies available, the most 
commonly cited data sources are compiled by security or antivirus 
vendors, who have business incentives to magnify the problem, or 
are in studies undertaken by academic institutions or think tanks and 
sponsored by corporations that operate in the field. These studies 
make unrealistic assumptions about the behavioral responses of 
companies, and do not take into account the unobserved differences 
among companies in the datasets. They assume that all companies 
react in the same way to information security incidents regardless of 
industry, size (whether by headcount or annual revenues), business 
model or current revenues, costs or profitability. In reality, the losses 
                                                 
24 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFF. OF 
MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2016). 
25 Middle Class Economics: Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE: THE 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact
_sheets/cybersecurity-updated.pdf. 
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
46 
that a company might face from a security breach are influenced by 
the individual company’s fragility, which in turn is a function of a 
number of firm-level characteristics including customer loyalty, profit 
margins or debt. For a hypothetical example, if a company with low 
profit margins, low customer loyalty and high debt is subject to a 
costly data breach, and that information becomes public, the periodic 
drop in revenues and curtailed access to short-term debt might 
render the company insolvent. This would not be the case for a 
company with high margins, high customer loyalty and low debt. Yet 
many studies treat all companies as if they were identical when 
predicting or forecasting potential impacts of a breach.  
Selection bias is also endemic. The only companies that 
appear in malware or data breach incident datasets are those that: a) 
detected the incident; b) subsequently reported the incident; and c) 
were able to accurately quantify the impact of the incident. Of the 
entire universe of companies, only a fraction of a fraction is likely to 
be included in this analysis. Simple methodological problems like 
ensuring a representative sample are endemic in commonly used, self-
reported surveys. The total losses across countries are often based on 
extrapolations for entire populations; multiplying the average loss per 
company by the total companies in the country or economy may not 
provide the most accurate estimate of actual breaches or losses.27  
This lack of evidence means that cyber security policy makers 
cannot determine where the true problems lies and where policy 
interventions might have the greatest benefit given their costs, nor 
can they track the subsequent outcomes of the policy interventions 
that they make. This failure then compounds over years as successful 
policy interventions aren’t identifiable and failed policy interventions 
are allowed to persist in spite of their failure.  
With no basis on which to evaluate the need for and 
effectiveness of cyber security policy, there is a risk that the system 
becomes nothing more than a ‘self-licking ice cream cone’: A self-
                                                 
27 Dinei Florencio & Cormac Herley, Sex, Lies and Cyber-crime Surveys 
(Microsoft Research, Working Paper), available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SexLiesandCybercrimeSurveys.pdf. 
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perpetuating process that is meant to address a problem but instead 
contributes to the very problem that it is ostensibly designed to solve.  
2. Chronic Lack of Technical Knowledge.  
The chronic lack of technical knowledge and talent within the 
organizations with responsibility for cyber security policy severely 
hampers these organizations’ ability to effectively develop and 
implement policies. This technical knowledge gap can be attributed 
to there being no standard way in which to classify or keep track of 
cyber security related roles, and to the inability of Federal agencies to 
retain and develop what technical talent they are able to hire. 
Again, this problem is not new. In 2011, the Government 
Accountability Office released a report titled ‘Cybersecurity Human 
Capital: Initiatives need Better Planning and Coordination’, flagging that, 
“eight agencies with the biggest IT [information technology] budgets 
have trouble handling their cybersecurity workforces and determining 
their composition and responsibilities.”28 It remains a persistent 
problem. In a 2013 report, the GAO wrote that, “only 2 of 8 agencies 
it reviewed developed cyber workforce plans and only 3 of the 8 
agencies had a department-wide training program for their 
cybersecurity workforce.”29 The Department of Defense was the only 
agency to report their shortage to the GAO in 2011 (as they were the 
only ones who had a methodology in place).  
This has not stopped government agencies from announcing 
large hiring targets, complete with large budgets, to hire cyber 
security personnel. The Department of Defense announced that it 
would have 6,000 ‘cyber-warriors’ by 2016 but there is little indication 
of where these people would come from (much less what a ‘cyber-
                                                 
28 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-8, CYBERSECURITY 
HUMAN CAPITAL: INITIATIVES NEED BETTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION 
(2011). 
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
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warrior’ does). The Office of Personnel Management was also 
competing to hire 1,000 cyber security personnel in this market.30  
The Department of Homeland Security is the private sector’s 
liaison on cyber security matters – it also advises other agencies on 
the issue. The GAO identified 1,361 cyber security personnel at DHS 
in their 2013 study. One official is quoted as saying, “the National 
Cyber Security Division has had trouble finding personnel for certain 
specialized areas, such as watch officers”.31 This division has a central 
role in operating important interventions such as the EINSTEIN 
system, developing the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, and 
operating the National Cybersecurity Center.  
The lack of any data to measure the problem or outcomes of 
policies to address the problem makes achieving strategic goals, like 
Initiative #8 of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which 
calls to, “develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce 
and an effective pipeline of future employees,” even more 
challenging.  
Another underlying reason for the chronic lack of technically 
skilled people in government is that government can rarely compete 
with the private sector in the IT arena in terms of salary, stock 
options, prestige and other remunerations. Few career public servants 
have an advanced understanding of technical issues in the area of 
cyber security, and even fewer private sector IT professionals have 
any understanding of, much less interest in, the processes underlying 
the formulation of government policy. At a cultural or ideological 
level, many of those who work in or are a part of the tech industry 
either in Silicon Valley or more generally have a Libertarian or 
Randian bent. They are broadly skeptical of and distrust 
government,32 exacerbating the conflict between government and 
industry in the surveillance versus privacy debate around cyber 
security goals. Even if the government could compete head-to-head 
                                                 
30 GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/FR-2015-11-10/html/2015-28566.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016). 
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16. 
32 A compact summary of this set of values can be found in Richard 
Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s 1995 essay ‘The Californian Ideology’. 
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in pay, it would still have to overcome the ideological forces that 
dissuade Silicon Valley from collaborating openly with government.  
The security and screening requirements for many positions 
related to cyber security in the Federal government have created 
obstacles to hiring talent as well. One example is Ashkan Soltani, 
who was in line to work with the White House’s Office of Science 
and Technology Policy after a stint as the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Chief Technologist, but whose security clearance 
application was rejected possibly due to past affiliation with Edward 
Snowden.33 In another example from 2014, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that the agency was 
considering relaxing its policy, which prohibited hiring anyone who 
had used cannabis in the past three years, because it was so difficult 
to find candidates for cyber security roles who would pass the 
policy’s requirements.34  
Simultaneously, private entities with the skill base to address 
some of these challenges technologically have no ostensible reason to 
include policy experts on their design teams. Government does not 
mandate or regulate such participants, and there is little or no support 
or infrastructure in most technology companies for their 
contribution. On the other side of the equation, it is hard enough for 
the government agencies to find people to manage and secure their 
internal information technology networks, let alone find those with 
the technical knowledge and skills coupled with an understanding of 
public policy formulation and implementation. Both sides are thus 
confronted with enormous challenges to achieving mutual 
understanding and translation of basic needs and goals.  
Finally, government organizations typically set their cyber 
security policy internally as a list of compliance-based check boxes 
that the system administrators are expected to rigidly follow. These 
                                                 
33 Danny Yadron, White House denies clearance to tech researcher with links to 
Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo 
gy/2016/jan/29/white-house-tech-researcher-denied-security-clearance-edward-
snowden-nsa. 
34 Leo Kelion, FBI ‘could hire hackers on cannabis’ to fight cybercrime, BBC 
NEWS (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27499595. 
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check box lists are developed from the perspective of the defender, 
not the adversary, so they are typically circumvented by highly 
resourced and sentient adversaries. Their ‘one size fits all’ approach 
emphasizes attaining compliance over actually directing resources 
towards areas where dynamic risks are greatest for the organization in 
question.  
The management of government agencies also does not 
permit the system administrators who manage their IT networks the 
autonomy necessary to take a proactive approach to system security. 
These rigid policies are the equivalent of handcuffing the security 
guard at the front of the building and then telling him/her to keep 
the place safe from thieves. A long-term effect is that, rather than 
empowering the system administrators to proactively address cyber 
security concerns, this approach drives out the most talented 
technical employees, thereby compounding the already acute skills 
shortage in Federal agencies. 
D. Individual  
1. Heuristics and Biases. 
Clearly many challenges confront our ability to formulate 
effective cyber-security policy.  Not least among these are systematic 
and predictable barriers which exist in the minds of individual 
decision makers and other stake-holders. A few of these merit some 
comment, specifically roadblocks related to loss aversion and the 
difficulties of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
These proclivities can induce a kind of paralysis because people find 
themselves averse not only to change, but especially to risks and 
threats that incorporate some element of uncertainty. 
Loss aversion constitutes a well-known phenomenon first 
experimentally documented in the work of Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky.35 This work elegantly demonstrated human hedonic 
                                                 
35 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 261-
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asymmetry.  In short, people are more averse to loss than they are 
attracted to an equal gain. So, for example, it hurts more to lose $10 
than it makes most people happy to win $10. In fact, people need to 
be offered about $25 on average to make them indifferent between a 
bet which can lead to a loss of $10. In other words, most people need 
two and a half times more potential benefit in order to take the risk 
of a potential loss. This phenomenon in and of itself can, of course, 
lead to a particular kind of paralysis since it embodies an inherent 
status quo bias. People will of course seek out uncomplicated gains, 
but if a path also poses a risk, people will, on average, show a 
relatively high degree of loss aversion.  
There is, however, one important consistent exception, as 
described in Prospect Theory.36 When people are operating in a so-
called domain of losses, when things are bad and look to be getting 
worse, people become much more prone to taking risks, including 
quite dramatic ones, in order to recoup previous losses, and return to 
the former status quo position.   
There are a couple of important caveats in this work. Most 
relevant, people will show the opposite tendency, meaning risk 
aversion in the domain of losses, when probabilities are low. This 
explains, for example, the almost universal acceptance of insurance 
whereby people pay a sure cost to avoid the very small probability of 
a larger loss. But note there that these assessments of likelihood 
typically result from subjective assessments and not necessarily 
objective probability, meaning that people can often misjudge how 
likely a given event may be. This would certainly be especially likely in 
a domain such as cyber-security where the base rate of risk is largely 
unknown as we noted above. While it makes sense that any given 
company or entity may want to keep successful attacks secret, this 
lack of transparency makes it much more difficult for the overall 
community to accurately assess the objective threat and share 
important information on successful defensive strategies. This 
secrecy works to the attackers’ advantage.  Greater dissemination of 
accurate information about kinds and types of attack, even within 
                                                 
91 (1979); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-50 (1984). 
36 Id. 
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closed networks, might allow for the development of more effective 
counter-strategies, or even more effective insurance policies to 
amortize risk across the broader system, even if such allocation were 
restricted to specific sectors or industries.  
In policy terms, this translates into some potentially 
destructive consequences. In short, people are more likely to take 
risks that could make things worse precisely when they are already in 
bad circumstances. This can easily snowball to make things a lot 
worse very quickly. These are the times when caution might be most 
warranted, but is also less likely, particularly in an environment 
permeated by a sense of crisis, time pressure or high stakes. Thus, 
policy makers may prove loath to develop policies to implement if 
disaster strikes when things are going well, for fear of offending 
potential allies and donors, because of distraction from more pressing 
problems at any given moment, or due to general status quo malaise. 
However, once a crisis hits, pressure mounts, and that sense of threat 
and risk is precisely what throws decision makers into a domain of 
loss where the potential for optimal decision making is restricted, and 
in the absence of well-developed and rehearsed standard operating 
procedures, catastrophic losses become much more likely to occur 
simply as a result of momentum. Under such conditions of attack, 
risk acceptance dominates, especially because the crisis itself shifts 
leaders’ perceptions regarding the probability of subsequent attack.  
This entire process may characterize decision-making in any 
number of domains but becomes exacerbated by the uncertainty that 
typically permeates cyber-attacks in particular. Decision making 
under uncertainty often proves difficult. In general, such decisions, 
particularly when time is of the essence, are dominated by a series of 
so-called judgmental heuristics37 which provide useful rules of thumb 
for filling in the blanks when objective probabilities remain unknown. 
Their exact operation remains outside the purview of this discussion 
and can be found elsewhere.38 For our purposes, suffice it to say that 
                                                 
37 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-31 (1974). 
38 See ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (University of Michigan Press, 
1998) (discussing an application to political science). 
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uncertainty, like risk, can systematically restrict optimal decision 
making by encouraging individual leaders to revert to established 
psychological strategies and procedures in decision making that may 
not be well suited for the given problems or challenges they confront. 
Recall that such biases evolved precisely because in most 
circumstances they offer fast and easy and largely accurate responses 
to the world; in other words, they developed precisely because, on 
average, they allow largely accurate estimates in the absence of 
objective information at the lowest cognitive cost. However, it is 
precisely in novel or unusual circumstances, such as those often 
posed by cyber-security challenges, where we might expect the 
systematic operation of such biases to induce predictable biases 
leading to sub-optimal results.  
However, this need not necessarily be the case. Sometimes, 
embracing the wisdom of uncertainty can precipitate unexpected 
creativity in decision-making. Admittedly, this is most likely when the 
decision-making milieu is not riven by time pressures, which is why 
systematic planning prior to crisis becomes essential to avoid the 
more negative consequences of psychological bias in decision 
making.  Conversely, when planning can take place at a time of 
relative security, the acceptance of uncertainty can help generate 
unexpected solutions and opportunities because individuals come to 
see that the standard operating procedures do not properly address 
new challenges which exist in domains divergent from those areas 
which the original procedures were designed to address. For example, 
standard operating procedures designed to respond to a military 
assault on a physical location will not offer much guidance when the 
attack occurs in virtual space, however real the financial, logistical or 
operational consequences of cyber breaches. Therefore, it is precisely 
the inherent uncertainty of the new environment that offers the 
possibility for new and creative responses, but these are only likely to 
emerge under conditions of calm, not under circumstances defined 
by threat and the risk, where loss aversion will dominate, and risky 
choices become more likely. 
Thus, it becomes easy to see how the same pattern of 
unproductive and unresponsive decision-making recurs. When the 
problem is not salient, it is easier not to do anything, but under 
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conditions of threat, risky choices predominate, which may not 
necessarily help future outcomes. As Einstein said, the definition of 
insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a 
different result. However, if we change the approach, and embrace 
the creative possibilities present under conditions of uncertainty in 
times of calm, it may then become possible to harness human 
psychological tendencies in our own favor to develop more creative 
solutions to novel problems. 
III.  SECTION 3 
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power 
and Non-State Actors 
The international system has to adapt to a world that is vastly 
different from that which it was built to manage. Effective cyber 
security policy development and implementation at an international 
level will require bringing nation states together with private 
companies, the technical community, non-governmental 
organizations, and individual hackers. Faced with diffused power 
across many linked entities, decision-making structures and processes 
themselves have to be more adaptable, flexible, bottom-up, and 
resilient. As with many contemporary global challenges, there is a 
need for governance mechanisms unlike those that were used to 
govern the more kinetic international challenges, which dominated 
international relations prior-to and during the 20th century. 
A number of international organizations are attempting to 
take responsibility for various aspects of cyber security policy at the 
international level. For example, in 2014, the United Nation’s 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) called for, 
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in 
the use of information and communication technologies.”39 The 
                                                 
39 International Telecommunications Union [ITU] (2014), Resolution 140 
rev Busan 2014: Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security 
in the use of information and communication technologies, 
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ITU membership brings together governments and the private sector 
(including Sector Members, Associates and Academia) to forge 
agreements on radio communications standards and increasing 
development through greater access to information and 
communication technologies (ICTs).  
The problem for organizations such as the United Nations 
and other international fora is that they either do not or can only 
partially include the diverse state and non-state stakeholders that 
comprise the cyber security field. In addition, their typical programs 
of work have timelines that span many years. In the time it takes to 
complete one cycle, a field like cyber security usually moved on to 
new and more pressing issues.  
One model worth examining more closely is the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has done a good job over the 
past two decades providing a forum in which technical experts and 
organizations can come together to make decisions relating to the 
technical architecture on which the Internet operates. This process 
has been effective because of its open format – anyone can join the 
meetings – its rough consensus system for reaching agreement, and 
the Request for Proposal system, which ensures that all participants 
have an opportunity to make proposals and then debate these 
proposals. These characteristics have resulted in technically robust 
and agreed upon technical standards and outcomes for the Internet.  
B. National – A National Cyber Security Plan 
Following Dörner’s original findings, addressing complex 
problems requires the establishment of an overall plan with clear 
goals, a ‘systems level’ understanding of the environment in which 
the plan will be executed, and iterative revision of the plan in 
response to information updates on the state of play. Components of 
a coherent plan to guide cyber security policy at a national level 
include a long-term strategy with clear goals, milestones, performance 
targets, resources, and responsibilities. 
                                                 
https://www.itu.int/en/action/cybersecurity/Documents/Resolutions/pp-
14_Res. 130.pdf (last visited March 7, 2016). 
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For the first time, as a follow-up to the 30-day ‘cyber sprint’,40 
an operational plan was released on October 30, 2015 to upgrade 
Federal cyber security in the United States. The White House 
Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) was intended, “to 
identify and address critical cyber security gaps and emerging 
priorities, and make specific recommendations to address those gaps 
and priorities.”41 It had 5 overarching objectives: 
• Prioritized identification and protection of high value 
information and assets; 
• Timely detection of and rapid response to cyber 
incidents; 
• Rapid recovery from incidents when they occur and 
accelerated adoption of lessons learned from the Sprint 
assessment; 
• Recruitment and retention of the most highly-qualified 
cyber security workforce talent the Federal Government 
can bring to bear; and 
• Efficient and effective acquisition and deployment of 
existing and emerging technology. 
                                                 
40 After realizing that over 14 million personnel records had been stolen 
from the U.S. government Office of Personnel Management, a 30 day 
‘cybersecurity sprint’ was announced. The goal was to take, “number of steps to 
further protect Federal information and assets and improve the resilience of 
Federal networks”. In tangible terms, some steps included the patching of critical 
vulnerabilities, acceleration of the implementation of multi-factor authentication, 
and tightening of policies and practices for privileged users. Progress reports were 
required after 30 days (The White House, 2015c). What’s extraordinary is that, after 
tens of billions of dollars in prior investment, these basic steps had not yet been 
implemented. 
41 Memorandum from The Executive Office of the President to Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 30, 2015), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-
04.pdf. 
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Each of these 5 objectives was given a set of concrete goals 
linked to the achievement of the objectives. Its timeline clearly laid 
out the steps that had to be taken, and allocated responsibility to the 
respective organizations in order to achieve the stated objectives 
before September 2016.  
This plan was a major first step in a very narrow part of the 
U.S. Federal Government’s efforts to implement basic cyber-security 
measures among selected Federal departments. This approach should 
be replicated to cover cyber-security policy nationally for the public 
and private sectors.  
As a part of the development of this plan, a clearer and less 
contradictory allocation of authority and responsibilities for key 
portions of cyber security policy is required. The announcement of a 
Chief Information Security Officer, who focuses on coordinating 
cyber security across federal agencies, and is housed within the Office 
of Management and Budget at the White House, is a promising first 
step in this direction.42 
However, the announcement of the possibility that the 
Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance responsibilities within 
NSA may be merged, two functions that are in practice contradictory, 
was a possible step in the wrong direction.43 A far better alternative 
would have been to allocate the Signals Intelligence mission to the 
NSA, the government and military Information Assurance mission to 
US Cyber Command (which would have to be led by a different 
person than the head of the NSA), and the private sector 
Information Assurance mission allocated to where it resides at 
present with the Department of Homeland Security (with the Chief 
Information Security Officer potentially playing an oversight or 
coordination role). Such an arrangement would have avoided the 
                                                 
42 Danny Yadron, White House seeks its first ever chief information officer, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb 
/09/white-house-seeks-first-chief-information-security-officer-hackers-
cybersecurity-hacking. 
43 Danny Yadron, NSA merging anti-hacker team that fixes security holes with 
one that uses them, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2016/feb/03/nsa-hacker-cybersecurity-intelligence. 
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prior conflict of interest by separating the offensive capabilities, by 
housing them in the Department of Defense, from the defensive 
capabilities, by housing them in the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
C. Organizational 
 1. Improving the Evidence Base.  
More robust evidence would contribute greatly to better 
cyber security policy and filling the chronic lack of technical 
knowledge that has emerged in Federal agencies.  Creating a 
mechanism where private companies are required to report breaches 
while ensuring the secrecy of such information might go far toward 
creating a more comprehensive data base, while assuring such firms 
that their leaks would not risk unnecessary public distrust or the 
exposure of proprietary code or information.  
There needs to be standard definitions for what cyber security 
budget spending actually constitutes and agreed measures for the 
results or outcomes of these budget items. This is necessary so that 
money nominally allocated to ‘cyber security’ is not used for other 
purposes merely because its meaning can be easily morphed; the 
result of a policy produced through such aggregation would be hap-
hazard at best, lacking integration and overall strategy. This is akin to 
asking for the input and output measures for cyber security policies. 
With these measures in hand, the outcomes of cyber security policy 
interventions can be evaluated.  
Of all fields, development economics might have tools for 
potential use in testing cyber security policy interventions. For 
instance, the logical framework approach (log-frames) has been used 
for decades to design interventions in many complex fields (e.g. 
agriculture, education, health) by identifying goals, tying actions to 
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those goals, and then evaluating the intervention according to pre-
established metrics.44  
Borrowing from the medical field, development economics 
and development aid organizations have some well-developed tools 
and principles for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions in 
complex systems.45 Participants are randomly allocated to one of two 
groups, only one of these groups is given the intervention, and then 
the differences between the groups post-intervention are measured 
so as to determine its effectiveness or efficiency. However, as with 
the human body, the Internet is a large network, meaning that 
changes in one place may affect other parts of the system in 
unintended or unanticipated ways, and attention to such feedback 
loops remains an important part of not making things worse by 
providing a series of bandages that do nothing to stop the bleeding 
(or to prevent later problems such as infections).  
Lessons from this field could be drawn and deployed to give 
cyber security policy makers a toolkit with which to classify their 
budget items in a consistent way (the inputs). This then allows 
measures of the effects of these policies across metrics like the 
number of breaches per year, or the proportion of designated high-
value information that is encrypted, or any measure that is deemed 
appropriate (the outputs) to be developed, and used to adjust, 
eliminate or add various program elements to improve performance. 
2. Specialized Track for Technical Talent. 
To improve the level of technical talent in cyber security roles 
within government agencies, a specialized track for this talent – 
                                                 
44 See D. McLean, The Logical Framework In Research Planning And Evaluation 
1-11 (ISNAR, Working Paper No. 12, 1988); see also Guidance on using the revised 
Logical Framework, DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/253889/using-revised-logical-framework-external.pdf. 
45 See Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the 
Evaluation of Development Effectiveness, http://economics.mit.edu/files/2785 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2016); see also Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental 
Approach to Development Economics, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 151, 151-78 (2009). 
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subject to different working conditions and hiring requirements than 
typical positions – is one avenue worth exploring. Indeed, as part of 
the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP), a $62 million 
educational fund was created, “for Americans who wish to obtain 
cybersecurity education and serve their country in the civilian Federal 
government.”46 This was an extension of the already-established 
National Science Foundation’s and Department of Homeland 
Security’s CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program and a sort of 
Reserve Officer Training Corps program for new cyber security 
talent.47 Such a program provides long term benefits to recipients as 
well as government agencies as a larger pool of experts is recruited 
and cultivated. 
Other existing initiatives might provide lessons for this or 
other special training initiatives. One might be the US Digital Services 
(USDS), which was originally modeled on the United Kingdom’s 
Government Digital Service. The USDS is housed within The White 
House Office of Management and Budget that brings technical, 
policy and legal professionals and places them in Federal agencies 
where technical talent is lacking. They take a human centered design 
approach to the use of technology to make government departments 
more responsive and accessible to people. They have projects 
running in areas that have been deemed priorities by the Obama 
administration including Veteran’s Affairs, Department of Homeland 
Security (linked to immigration, not cyber security), Social Security 
and the IRS. Their annual budget is partially covered by Congress 
and partly comes from the partner agencies where their members 
work.  
Another model that might be worth emulating is the 
Jefferson Science Fellowship Program. This program has existed 
since 2003 and allows tenured, or similarly ranked, academic 
scientists, engineers and physicians from U.S. institutions of higher 
learning to spend one year in Washington D.C. at the U.S. 
                                                 
46 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 24. 
47 See Sean Gallagher, Obama wants you to join CyberCorps Reserve to help feds 
get their act together, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 9, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/02/obama-wants-you-join-the-cybercorps-reserve-to-help-feds-get-
their-act-together/. 
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Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). A similar program might be developed for 
cyber security talent, in U.S. higher education establishments or even 
private sector companies (given that some of the best talent resides in 
the financial sector), to do a yearlong service in government agencies 
where their technical talent or specialized knowledge could be used to 
improve the organization’s cyber security or strategy in this area. 
Such a program might also potentiate important and on-going social 
networks between government and technical experts, and allow each 
to achieve a greater understanding of the other’s needs, incentives, 
goals and constraints.  
Each of these programs may not be able to compete 
financially with the private section, but by harnessing existing talent, 
supporting emerging talent, and trying to attach service and prestige 
to government work, such strategies can help to improve the current 
reservoir of skill within existing agencies.  
D. Individual 
Of course, the structural incentives identified can be shifted 
through organizational changes to induce greater compliance and 
attention to issues surrounding cyber security, including enhanced 
transparency and improved integration and communication across 
agencies tasked with different but overlapping goals. But ultimately 
the causal agents within any organization are individuals who remain 
subject to the inherent psychological biases we discussed above.  
1. Transparently Structured Choices and Consequences.  
It is not easy, but there are some standard ways to reduce 
individual’s susceptibility to such biases.48 First among these is simply 
to make people aware of the unconscious biases that may affect their 
judgment and decision-making. The simplest way to do this is not 
through complicated, time-consuming, expensive training programs 
during which people zone out. Rather, the idea is to make sure that 
                                                 
48 See supra note 35, at Id. 
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choices are structured in a transparent way so that such biases 
become evident. For example, in the classic experiment where people 
had to make real life choices between radiation and surgery for 
cancer, options were presented with “mortality” and “survival” 
statistics side by side. When this is done, the equivalency of the 
options becomes immediately evident, but the psychological pull 
across framing also remains obvious. In a similar manner, choices 
between options in response to a particular threat should present 
both the costs and benefits of options side by side, not only for the 
relevant choices, as is often typically done, but also relative to the 
status quo (i.e. doing nothing) option so that costs and consequences 
of inaction become as immediately salient as those associated with 
any given course of action.  
Because people are preternaturally preoccupied with loss, it is 
important to find ways to convey not only probabilities, but also help 
people to better understand how to psychologically calibrate the 
meaning of abstract probabilities. The human mind does not do well 
with very large numbers; we are all aware of the phenomenon of 
“crisis fatigue” whereby one dead boy on a beach is a tragedy but 
hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring into Europe from Syria is 
an immigration challenge that provokes border controls and political 
hostility.   
These numeracy challenges can play out in myriad ways. One 
of the best ways to help decision makers contemplate very large data 
breaches is to encourage strategies or procedures for transforming 
such issues into very direct and small scale terms. Human psychology 
is much better suited for solving smaller scale problems; it is much 
easier for people to get a handle on and contemplate how to respond 
in a constructive way to challenges that are framed in local terms. So, 
for example, we can worry about threats to the electrical grid but the 
initial policy problem that needs to be solved and addressed might be 
better facilitated if it was framed in terms of how to get electricity 
back up in Washington, D.C. without cyber capacity, and then scale 
up from these more local decisions to national policy plans.  
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2. Training through Gaming and other Table-Top Simulations for 
Emotion Regulation. 
 Importantly, as much as the Western canon has taught 
professionals to privilege rationality over emotion, rationality as 
posited by economists in particular is little more than an intellectual 
construct completely devoid of psychological reality. Psychological 
rationality is deeply emotional by design; the human mind privileges 
emotional information since that is what has been key to survival in 
the face of myriad threats over millennial time. This means that 
people are exquisitely sensitive to emotional inputs, perhaps overly so 
in modern contexts, but as with loss aversion, we are more attentive 
to negative emotions such as fear and anger than more positive ones 
such as hope and joy.   
Negative emotions, while important and useful for helping us 
to properly allocate energy and attention, and also to consolidate 
memory, can nonetheless encourage over-reactions to threats and 
attacks, especially uncertain ones that pose an ambiguous or 
uncertain risk. Encouraging training for emotion regulation would be 
time and money well spent to reduce the risk of over-reaction to 
uncertain or threatening stimuli. Enormous amounts of evidence 
now exist documenting the benefits of mindfulness based stress 
reduction strategies in achieving such goals.49 
Moreover, this is a domain in which gaming and other table-
top simulations positing different kinds of threats and crises could 
prove helpful in giving people an engaging, even fun, way to gain 
practice, experience and knowledge about potential response options 
to any given scenario. Such strategies also work to build a sense of 
community and camaraderie among those who would have to work 
together in a real crisis. In this way, issues of dominance, 
specialization of labor and other issues which can interfere with 
effective, time-sensitive responses, can be negotiated prior to the 
actual crisis, so that when real challenges emerge, team coordination 
and cooperation can be as smooth as might reasonably be expected.   
                                                 
49 See P.R. Goldin & J.J. Gross, Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction 
(MBSR) on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder, 10 EMOTION 83, 83-91 (2010). 
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IV.  SECTION 4 
Research will be required to translate many of the proposals 
made in the section above into the cyber security policy field. This 
section outlines a research agenda that is intended to provide some 
guidance on the kinds of research questions that might profitably be 
pursued and the research methods that might help yield useful 
answers.  
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power 
and Non-State Actors 
An examination of governance models that have either been 
designed to coordinate diffuse entities, or that have proven to be 
successful in coordinating diffuse entities, would be a useful step 
forward in determining a global governance model for cyber security 
policy. This paper has already mentioned the IETF as a model that 
has proven successful in the past for managing technical matters 
related to the Internet globally.  
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from global 
governance models in other areas of public health policy, such as the 
World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control, or 
in conflict mitigation and resource sharing, such as the Arctic 
Council, or in the establishment of international law, such as the 
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea? 
A comparative examination of these varied arrangements 
would look at the types of parties involved, the mechanisms by which 
decisions are made and consensus is achieved, the cost of setting up 
and maintaining the mechanism (and by whom this cost is borne), the 
success of the mechanism in achieving its stated objectives, and the 
reasons for failure should failure be experienced.  
One of the challenges with devising a new set of governance 
strategies with the flexibility and adaptivity that would allow both 
state and non-state actors, including businesses, to engage is that the 
Internet itself, as a network of networks, and the World Wide Web, 
run contrary to most established forms of government structure, 
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which are hierarchical in nature. While originally hailed as a 
mechanism to survive and enhance resilience in the case of nuclear 
war, and later as a means by to encourage and facilitate greater 
democratic involvement, the Internet also provides a platform where 
individuals with very few resources can exert almost unprecedented 
damage and destruction. This structure challenges those who wish to 
provide an interface between hierarchical and horizontal governance 
structures to offer a different kind of structure. 
One kind of structure that might potentially be considered 
involves the notion of panarchy as developed by Buzz Holling and 
colleagues50 in their work on environmental sustainability. This work 
developed out of examining how systems in nature achieve balance 
across large systems over time. In this concept, three factors of 
capacity, connectedness and resilience emerge most prominent.  
The Internet itself offers almost limitless potential for 
connectedness and great potential for resilience, but this framework 
raises stark concern about the relative capacity of predator and prey. 
However, this is where another biological model might prove useful 
and instructive. Well-established equations such as the Lotka-
Volterra51 which characterizes the predator-prey dynamic would allow 
similar mathematical modeling of the dynamic interaction between 
hackers, governments and the businesses who try to survive and 
thrive in cyber space. Although originally developed in a biological 
context to represent the impact of disease and competition among 
animals as a function of numbers, time and rates of interaction to 
measure prospects for survival or extinction, it has long been used in 
                                                 
50 C.S. Holling, Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social 
systems, 4 Ecosystems 390, 390-405 (2001); Brian Walker et al., Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems, 9 Ecology and Soc’y (2004). 
51 A.J. Lotka, Contribution to the Theory of Periodic Reaction, 14 J. OF 
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 271, 271-74 (1910); A.J. Lotka, Analytical Note on Certain 
Rhythmic Relations in Organic Systems, 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
OF THE U.S. 410, 410-15 (1920); A.J. LOTKA, ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL BIOLOGY, 
71-274 (Williams and Wilkins, 1925); VITO VOLTERRA, VARIATIONS AND 
FLUCTUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN ANIMAL SPECIES LIVING 
TOGETHER (R.N. Chapman ed., 1931). 
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economics to model interaction of sectors in industries as well,52 and 
could readily be adapted for use in the context of cyber competition. 
It has more recently been used successfully to characterize the 
maintenance of cultures of honor in environments with aggressive 
actors and weak institutions, a condition not unlike the current state 
of Internet governance. 
This model offers important insight because although it 
makes a number of important simplifying assumptions, it also 
highlights how the evolution of predator and prey influence each 
other. In an evolutionary context, predators select for characteristics 
that will enhance their ability to find and capture prey, just as prey 
select for traits that increase their ability to hide, escape or otherwise 
evade predation. These selection features influence the oscillation 
dynamics of each side in the equation, precipitating cycles of 
dominance, but because the goals of predator and prey are 
antagonistic, the selection of mutually antipathetic characteristics 
profoundly affects the dynamics of their interaction as well as 
prospects for survival. These biological models, which exist in well-
developed differential equations, and have already been used to 
positive effect in economics, offer concrete ways to examine the 
interaction between hackers and defenders, regardless of which sides 
governments or businesses may be on.  
B. A National Cyber Security Plan 
The first step in developing a national cyber security plan 
requires examining what has been done in other countries in the past, 
as well as seeking to develop innovative solutions for our own 
particular needs and goals. To date, there is limited comparative 
literature on the national cyber security plans deployed in countries 
such as Singapore’s 5 year National Cyber Security Masterplan, the 
United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy, and Canada’s 
Cyber Security Strategy, among many others. 
                                                 
52 R.M. Goodwin, A Growth Cycle, in SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (C.H. Feinstein ed., 1967). 
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Comparing the success of other country’s plans - which have 
clear goals, action plans, metrics for success, timelines and 
responsible agencies - would allow for a comprehensive plan to be 
written in the United States that learns from the successes and 
failures of others (rather than repeating any recognized mistakes).  
C. Specialized Track for Technical Talent 
The first step in considering new policy proposals should be a 
pre-feasibility study based on cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit 
analysis would look at the financial cost, both to the host 
organization that would pay for the awardee’s stipend, and to the 
organization from which the awardee is seconded. It then becomes 
possible to compare this dollar amount to the benefits that would 
accrue to the host organization and to the alternative policy option of 
training or hiring talent from scratch. If the costs outweigh the 
benefits by a certain ratio, then this policy option may not be worth 
pursuing.  
The point of comparing this specialized track to training or 
hiring from scratch is important. The major strength of creating a 
specialized track for bringing technical talent into government for the 
short-term, vis-à-vis the current approach, which is epitomized by 
proposals to hire 6,000 ‘cyber warriors’ into DoD or 1,000 new 
personnel into OPM, is that it is will not run into the practical 
resource constraints that are going to face these other proposals 
(namely: that there simply aren’t enough qualified people in work 
force to hire at this level for the medium-term). Indeed, a cost-
benefit analysis will likely find that the cost effectiveness of a 
specialized track is many times less than the alternative, which would 
have the added benefit of freeing up funds to be used for other 
initiatives with the goal of bolstering cyber security.  
D. Improving the Evidence Base 
Compiling transparent, reliable, and statistically rigorous 
cyber security statistics would contribute to better decisions in cyber 
security policy. The problem to date has been that this responsibility 
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has been taken on either by organizations with a stake in stoking 
greater fears about cyber security (e.g. anti-virus companies and 
private security vendors) or with organizations that lack the requisite 
statistical capacity to provide reliable data (e.g. the FBI’s Internet 
Crime Complaint Center). 
This is typical practice in the U.S., where statistics are 
compiled by organizations responsible for the regulation of the sector 
or administration of the sector (e.g. the Federal Aviation Authority 
compiles aviation data, similarly the National Center for Health 
Statistics operates under the Centers for Disease Control). Assigning 
a disinterested party with sufficient statistical capacity and credibility 
to provide an independent assessment of the scale of the problem 
could prove very helpful for beginning to design programs to help 
address these issues. Could the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology play a role, either as a convener or as an authority to 
grant some authority to cyber security data? 
When randomized control trials were applied from medicine 
to the development economics field in the late 1990s, there was a 
need to develop a specialized methodology to respond to the unique 
logistical and ethical issues that arise in international development 
work. Adjustments to randomized control trial methodologies will 
likewise have to be made to adapt them to the unique characteristics 
of cyber security. 
For instance, it isn’t clear how comparable control and 
treatment groups might be identified or separated when so many 
network elements differ across organizations (indeed, even within 
organization the elements are likely to differ). The rate at which the 
technology changes and software is patched might also make it 
difficult to keep the two groups separate and, within the groups, 
maintain consistency across subjects (then again, many organizations 
run on legacy systems that are 10 years old, so this might not be such 
a great obstacle depending on the organization). This might imply 
that the studies might only be able to be conducted at the 
organization-level, though we simply don’t know yet.  
An assessment of the costs of running an experiment would 
be useful. The costs of randomized control trials in cyber security 
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may not be cost-effective. The up-front costs to actually run the 
experiments may not be overwhelming, especially considering the 
multi-billion dollar budgets being allocated at a national level, but the 
cost associated with the losses to the control group may accrue over 
time and offset the potential gains from the experiment (then again, 
given that attackers only need to infiltrate one out of potentially 
thousands of users to compromise a system, perhaps the risk levels 
remain the same whether undertaking an experiment or not, although 
the cost may not).  
A taxonomy of cyber security ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ would 
also have to be developed in order to undertake an experiment. 
Accurate measures for the effects of treatment would also need to be 
developed and established. The goal would be to determine which 
metrics exist and can be reliably measured, or which ones might have 
to be created, in order to measure effectively the various policy 
interventions that could be made to reduce certain cyber security 
risks.  
E. Developing Gaming and Other Table-Top Simulations 
There is a long and established body of work on gaming and 
table-top simulations for crisis situations, even in cyber security. 
Indeed, a recommendation during a panel on mitigating cyber 
security threats at a recent conference at Columbia University was 
that, “simulations, war/business games, and table-top exercises can 
provide additional venues for information sharing and help build 
trust between participants, which can be helpful in crisis 
situations.”53  
Indeed, this is where using the intrinsic strengths of the 
industry itself may be able to potentiate innovative methods for 
training and testing; the use of simulations can prove enormously 
helpful by providing a way to control for many elements while 
                                                 
53 Proceedings of the Conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security, 
COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L AND PUB. AFF. (May 14, 2015), 
https://sipa.columbia.edu/system/files/Proceedings_ColumbiaSIPA_InternetGov
erance_Cybersecurity_Conference2015.pdf. 
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varying one, and being able to do so across many diverse elements 
quickly, either simultaneously or sequentially. Once problematic areas 
are identified using this strategy, more elaborate real time 
experiments can be conducted manipulating potentially problematic 
aspects. Any such simulations could be easily conducted using 
existing Internet based platforms which allow for multi-user 
simultaneous interaction. 
Where new research might be especially useful is in the 
development of methods that combine psychological training and 
emotion regulation training with simulations. The idea would be to 
run through the several stages that comprise risk-based approaches to 
cyber security, such as the NIST Risk Management Framework, so as 
to identify where the failure to successfully implement the framework 
occurs due to panic or individual biases and heuristics, and then 
address these sources of failure.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
We have described the factors that we believe influence 
decision making in the area of cyber security across four main levels 
of analysis: international; national; organizational; and individual. 
Each poses unique challenges to the development of a coherent and 
consistent policy of cyber security.  
After describing what has been done to enhance cyber 
security at each level, and noting the challenges that remain, we have 
suggested some important ways in which policy and research might 
advance policy in more productive ways. These include: establishing a 
coherent national plan with clear and coherent benchmarks and 
policies and plans for implementation and accountability; the 
conscious development of different governance structures for 
regulating the Internet internationally; creating a national service 
action plan for recruiting and circulating cyber talent in and out of 
government; providing a more accurate evidence base of past 
experience to improve future response; and establishing regular 
games and simulations to train people in how to respond to differing 
potential threats.  
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Enhancing cyber security is a critically important project. It 
also appears an overwhelming one on which we have made less 
progress than those who seek to exploit the systems in question. In 
developing systems designed more for overall resiliency than security, 
the architects of the Internet never imagined the widespread use it 
would achieve. However, this resilience has also resulted in 
vulnerabilities that now need to be addressed. It will require a great 
deal of coordinated action on the part of many individuals, users, 
industry and government actors to improve cyber security without 
compromising privacy unduly. Working diligently and creatively to 
achieve such a goal will help make everyone safer and more 
productive. 
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Cybersecurity in the financial sector is of paramount importance. Due to significant cyber 
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Unfortunately, at least some of the rules need serious improvement. In particular, the proposed 
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firm’s cybersecurity program meets the proposal’s requirements. Those submitting the 
certification could be held individually liable if the organization’s cybersecurity program is 
deficient. This liability includes civil and criminal penalties.  
However, this contrasts with NYDFS’s rule regarding anti-money laundering (“AML”) and 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) transaction monitoring and filtering programs. 
Under those rules, there are no criminal penalties for individual directors. Because recent 
developments in financial institutions suggest that AML policy and cybersecurity policy are 
significantly intertwined and are not easily separable; to track consistency with developments in 
federal law pertaining to individual liability in corporations; and to maintain consistency and 
clarity in the law, the NYDFS should, where appropriate, allow its regulators to pursue 
criminal liability against individuals. 
 
                                                 
* Associate, Taylor English Duma LLP, Atlanta, Georgia 
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(CAMS). The author would like to thank his family and friends for their support, as 
well as Cam Piasecki for his commentary and revisions. 
 
MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Dixon 5:1 
73 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 74 
II.    BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 77 
A. Corporate criminal liability for individuals ........................ 77 
B. Cyber-Attacks ....................................................................... 82 
C. Money Laundering ............................................................... 85 
III.  THE RULE, INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE LIABILITY, AND 
SUGGESTIONS .............................................................................. 93 
IV.  SUGGESTIONS AND RATIONALE .................................................104 
A. Changing the language of the statute but not the 
underlying enforcement mechanism is unresponsive 
to concerns and only confuses firms trying to comply 
with the rule ........................................................................105 
B. Uniform Language as a Response to Dual Corporate 
Officer Liability Loopholes ...............................................106 
C. The Yates Memorandum & Creating a 
Comprehensive Model ......................................................107 
V.  THE NEW RULE ............................................................................108 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................110 
 
 
 
 
  
MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
74 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Everyday hackers attack financial institutions for a variety of 
motives. Some hackers target financial institutions for money, others, 
for “the lulz.” Still, others hack financial institutions for political 
motivations because by doing so, they may cause damage to the 
global economy.  
In any of these scenarios the potential for damage is 
significant. For example, in 2013 a Kiev ATM began randomly 
dispensing money throughout the day.1 When a Russian 
cybersecurity firm began to investigate, they discovered that the ATM 
was only the tip of the iceberg: malware had severely penetrated the 
bank’s computers, even sending back video feeds of employees 
conducting routine tasks throughout the day.2 The criminal group – 
comprised of Chinese, Russians, and Europeans – were then able to 
impersonate bank officers, turn on various cash machines, and 
transfer millions of dollars from banks throughout the world into 
dummy accounts.3   
The largest financial institution hack in U.S. history highlights 
the damages a hack can cause.  The United States Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York charged Gery Shalon, Joshua 
Samuel Aron, and Ziv Orenstein in a 23-count indictment in 
November of 2015.4 In addition to charging the men with securities 
fraud and money laundering, the indictment alleged that the men had 
stolen the personal information of more than 100 million 
customers.5 As these examples demonstrate, cybersecurity in the 
financial sector is of paramount importance. 
Due to these attacks, along with other significant cyber 
intrusions affecting some of the world’s biggest banks, the New 
                                                 
1 David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank Hackers Steal Millions via Malware, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/ 
world/bank-hackers-steal-millions-via-malware.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. v. Shalon, Aaron, and Orenstein, No. 15-cr-333 (S.D. N.Y. 2015). 
5 Id. 
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York’s Department of Financial Services [hereinafter “NYDFS”] 
proposed regulations6 requiring banks and insurance companies to 
establish cybersecurity programs and designate an internal 
cybersecurity officer in September of 2016.7 These regulations were 
the result of years of research that probed weaknesses in financial 
institutions and then asked for feedback from those institutions 
regarding their efforts to strengthen their cybersecurity regimes. The 
results established the groundwork for the basic regulations, subject 
to a public comment period that closed in November of 2016. The 
rules became effective on March 1st, 2017. 
Described as a “first-in-the-nation” effort,8 the regulations 
will only affect banks and other financial services providers in New 
York; nevertheless, only is a relative term. Given New York’s outsized 
influence on the financial services industry the rules will set a 
precedent for cybersecurity within financial institutions, and, both 
state and federal regulators may use the rules as a framework for their 
own cybersecurity rules and regulations. Thus, it is important that the 
NYDFS set a rigorous, clear standard that reflects reality and assesses 
liability where appropriate. 
Unfortunately, the NYDFS has unintentionally created a 
conflict amongst their rules. The cybersecurity regulations require 
either the chairperson of the board or a senior officer certify the 
firm’s cybersecurity program meets the proposal’s requirements in an 
annual certification.9 Those submitting the certification can be held 
                                                 
6 Hereinafter, unless specified otherwise, the terms “regulations” or “the 
regulations” should be assumed to be referring to the DFS’s proposed regulations 
discussed here.  
7 Sanger & Pelroth, supra note 2. 
8 Governor Cuomo, Press Release, Governor Cuomo Announces Proposal of First-
in-the-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation to Protect Consumers and Financial Institutions, 
OFFICIAL NEWS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (September 13, 2016), 
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-
proposal-first-nation-cybersecurity-regulation-protect-consumers-and [hereinafter 
“Governor Cuomo Press Release”]. 
9 23 NYCRR 500: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services 
Companies, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS., Section 500.00 (Feb. 2017), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/rf23-nycrr-
500_cybersecurity.pdf.  
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individually liable if the organization’s cybersecurity program is 
deficient.10 This liability includes civil and criminal penalties.11 Such a 
program is often standard in today’s corporate culture. 
This rule conflicts with NYDFS’s rule regarding anti-money 
laundering [hereinafter “AML”] and Office of Foreign Assets Control 
[hereinafter “OFAC”] transaction monitoring and filtering programs. 
Under the AML and OFAC rules, there are no explicit criminal 
penalties for individual directors, nor is there an annual certification 
procedure.12 As it follows, a situation could arise where a director 
would not be liable under the AML rule, but would be liable under 
the cybersecurity rule.  
While such a discrepancy in the rules may not seem 
important, in the context of financial institutions, data breaches and 
money laundering often go hand-in-hand, as demonstrated by the 
above example. Indeed, given the broad scope of money laundering 
laws, money laundering is almost guaranteed to occur in a data 
breach of a financial institution, even if the theft only amounts to a 
penny. But that is not the only reason why cybersecurity and AML 
rules regarding certification should harmonize. Recent developments 
in U.S. corporate liability law at the federal level may very well 
influence individual corporate liability at the state level. Thus, the 
NYDFS should, where appropriate, allow its regulators to pursue 
criminal liability on both individuals, and the corporation.  This will 
create clarity in the law; reflect the reality of intertwined AML and 
cybersecurity policies and close a loophole; and will track federal legal 
developments. 
Part II of this article will briefly explain the background of 
modern individual corporate liability, cybersecurity, and money 
laundering. In Part III, the proposed rules will be examined and 
                                                 
10 Id. at 500.20. 
11 Id. at 500.20. 
12 See generally NYDFS Issues Final Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rule, 
DEBEVOISE PLIMPTON (Jul. 6, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media 
/files/insights/publications/2016/07/20160706_nydfs_issues_final_anti_money_l
aundering_and_sanctions_rule.pdf (discussing final changes to AML rule, including 
removal of compliance rule and threat of criminal penalties). 
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explained. As we will see, AML and cybersecurity are so intertwined 
that it does not make sense to have different standards for what is 
quickly becoming the same group. In Part IV, this author will 
propose a modification in accordance with New York corporate 
liability law that reflects the reality of AML and cybersecurity policy. 
Part V, consists of the author’s closing remarks. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
A. Corporate criminal liability for individuals 
New York is the birthplace of corporate criminal liability. In 
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States,13 the 
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether Congress had 
acted constitutionally when, via the Elkins Act, legislators imputed 
criminal liability to a common carrier where any agents and officers 
of a common carrier granted an illegal rebate.14 The Court held that 
Congress could subject a corporation to criminal punishment solely 
on the basis of an agent’s conduct because the Court saw “no valid 
objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the 
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act 
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable.”15   
Corporate criminal liability law has existed in some capacity in 
New York since at least 1948.16 In those days, the state of New York 
imposed a $5,000 fine for a corporation convicted of a felony that 
would lead to imprisonment.17 At the time, case law suggested that 
                                                 
13 New York Central R Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For an 
excellent discussion of this case and modern corporate criminal liability, see Andrew 
Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 INDIANA 
L. J. 411, 420-421 (2013) (discussing New York Central). 
14 Id. at 421. 
15 N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495. 
16 See Corporate Criminal Liability in New York, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 794 (1948) 
(“under the present state of law, a corporation may be liable for almost any crime 
perpetrated in connection with corporate activities.”). 
17 Id. at 794. 
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directors, officers, or employees acting within the scope of their 
authority could render a corporation criminally liable.18   
It was around this time that a theory began to form of 
holding individuals in corporations accountable for crimes. During 
the Nuremberg trials after World War II, Justice Robert Jackson, 
Chief Counsel for the United States at Nuremberg, stated during the 
trial of industrialist Gustav Krupp that, “the great industrialists of 
Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in this indictment quite as 
much as its politicians, diplomats, and soldiers.”19 Other cases 
followed involving industrialists committing war crimes through their 
corporations.20 Still, with the exception of acts constituting war 
crimes,21 or blatant statutory violations such as securities fraud, for 
decades prosecuting individuals for crimes committed in connection 
with their work at a corporation was uncommon.  
H. David Kotz, former Inspector General at the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and current Managing Director of the 
Berkeley Research Group, has two theories on why this has occurred. 
First, historically, companies were much more likely to engage in a 
settlement process with the government, whereas individuals who 
faced prison time were much more likely to fight any charges. A 
recalcitrant individual is not preferable to a prosecutor, who 
unfortunately tends to be overworked and is trying to resolve a case 
                                                 
18 Id. at 795 (citing, e.g., People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 
N.E. 2d 30 (1940) (illegal practice of law); People v. Woodbury Dermatological 
Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908) (illegal practice of medicine); People v. 
Globe Jewelers Inc. 249 App. Div. 122, 291 N.Y. Supp. 362 (1st Dep’t 1936) 
(treasurer of the corporation sent out a fake form, simulating a court order)) 
(footnote omitted). 
19 Chatham House, What Are the Relevant Legal Principles Relating to the 
Responsibility of Companies and CEOs for Violations of International Criminal Law? (2012). 
20 Id. 
21 See Rule 156, Definition of War Crimes, Int’l. Comm. Of Red Cross 
(defined as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an 
armed conflict not of an international character,”), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2017). 
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as quickly as possible.22 Secondly, and on a related note, corporations 
do not face the negligence or intent requirement that individuals face 
in criminal prosecutions, nor is there a priority for cases that are 
novel, challenging, and difficult to prove, which shifted enforcement 
away from individuals and instead towards more obvious corporate 
conduct with a lower evidentiary threshold.23  
Yet, because of a flurry of disastrous financial events ranging 
from Enron’s collapse to the financial meltdown of 2008, the 
enforcement approach utilized by agencies has changed dramatically 
in the past decade. For years critics argued that the Department of 
Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”] and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission [hereinafter “SEC”] were not doing much to bring civil 
and criminal cases against parties involved in the 2008 financial 
crisis.24 For example, in 2013 Jed Rakoff, U.S. District Court Judge of 
the Southern District of New York – no stranger to fraud trials 
prosecuted by the SEC –, complained that the government was not 
holding individuals responsible for massive frauds, “speak[ing] greatly 
to weaknesses in our prosecutorial system.”25  
This sentiment set the stage for a memorandum from Deputy 
Attorney General Sally Yates in September 2015 that outlines a new 
DOJ policy regarding individual liability in corporate contexts, which 
came to be known as the “Yates Memo.”26 Since the memo, the DOJ 
has increasingly imposed criminal and civil liability for individuals 
conducting corporate misconduct.27 This policy also requires 
                                                 
22 Berkeley Research Paper, https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/content/ 
dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/white-paper/yates-memo-background-and-
its-impact-white-paper.pdf (registration required). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (quoting Nate Raymond, Judge Criticizes Lack of Prosecution against Wall 
Street Executives for Fraud, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/financial-judge-idUSL2N0IX1B620131113.  
26 Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Sally Q. Yates, 
Department of Justice, Sept. 9, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/ 
download. 
27 Roberto J. Gonzalez & Jessica S. Carey, The Government’s Making AML 
Enforcement Personal, NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 22, 2016), available at https://www. 
paulweiss.com/media/3359752/gonzalez_carey__nlj_022216.pdf.  
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companies to provide “all” relevant facts about “all” individuals 
involved in wrong doing, regardless of “position, status, or seniority,” 
in order for the company to get any kind of cooperation credit.28   
The election of President Donald J. Trump makes it unclear 
whether the Yates memo will continue to be enforced. A March 8, 
2017 memorandum from United States Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions says that violent crime will be a priority for the United States 
Department of Justice.29 At least one commentator believes that in a 
time of shrinking budgets, a focus on violent crime means a shift 
away from white-collar crime.30 However, as James Connelly of 
Womble Carlyle in Atlanta has pointed out, federal policies change 
slowly.31 Yates herself believes that the priorities laid out in her 
memorandum represent core values of criminal justice and are thus 
not ideological.32 For the purposes of this Article, we will assume that 
the Yates Memo is indicative of a long-term trend in federal 
prosecution. 
Similarly, the federal government has become aggressive in 
pursuing individual wrongdoing in the anti-money laundering 
(“AML”) sector. In Treasury v. Haider, Civil No. 14-CV-9987 
(S.D.N.Y.), the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York (acting on behalf of FinCEN at the United 
States Department of Treasury) issued a 146-page complaint against 
MoneyGram International’s former Chief Compliance Officer, 
Timothy Haider, for the willful failure to implement an effective 
                                                 
28 Yates Memo, https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/ 
download. 
29 Memorandum, available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/ 
documents/world/read-the-memo-sent-by-sessions-on-violent-offenders/2367/. 
30 Bethany McLean, Why White-Collar Crooks May Be Cheering This Sessions 
Memo, YAHOO (Mar. 21, 2017), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-white-collar-
crooks-may-be-cheering-this-jeff-sessions-memo-133115487.html. 
31 James Connelly, Trump Administration Likely to Maintain Yates Memo 
Priorities on Corporate Wrongdoing, WOMBLE CARLYLE (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://www.wcsr.com/Insights/Articles/2017/February/Trump-Administration-
Likely-to-Maintain-Yates-Memo-Priorities-on-Corporate-
Wrongdoing?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=
View-Original. 
32 Id. 
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AML compliance program or properly file suspicious activity reports, 
as required under the Bank Secrecy Act.33 The acts in that case 
occurred in New York, among other places. Haider allegedly failed to 
implement disciplinary or termination policies, contravening legal 
advice provided to Haider.34 Despite the fact that Haider had 
knowledge of the fraudulent activity occurring at MoneyGram by its 
agents and outlets, he continued to allow those agents and outlets to 
conduct the fraud through MoneyGram’s currency transfer system.35 
The complaint also alleges that Haider knew or should have known 
specific agents posed an unreasonable fraud risk, which 
MoneyGram’s Director of AML Compliance called “egregious and 
beyond anyone’s ability to doubt that the agent and knowledge and 
involvement.”36 Nevertheless, Haider did not cut ties with any agents 
or outlets.37 Finally, while Haider was in charge SAR analysts were 
unable to access sufficient information to file SARS because Haider 
kept each department in a separate “silo.”38 Because of this, they 
failed to have a coherent diligence process, and ignored warning signs 
regarding authorizing new agents or outlets.39 Even though the case is 
still ongoing, the thoroughness of the complaint, the magnitude of 
the violations, and the District of Minnesota’s denial of Mr. Haider’s 
claim that only financial institutions themselves are liable for the 
failure to maintain an effective AML program, could all be harbingers 
of the future.40  
In terms of individual liability, in New York, “[a] person is 
criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he 
performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a 
corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in 
his own name or behalf.”41 Although this statute appears to lack a 
                                                 
33 FinCEN Seeks Civil Money Penalty and Injunction Against Former Chief 
Compilance Officer of MoneyGram, FINCEN (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.sidley.com 
/en/news/2015-02_banking_and_financial_services_update (citations omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See generally Gonzalez & Carey, supra note 27. 
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (2016). 
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mens rea requirement, New York adopts the Model Penal Code’s 
definitions for “purposely,” “knowingly,” “willfully,” “recklessly,” 
and “negligently.”42 When a mens rea requirement is not stated in a 
criminal statute, the intent is nevertheless established if the defendant 
acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.43 Thus, corporate criminal 
liability arises when an individual commits an offense purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly. It is unclear whether the New York 
Attorney General (“NYAG”) is prioritizing individual corporate 
liability, as their counterparts in Washington, D.C. are, but given the 
language of New York’s final rules, described infra, as well as New 
York’s reputation as the financial center of the United States, the 
NYAG is likely to follow suit.  
The individual liability is strongest in the cybersecurity rules, 
so our discussion will begin there. 
B. Cyber-Attacks 
Cyber-attacks – “an attack initiated from a computer against a 
website, computer system or individual computer . . . that 
compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the 
computer or information stored on it”44 - are not new.45 Cyber-
attacks take many forms, including: gaining or attempting to gain 
unauthorized access to a computer system; denial of service attacks; 
installation of viruses; and unauthorized use of a computer for 
processing or storing data.46 The first cyber-attack occurred in 1988 
when Robert Tapan Morris – a professor who now works at MIT 
that was convicted for the cyber-attack – introduced the Morris 
                                                 
42 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (2016). 
43 See generally the Model Penal Code. 
44 VINCE FARHAT, BRIDGET MCCARTHY, & RICHARD RAYSMAN, 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, CYBER ATTACKS: PREVENTION AND PROACTIVE 
RESPONSES (2011), available at https://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication 
/bd9553c5-284f-4175-87d2-849aa07920d3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment 
/1880b6d6-eae2-4b57-8a97-9f4fb1f58b36/Cyber-attacksPreventionandProactiveRe 
sponses.pdf. 
45 NATO, The history of cyber attacks – a timeline, available at http://www.nato 
.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm. 
46 Farhat, McCarthy, and Raysman, supra note 44. 
MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Dixon 5:1 
83 
worm to determine the size of the Internet.47 The worm replicated 
itself to multiple computers through weaknesses in the UNIX system, 
and slowed down those computers to the point that they were 
unusable.48   
At first, the most serious cyber-attacks seemed to focus on 
government and military servers. For example, in the 2000s, countries 
as diverse as China, Estonia, and the United States reported hacks on 
various government servers, as well as hacks on private email servers 
belonging to high-ranking officials.49 Nevertheless, by 2010 cyber-
attacks on private websites had become a frequent occurrence.  To 
illustrate, throughout December of 2009 and January of 2010 a group 
calling itself the “Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted both Twitter and 
the Chinese search engine Baidu to redirect users to a site containing 
a political slogan.50 In 2013, some South Korean financial institutions 
reported a cyber infection resembling past cyber efforts by North 
Korea.51  
Indeed, as connectivity throughout the world has increased 
over the last seventeen years, so too has cyber-attacks.52 In 2007, the 
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, an arm of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), reported 12,000 cyber-
incidents. Because DHS defines a cyber-incident as a “violation of an 
explicit or implied security policy,” and provides examples such as 
denials of service, the unauthorized use of a system for processing or 
storing data, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems or 
their data,53 we may infer that cyber-incidents and cyber-attacks are 
functionally similar, if not identical. By 2009, the number of cyber-
incidents had doubled from 2007; in 2012, the number had 
                                                 
47 NATO, supra note 45. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Brian Fung, How Many Cyberattacks Hit the United States Last Year?, 
NEXTGOV (Mar. 8, 2013) http://www.nextgov.com/security/2013/03/how-many-
cyberattacks-hit-united-states-last-year/61775/.  
53 Press Release, Department of Homeland and Security, Report Cyber 
Incidents, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, available at https://www.dhs.gov/how-
do-i/report-cyber-incidents (last accessed Nov. 30, 2016). 
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quadrupled. It is unclear whether this result occurred due to an 
increase in attacks, or due to an increase in detection. Regardless, the 
number of attacks underlines the frequency of cyber-attacks. 
Cyber-attacks can have many effects depending on what 
specific entity is attacked, and the level of the breach. For example, 
energy company BP reports 50,000 attempted cyber-attacks per day.54 
These intrusions can range from something as harmless (albeit 
annoying) as taking down the website to keep web browsers from 
learning more about the company, to a highly-damaging intrusion 
that steals long-term strategy, confidential project-related employee 
emails, or proprietary information regarding a company’s 
manufacturing process. The National Nuclear Security 
Administration, an agency tasked with the military application of 
nuclear science, records 10 million hacks a day.55 Given that the 
National Nuclear Security Administration handles nuclear security for 
the United States and assists the military in determining the 
effectiveness of nuclear weapons,56 a successful cyber-attack on this 
organization could be disastrous to international security.  
Financial institutions can suffer greatly from a cyber-attack. 
For example, in June of 2016 the international consulting firm 
Deloitte published a report outlining 14 business impacts of a cyber-
incident.57   
                                                 
54 Michael Tomaso, BP Fights Off Up to 50,000 Cyber-Attacks a Day: CEO, 
CNBC.Com (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100529483. 
55 Jason Koebler, U.S. Nukes Face Up to 10 Million Cyber Attacks Daily, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2012/03/20/us-nukes-face-up-to-10-million-cyber-attacks-daily.  
56 Our Mission, NAT’L NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN, https://nnsa 
.energy.gov/ourmission. 
57 See Deloitte, Press Release (June 15, 2016)(listing customer breach 
notifications; post-breach customer protection; regulatory compliance; public 
relations/crisis communications; attorney fees and litigation; cybersecurity 
improvements; technical investigations; insurance premium increases; increased 
cost for debt raising; operational disruption or destruction; lost value of customer 
relationships; lost contract revenue; devaluation of trade name; and loss of 
intellectual property). 
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C. Money Laundering 
“Simply put, money laundering is the process of making dirty 
money look clean.”58 That is money laundering in a nutshell, but the 
simplicity of the statement hides the complexity of the crime. For 
example, money laundering is not just about cash; the Financial 
Action Task Force (“FATF”) has demonstrated “that money 
laundering can be achieved through virtually every medium, financial 
institution or business.”59 Though once considered integral only with 
drug trafficking, money laundering is a necessary step in virtually any 
criminal activity yielding profits.60  
Criminals launder money for three reasons. First, it represents 
the lifeblood of the organization allowing members to cover 
expenses, maintain inventories, bribe officials, expand illegal 
enterprises, and finance their lifestyles.61 Second, it would be foolish 
to take money directly from these enterprises for those purposes, as 
law enforcement can easily trace the funds’ origin.62 Third, these 
criminal proceeds can be the target of investigation and seizure.63 
Consequently, criminals have a high incentive to conceal the 
existence of these funds or make illegal proceeds appear legitimate to 
confound law enforcement and continue the criminal enterprise.64  
Generally, money laundering can be divided into three stages: 
(1) placement, (2) layering, and (3) integration. Placement, as the first 
step, is “the physical disposal of cash or other assets derived from 
criminal activity.”65 The funds can be placed into the financial system, 
or they can be placed into casinos, shops, and other businesses.66 
                                                 
58 Study Guide for the ACAMS Certification Examination 13, ASSOC. OF 
CERTIFIED ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SPECIALISTS, (5th ed. 2015). 
59 Id. at 14. 
60 William R. Schroeder, Money Laundering: A Global Threat and the 
International Community’s Response, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1 (FBI, D.C.), 
(May 2001). 
61 Id. at 1. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Schroeder, supra note 60, at 15. 
66 Id. at 15. 
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Layering, the second step, consists of  separating illegal proceeds 
from their source through layers of financial transactions intended to 
conceal the origin of the proceeds.67 Layering “involves converting 
the proceeds of the crime into another form and creating complex 
layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail, source and 
ownership of funds.”68 The final step of the process is integration. In 
integration, money is reintroduced into the economy through various 
methods making it almost impossible for the funds to be traced back 
to their illicit origin.69  
Money laundering affects the economy and society in various 
ways, and while these effects are present in the United States, they 
tend to be more pronounced in emerging markets.70 Consequently, 
emerging markets serve as effective examples when studying the 
consequences of money laundering. The World Bank has identified 
five areas where money laundering affects developing countries:  
1. Increased crime and corruption;  
2. Damaged reputations and international consequences; 
3. Weakened financial institutions; 
4. Compromised economy and financial sector; and  
5. Damaged privatization efforts.71  
Let’s focus on 1, 3, and 4. It should come as no surprise that 
when a country is viewed as a money-laundering haven, criminals are 
likely to go there.72 This in turn generates more crime and 
                                                 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 Id. at 16. 
69 Id. at 18. 
70 John McDowell & Gary Novis, BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, 
U.S. Dep’t of State 7 (May 2001). 
71 Paul Allen Schott, Reference Guide to Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism, THE WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
Section II at II-1 (2006)[hereinafter “The World Bank”]. 
72 Id. at II-2. 
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corruption.73 Finally, it also encourages bribery in functionaries that 
are critical to the economy, including lawyers.74  
Financial institutions face unique threats from money 
laundering because financial transactions can occur instantaneously. 
Typically, the risks faced by financial institutions due to money 
laundering can be categorized as reputational, operational, or legal 
and concentration risks.75 Reputational risk is defined as the risk that 
public perception of a bank’s business practices and associations, 
regardless of their accuracy, will cause a decline in the public’s 
confidence in the institution and its integrity.76 Operational risk is the 
loss potential from inadequate or failed internal procedures, whether 
systems-based or human-based.77 Legal risk is the risk of lawsuits, 
adverse judgments, unenforceable contracts, fines and penalties 
generating losses, increased expenses, or even institution closure.78 
Finally, Concentration risk is the loss potential of a company due to 
credit or loan exposure to borrowers.79 For example, when a bank 
lacks knowledge about a customer, the customer’s business, or the 
customer’s status with other creditors, the Bank has concentration 
risk.80  
                                                 
73 Id. at II-3. 
74 Id. at II-3. Whether lawyers should report a client’s suspicious 
transactions has long been the subject of controversy. See AM. BAR ASSOC., 
STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 463, 
CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY LAUNDERING, & TERRORIST FINANCING (May 
23, 2013) (providing risk-based control measures to assist lawyers in avoiding aiding 
illegal activities “consistent with the Model Rules.”); Joel Schectman, U.S. Lawyers 
Are A Money Laundering Blindspot, Some Argue, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 5:30 A.M. 
ET) (discussing the controversy over whether lawyers in the United States should 
report suspicious transactions as attorneys must do in the European Union); See 
generally Adam K. Weinstein, Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering, 51 DUKE L. J. 
371, 372, 378-386 (1988) (arguing that “subjecting attorneys to criminal and civil 
prosecution violates their clients’ right to counsel, right to counsel of choice, and 
right to effective assistance of counsel.”). 
75 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-4. 
76 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted). 
77 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted). 
78 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted). 
79 Id. at II-5. 
80 Id. at II-5. 
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Many recent cases highlight the dangers financial institutions 
face in money laundering. HSBC’s recent $1.9 billion settlement with 
the United States government is a salient example of how money 
laundering affects financial institutions.81 HSBC “failed to apply 
legally required money laundering controls to $200 trillion in wire 
transfers alone, in only a three year period.”82 In fact, the Bank’s 
inadequacies were so great that the DOJ discouraged HSBC from 
publicizing the incident to avoid further criminal exploitation of 
HSBC’s compliance gaps.83  
Money launderers commonly use “front companies,” which 
appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business, but are controlled 
by criminals.84 Front companies are not concerned with making a 
profit; they are concerned with preserving and protecting illegitimate 
funds.85 Front companies have access to illicit funds that can be used 
to subsidize the front company’s products and services. As a result, 
this makes it difficult for legitimate enterprises to compete with those 
front-companies that need-not rely on the company’s actual revenue 
to continue operations.86 If a criminal organization gets big enough, 
the organization can control entire sectors of the economy, which in 
turn leads to economic instability due to a misallocation of resources 
from “artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices.”87 Front 
                                                 
81 See Heather A. Lowe, Money Laundering & HSBC – How it affects you, 
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 22:01 GMT) (discussed supra and infra). HSBC avoided an 
indictment because state and federal authorities concluded that criminal charges 
would jeopardize the bank and destabilize the financial system. Ben Protess & 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money 
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012 4:10 P.M.) 
82 Id. 
83 James Ball & Harry Davies, HSBC money-laundering procedures “have flaws too 
bad to be revealed,” GUARDIAN (Jun. 5, 2015, 10:10 EDT), http://www.theguardian 
.com/business/2015/jun/05/hsbc-money-laundering-procedures-flaws-too-bad-
to-be-revealed (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
84 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6. 
85 Id. at II-6. 
86 Id. at II-6. 
87 Id. at II-6 (citing John McDowell & Gary Novis, Economic Perspectives, 
U.S. State Dep’t, May 2001). 
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companies can also serve as a tax-evasion vehicle, depriving a country 
of revenue it would have otherwise received.88  
In the United States, organized crime has used pizza parlors 
to launder heroin trafficking proceeds.89 The “Pizza Connection 
Trial” lasted from September 30th, 1985 and ended on March 2nd, 
1987, making it the longest federal criminal trial in the Southern 
District of New York at the time.90 19 defendants in a Mafia group 
ranging from Brazil, Sicily, New York and the Midwest were charged 
in participation of a drug ring trafficking heroin and cocaine, 
laundering tens of millions of dollars through the use of pizza 
restaurants as fronts.91 The case – led by then-federal prosecutor 
Rudolph Giuliani and involving former-prosecutor Louis B. Freeh– 
cost millions of dollars to complete.92 These tens of millions of 
dollars undoubtedly created the distortions mentioned above, and 
ultimately 17 of the defendants were found guilty.93   
In the United States, the methods of money laundering have 
remained stable for the past ten years.94 They can be classified as one 
of the following methods: 
                                                 
88 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6. 
89 John McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and 
Financial Crime, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Dep’t of State, D.C.) (May 2001), at 7, 
http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/ijee0501.pdf (last accessed Mar. 
26th, 2016). 
90 Ralph Blumenthal, Acquitted in “Pizza Connection Trial,” Man Remains in 
Prison, N.Y. Times (Jul. 28, 1988), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/ 
28/nyregion/acquitted-in-pizza-connection-trial-man-remains-in-prison.html. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. To learn more about the Pizza Connection Trial, see generally Shana 
Alexander, THE PIZZA CONNECTION: LAWYERS, MONEY, DRUGS, MAFIA (1988) 
(discussing the trial); see also John Surico, How Mafia Pizzeria Drug Fronts Inspired One 
of the Most Complex Criminal Trials Ever, VICE (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.vice.com/read/how-mafia-pizzeria-drug-fronts-inspired-one-of-the-
most-complex-criminal-trials-ever (“’It was a trial with no end in sight involving a 
billion puzzle pieces,” said [organized crime expert] David Amoruso . . . “all of its 
participants – defendants, lawyers, prosecutors, jurors, and the judge - had to do 
their best not to be driven totally insane.”). 
94 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK 
ASSESSMENT 3 (2015) (“This assessment finds that the underlying money 
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1. Use of cash and monetary instruments in amounts under 
regulatory recordkeeping and reporting thresholds; 
2. Opening bank and brokerage accounts using nominees 
to disguise the identity of the individuals who control the 
accounts; 
3. Creating legal entities without accurate information about 
the identity of the beneficial owner; 
4. Misuse of products and services resulting from deficient 
compliance with anti-money laundering obligations; and 
5. Merchants and financial institutions wittingly facilitating 
illicit activity.95  
By reviewing the above methods, one may notice that all five 
methods relate to financial institutions. These funds derive mainly 
from fraud and drug trafficking.96 Fraud covers a wide range of 
crimes, like healthcare fraud, federal government payments fraud, and 
identity fraud.97 Drug trafficking alone generates an estimated $64 
billion in cash per year.98 Furthermore, recent evidence suggests the 
severance of customer relationships between U.S. banks and Mexican 
money exchangers, commonly known as “casas de cambio,99 “has led 
to increases in the retention and use of drug-related cash, both in the 
United States and internationally, which has “shifted money 
laundering activity from Mexico to the United States.”100  
                                                 
laundering vulnerabilities remain largely the same as those identified in the 2005 
United States Money Laundering Threat Assessment.”) 
95 Id. at 3. 
96 Id. at 2. 
97 Id. at 2. 
98 Id. at 2. 
99 Hannah Stone, US Targets Bank in Mexican Money Laundering Crackdown, 
INSIGHT CRIME, “Exchange houses which are often used by Mexican criminal 
groups to launder funds.” available at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-
analysis/us-targets-bank-in-mexico-money-laundering-crackdown 
100 Id. at 3. 
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 Now, one can also imagine how a criminal, state actor, or 
non-state actor might try and bypass cyber-security protocols to 
commit a crime, and then launder the proceeds of the crime. For 
example, in 2015 a gang of hackers infiltrated more than 100 banks in 
30 countries.101 At the time of the hack, employees were unknowingly 
opening emails that allowed hackers to insert malware.102 This 
malware manipulated the banks’ cyber-security protocols and 
proceeded to and siphon as much as $1 billion directly from the 
banks over a two-year period.103 To cover their tracks the hackers 
layered the proceeds into their own accounts.104   
A further example can be found in a FINRA report from 
February 2016 describing an incident where foreign customers 
considered to be “high-risk” opened four accounts with an online 
firm and engaged in patterns of fraudulent trading through the firm’s 
Direct Market Access (DMA) platform.105 These customers hacked 
other online broker-dealers’ accounts, engaging in a short sale 
schemes that resulted in large profits for the customers’ of the firm 
through their accounts, and losses in the compromised broker-dealer 
accounts.106 FINRA punished the online firm for “failing to establish 
and implement [AML] policies and procedures adequately tailored to 
the firm’s online business in order to detect and cause the reporting 
of suspicious activity; and . . . failing to establish and implement a 
reasonably designed customer identification program to adequately 
verify customer identity.”107  
Curiously, NYDFS has recognized the intersection of AML 
and cyber-security on prior occasions such as when the agency issued 
                                                 
101 Thomas Bock, The Convergence of Anti-Money Laundering and Bank Security, 
K2 Intelligence (Nov. 2015), available at https://www.k2intelligence.com/ 
en/insights/thought-leadership/the-convergence-of-anti-money-laundering-and-
cyber-security.  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 FINRA, REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES (Feb. 2015), available at 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersec
urity%20Practices_0.pdf.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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its BitLicense regulations.108 These regulations required financial 
institutions to have designated compliance personnel and AML 
procedures that are the same as those for institutions handling 
traditional, fiat currency.109  
The United States Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has also started making the 
connection between cyber-security breaches and money laundering 
schemes.110 FinCEN has recently begun to encourage financial 
institutions to include information on cyber-security events or 
breaches on Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”).111 Specifically, the 
guidelines provide guidance for SAR reporting in connection with: 
cyber-enabled crime and cyber events; the inclusion of relevant 
cyber-related information in SARs; encouraging collaboration 
between cybersecurity units and AML units within the same firm; and 
sharing cyber-related information across financial institutions to 
combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and cyber-attacks.112 
The efficacy of linking a cybersecurity event to a SAR is evidenced by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of a SAR to trace $7 million 
dollars from a Florida bank account to criminals in Russia and 
Ukraine that had released a “Zeus” botnet virus to make the 
fraudulent withdrawal.113  
The convergence of opinion between government 
recommendations and consultants in the private sector point to a 
growing consensus that, while AML and cyber-security practices do 
not and cannot have complete overlap in their functions, they do 
have significant overlap in their goals and methods. It would seem 
that two functions within the same organization with significantly 
overlapping missions would have similar regulatory liability when 
                                                 
108 See generally Bock supra note 104. 
109 Id. 
110 Chris Kentours, Cybersecurity and AML: How the Twain Must Meet?, 
FINOPS REPORT (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://finops.co/slider/cybersecurity-
and-aml-how-the-twain-must-meet/. 
111 Id. 
112 Id; See also Clifford Chance PDF (internal citations omitted) (Note that 
the advisory does not change any of the existing laws). 
113 Kentours, supra note 112 at Id. 
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managers in those groups fail to fulfill their duties. As we will see in 
the next section, this is not the case. 
III.  THE RULE, INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE LIABILITY, AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
In 2013, the NYDFS conducted a survey on cyber-security.114 
60 community and regional banks, 12 credit unions, and 82 foreign 
branches and agencies participated in the NYDFS’s questionnaire. 
The questionnaire asked questions about “each participant’s 
information security framework; corporate governance around cyber 
security; use and frequency of penetration testing and results; budget 
and costs associated with cyber security; the frequency, nature, cost 
of, and response to cyber security breaches; and future plans on cyber 
security.”115 NYDFS also met with “depository institutions and 
cybersecurity experts . . . to discuss industry trends, concerns, and 
opportunities for improvement.”116  
NYDFS’s findings discussed management of information 
technology systems; information security frameworks; use of security 
technologies; penetration testing; budget and costs; corporate 
governance; cybersecurity incidents and breaches; and planning for 
the future.117 Most institutions experienced intrusions, and the larger 
the institution, the more likely it was to experience malware and 
phishing attempts.118   
It was further noted that larger institutions were more likely 
to experience financial losses after a cyber-attack.119 These institutions 
were also reported to be more likely to have a cybersecurity plan 
                                                 
114 Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN. 
SERVS. (May 2014), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/dfs_cyber 
_banking_report_052014.pdf. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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instituted than their smaller counterparts.120 Recent examples help 
illustrate this last point. In 2011, more than 300,000 Citibank 
accounts were compromised in a targeted hack.121 In 2012, a cyber-
attack focused on employee login credentials at Bank of America and 
Wells Fargo.122  
An April 2015 update on the NYDFS report focused on 
third-party security service providers, as well as steps taken to 
implement the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of 
Standards and Technology.123 Most of the institutions involved had 
taken or were taking steps to implement NIST principles, but the 
application of those principles varied across institutions.124 Ultimately, 
the report concluded that banks were taking steps to increase 
cybersecurity, although progress varied depending on an institution’s 
size and type.125  
On September 13th, 2016, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo announced “first-in-the-nation” regulations to protect New 
York financial institutions from cyber-attacks.126 In his remarks, 
Governor Cuomo said: 
“New York, the financial capital of the world, is leading the 
nation in taking decisive action to our consumers and our financial 
system from serious economic harm that is often perpetrated by 
state-sponsored organizations, terrorist networks, and other criminal 
enterprises. This regulation helps guarantee the financial services 
                                                 
120 Id. 
121 Banks Likely to Remain Top Cybercrime Targets, SYMANTEC (last accessed 
Nov. 30, 2016), available at https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us 
/enterprise/other_resources/b_Financial_Attacks_Exec_Report.pdf. See also, Press 
Release, CitiGroup Inc., Updated Information on Recent Compromise to Citi 
Account Online for Our Customers, (June 15, 2011), available at 
http://citigroup.com/citi/press/2011/110610c.htm. 
122 Id. 
123 Press Release, NYS Department of Financial Services, Update on Cyber 
Security in the Banking Sector: Third Party Service Providers, NYS DEPARTMENT OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, (April 2015), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/ 
dfs_rpt_tpvendor_042015.pdf [hereinafter “2015 Report”]. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Governor Cuomo Press Release, supra note 8. 
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industry upholds its obligation to protect consumers and ensure that 
its systems are sufficiently constructed to prevent cyber-attacks to the 
fullest extent possible.”127  
The proposed regulation includes proposals designed to 
balance “certain regulatory minimum standards while maintaining 
flexibility so that the final rule does not limit industry innovation and 
instead encourages firms to keep pace with technological 
advances.”128 Although this article is not intended to provide a 
thorough analysis of the components contained within either the 
cyber-security rule, or the AML rule, a brief overview nonetheless 
provides helpful context in regards to the certification rules. 
The cybersecurity program requires every covered entity129 to 
establish and maintain a cybersecurity program to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and the availability of its Information 
Systems,130 which, among other things, means “a discrete set of 
electronic information resources organized for the collection, 
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of electronic 
information.”131 Covered entities are to implement and maintain a 
written cybersecurity policy setting forth policies and procedures in 
order to protect Information Systems and private information stored 
on those systems. The minimum policy standards require covered 
entities to address: 
1. Information security;  
2. Data governance and classification;  
3. Access controls and identity management;  
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 “[A]ny [individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity] 
operating under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter, 
certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the banking law, the 
insurance law, or the financial services law.” 
130 Press Release, Proposed Regulations: Section 500.00, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. 
SERVS. (September 2016), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations 
/proposed/rp500t.pdf(last accessed Sept. 2016). 
131 Id. 
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4. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning and 
resources;  
5. Capacity and performance planning;  
6. Systems operations and availability concerns;  
7. Systems and network security;  
8. Systems and network monitoring;  
9. Systems and application development and quality 
assurance;  
10. Physical security and environmental controls;  
11. Customer data privacy;  
12. Vendor and third-party service provider management;  
13. Risk assessment; and  
14. Incident response.132  
This requires the board of directors or an equivalent 
governing body to review the policy as frequently as necessary (but 
no less frequently than annually), and a senior officer to approve of 
the policy’s contents.133  
The proposed regulation also contained an annual 
certification of compliance requirement.134 Every covered entity135 
must certify that it follows the requirements of the regulation.136 The 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Press Release, Maria T. Vullo, Notice of Final Regulations’ Promulgation 
under Part 500 Title 23 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and 
Regulations of the State of New York: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial 
Services Companies, 500.17(b), (Feb. 13, 2017), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf.  
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
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language of the certification is found in Appendix A and reads as 
follows: 
The Board of Directors or a Senior Officer of the 
Covered Entity certifies: 
(1) The Board of Directors (or name of Senior 
Officer(s)) have reviewed documents, reports, 
certifications and opinions of such officers, 
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other 
individuals or entities as necessary; 
To the best of the (Board of Directors) or (name of 
Senior Officer(s)) knowledge, the Cybersecurity 
Program of (name of Covered Entity as of ___ (date 
of the Board Resolution or Senior Officer(s) 
Compliance Finding) for the year ended ____ (year 
for which Board Resolution or Compliance Finding is 
provided) complies with Part __. 
Signed [and dated] by the Chairperson of the Board 
of Directors or Senior Officer(s). 
Failure to certify will be enforced under “any 
applicable laws,” including civil and criminal 
penalties.137  
NYDFS’s final cybersecurity regulations went into effect 
March 1st, 2017.138 In a February 16, 2017 press release, New York 
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo said: 
                                                 
137 Id.; see also PwC, AML monitoring: New York regulator gets prescriptive, 
FINANCIAL CRIMES OBSERVER PWC, (July 2016), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financial-crimes/publications/asse 
ts/aml-monitoring-nydfs-2016.pdf [hereinafter “PwC”]. 
138 Press Release, Governor Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces First-in-
the-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation Protecting Consumers and Financial 
Institutions from Cyber-Attacks to Take Effect March 1, (February 16, 2017), 
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1702161.htm. 
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New York is the financial capital of the world, and it 
is critical that we do everything in our power to 
protect consumers and our financial system from the 
ever increasing threat of cyber-attacks . . . These 
strong, first-in-the-nation protections will help ensure 
this industry has the necessary safeguards in place in 
order to protect themselves and the New Yorkers 
they serve from the serious economic harm caused by 
these devastating cyber-crimes.139  
The final regulation includes 
• Controls relating to the governance framework for a 
robust cybersecurity program including requirements for 
a program that is adequately funded and staffed, 
overseen by qualified management, and reported on 
periodically to the most senior governing body of the 
organization; 
• Risk-based minimum standards for technology systems 
including access controls, data protection including 
encryption, and penetration testing; 
• Required minimum standards to help address any cyber 
breaches including an incident response plan, 
preservation of data to respond to such breaches, and 
notice to DFS of material events; and 
• Accountability by requiring identification and 
documentation of material deficiencies, remediation 
plans and annual certifications of regulatory compliance 
to DFS.140  
Section 500.20, which covers enforcement, says that “This 
regulation will be enforced by the superintendent pursuant to, and is 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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not intended to limit, the superintendent’s authority under any 
applicable laws.”141  
So far - so good. However, in June 2016, NYDFS had issued 
a similar final rule regarding AML compliance certification.142 This 
issuance was a result of multiple NYDFS investigations into 
compliance at “regulated institutions” (“all banks, trust companies, 
private bankers, savings banks and savings and loans associations 
chartered under New York Banking Law, New York-licensed 
branches and agencies of foreign banking corporations, as well as 
New York-licensed check cashiers and money transmitters[]”143) with 
applicable money laundering rules.144 The investigation identified 
shortcomings in these financial institution’s transaction monitoring 
and filtering programs, which was in turn attributable to a lack of 
governance, oversight, and accountability at senior levels.145 Based on 
this investigation and other factors, NYDFS believed financial 
institutions had systemic shortcomings in their AML programs and 
wanted to not only clarify AML program requirements, but also have 
the Board of Directors or a Senior Officer submit a Board Resolution 
or Compliance Finding.146  
The final AML rules require every regulated institution to 
maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program that should contain, 
where applicable, the following attributes: 
1. Based on the institution’s Risk Assessment; 
                                                 
141 Supra note 10.  
142 Publication, Shearman & Sterling LLP, NYS Department of Financial 
Services Outlines Requirements for Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs of NY State-
Licensed Institutions, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP CLIENT PUBLICATIONS (Jul. 20, 
2016), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/ 
Publications/2016/07/NYS-Department-of-Financial-Services-Outlines-Requirem 
ents-FIAFR-072016.pdf [hereinafter “Shearman and Sterling”]. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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2. Periodically reviewed and updated to reflect and account 
for changes to BSA/AML laws and other relevant 
information; 
3. Match BSA/AML risks to the firm’s business, product 
and service lines, and customers; 
4. BSA/AML detection scenarios with values and amounts 
that detect potential money laundering, suspicious 
activity, or other illegal activity; 
5. A full scope testing of the Transaction Monitoring 
Program, including governance review, data mapping, 
transaction coding, detection scenario logic, model 
validation, data input and Program output; 
6. Documentation articulating the institution’s current 
detection scenarios and the assumptions, thresholds, and 
parameters of those scenarios; 
7. Protocols outlining how the firm will investigate the 
Transaction Monitoring Program’s alerts, how the 
Regulated Institution will decide which alerts will result 
in a filing or other action, who is responsible for 
deciding, and how the investigative and decision-making 
process is to be documented; and 
8. Be subject to on-going analysis in order to determine 
whether detection scenarios, underlying rules, threshold 
values, parameters, and assumptions are still relevant.147  
The Regulated Institution’s Filtering Program’s requirements 
are similar to the Monitoring Program in that they are only to be 
implemented where applicable, and are as follows: 
1. Be based on the institution’s Risk Assessment; 
                                                 
147 Id. 
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2. Be based on technology, processes, or tools that will 
match names and accounts consistent with the 
institution’s risks, transaction, and product profiles; 
3. Full scope testing of the Filtering Program, including 
relevant reviews of data matching, determining whether 
the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings 
synchronize to an institution’s risks; assessing the logical 
fit of technology or tools, model validation, and data 
input with the Program’s output; 
4. On-going analysis to assess technology and tool’s logic 
and performance in matching names and accounts, as 
well as the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings to 
see if they map the institution’s risks, and 
5. Documentation articulating the Filtering Program’s 
intent and design for tools, processes, and 
technology.148  
Both the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs are 
required to have, where applicable: 
1. ID of all data sources with relevant data; 
2. Validation of data’s accuracy, integrity, and quality, 
ensuring accurate and complete data flows through the 
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program; 
3. Processes for data extraction and loading to ensure a 
complete and accurate data transfer from source to 
system (provided automated systems are used) 
4. Governance and management oversight, including 
policies and procedures that govern changes to the 
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program ensuring 
that changes are managed, reported, audited, defined, and 
controlled; 
                                                 
148 Id. 
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5. Vendor selection processes where third-party vendors are 
used in the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering 
Program; 
6. Funding for the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering 
Program; 
7. Qualified personnel or third-party consultants 
responsible for various aspects of the Transaction 
Monitoring and Filtering Program, including design, 
implementation, ongoing analysis, planning, operation 
testing, and 
8. Periodic training of all Transaction Monitoring and 
Filtering Program stakeholders.149  
When Regulated Institutions identify areas, systems, or 
processes needing material improvements, updates, or redesigns, the 
Regulated Institutions are required to document the identifications 
made, and the corresponding planned remedial efforts. The 
Superintendent of NYDFS must be able to view these 
documents.150  
Either the board or the senior officers of a company must 
certify that the company has followed these rules outlined above. The 
Board Resolution or Compliance Finding requirement dictates that: 
[E]ach Regulated Institution “shall adopt and submit 
to the Superintendent a Board Resolution or Senior 
Officer(s) Compliance Finding in the form set forth 
in Attachment A by April 15th of each year. Each 
Regulated Institution shall maintain for examination 
by the Department all records, schedules and data 
supporting adoption of the Board Resolution or 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
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Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding for a period of 
five years.151   
The language of the aforementioned certification is as 
follows: 
The Board of Directors (or name of Senior 
Officer(s)) has reviewed documents, reports, 
certifications and opinions of such officers, 
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other 
individuals or entities as necessary to adopt this Board 
Resolution or Senior Officer Compliance Finding. 
The Board of Directors or Senior Officer(s) has taken 
all steps necessary to confirm that (name of Regulated 
Institution) as of ___ (date of the Board Resolution 
or Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding) for the year 
ended ___ (year for which Board Resolution or 
Compliance Finding is provided) complies with 
[Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Requirements]. 
Signed [and dated] by each member of the Board of 
Directors or Senior Officer(s).152  
In the final rule, these requirements are to “be enforced 
pursuant to, and is not intended to limit, the Superintendent’s 
authority under any applicable laws.”153 Thus, the scope of the 
Superintendent’s authority is both civil and criminal. However, the 
original wording of the rule was harsh, as illustrated below: 
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all 
applicable penalties provided for by the Banking Law 
and the Financial Services Law for failure to maintain 
a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a Watch List 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program 
Requirements and Certifications, 3 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 504 (Mar. 2017), available at 
http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2016/july20/pdf/rulemaking.pdf and 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf. 
153 Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142. 
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Filtering Program complying with the requirements of 
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications 
required under Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying 
Senior Officer who files an incorrect or false Annual 
Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties 
for such filing.154  
It is unclear why the original language was worded as it was. 
More than likely, the language intended to serve two purposes: (1) to 
underline the seriousness of the offense, and (2) to warn potential 
officers certifying the Annual Certification of the consequences 
resulting from a failure to certify the company’s program.  
Regardless, due to industry feedback that language was struck 
out entirely and replaced with new language for the finalized rule. In 
the final rule, NYDFS removed the threat of criminal penalties for 
incorrect or falsified filings.155   
Thus, there are meaningful distinctions between the 
requirements of the cybersecurity rule and the AML rule. However, 
the reality of modern financial institutions means that AML is a 
significant component of cybersecurity, such that AML measures 
cannot be effective without cybersecurity, and cybersecurity in 
financial institutions cannot be fully effective without AML measures.  
In the following section, I will explain why the current rules require 
some form of harmonization in their application and enforcement, 
and further, why those rules need to establish a specific standard for 
the imposition of criminal liability in specific instances.  
IV.  SUGGESTIONS AND RATIONALE 
Both the cybersecurity rules and the AML rules should have 
the same language, however, they do not. Unfortunately, both rules 
lack much-needed language allowing for the imposition of criminal 
liability in appropriate situations. This problem could be addressed 
                                                 
154 Id. 
155 PwC, supra note 137.  
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through a number of ways and considerations. First, one must 
consider that by softening the language in both rules, the NYDFS 
was not responsive to institutions’ vocalized concerns, and likely only 
further confused individuals trying to comply. Second, if both rules 
contain the same language, the possibility of corporate directors 
avoiding liability in one function, while negating liability in another 
for the same act, will likely lessen. Third, by emphasizing the 
potential of corporate criminal liability the rule will more properly 
reflect the principles outlined by the Yates memorandum. Even 
though the Yates memorandum is not an official policy of the New 
York Attorney General’s Office, aligning the language of the rules 
with the spirit of the Yates memorandum could eliminate the 
complexity created by the current compliance rules for company 
directors.  
A. Changing the Language of the Statute but not the Underlying 
Enforcement Mechanism is Unresponsive to Concerns and Only 
Confuses Firms Trying to Comply with the Rule 
In response to public comments regarding the rule, the 
NYSFDS changed the AML rule’s language so that the regulation 
“[would] be enforced pursuant to, and [] not intended to limit, the 
Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”156 Although 
the laws are not explicitly mentioned, the language of the AML rule 
presumably refers to legislation relating to Banking, Insurance, and 
Financial law. However, if this is true, the NYSFDS is committing 
two errors. 
First, by not changing the underlying penalties of the law, the 
NYSFDS is not being responsive enough to the concerns of 
commenters. Secondly, by stating only that regulators will pursue 
enforcement under “any and all applicable laws,” individuals are left 
“in the dark” about specific applicable law. If we were to assume that 
a law’s ability to be interpreted directly influences the law’s likelihood 
of being followed, then one must also consider the vagueness of this 
rule and its resultant effect on compliance.  
                                                 
156 Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142. 
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This problem of vagueness in compliance can also be found 
in the proposed cybersecurity rule. Like the AML rule, the 
cybersecurity rule only states that the Superintendent will enforce the 
Regulation pursuant to “authority under any applicable laws.”157 One 
can only speculate why the rule is phrased this way. Perhaps this 
phraseology was a response to the public comment regarding the 
AML rules and was intended to preemptively address similar 
complaints about the AML rule. Again, however, this language is 
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This lack of clarity 
could feasibly hinder corporations from ensuring which laws are 
applicable, and consequently, what standards to adhere to when 
certifying their cybersecurity programs.  
Furthermore, rule-makers determined that the prior language 
was not precise enough to warrant inclusion. As we have seen, 
cybersecurity breaches and AML risks are frequent. Thus, this 
arguably makes individual penalization through criminal liability 
unjust in certain situations, such as, for example, the filing of false or 
incorrect Annual Certifications in good faith. Beyond that, a variety 
of scenarios could occur: firms may have to start offering large 
salaries to compliance officers just to attract quality talent, or, firms 
may feel encouraged to structure their company in such a way that 
does not require a New York state business charter, and thus 
bypassing the rule. In a true nightmare scenario, firms could just 
dissolve their charters, leave New York, and set up shop in 
alternative financial centers such as San Francisco, Boston, Chicago, 
Charlotte, or Washington, D.C. 
B. Uniform Language as a Response to Dual Corporate Officer 
Liability Loopholes 
As the rules are currently written, it is entirely possible that an 
individual could face criminal liability for a certification violation in 
the cybersecurity context, yet simultaneously avoid criminal liability 
under the AML rules. To be sure, in some situations this will not be 
relevant. For example, suppose that there is a cybersecurity breach of 
                                                 
157 Vullo, supra note 134. 
MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Dixon 5:1 
107 
a financial institution based on corporate espionage. If, after an 
individual makes a bad faith cybersecurity certification, a hacker gets 
into an employee’s email, he may learn of a new marketing campaign, 
the valuation of a confidential M&A deal, or proprietary research 
created by a firm’s research team. Cybersecurity breaches involving 
financial institutions are often related to some form of money 
laundering activity. Such breaches are cybersecurity breaches, 
although they do not involve the laundering of money.  
However, in situations where a cybersecurity breach does 
involve money laundering, if both the cybersecurity policy and money 
laundering policy were certified by an individual omission or outright 
lie, it is possible that the individual could avoid liability under the 
AML rule, but not the cybersecurity rule. A predictable argument 
could be that criminal prosecution under the AML rule is unfair 
because the language change from the proposed rule to the final rule 
reflects a retraction in the intended harshness of the policy against 
criminal prosecution. Thus, it is foreseeable that criminal liability was 
not intended to be permissible for AML violations, and the rule is 
thus arguably be unconstitutional for being overly vague. 
However, if both rules were to have the exact same language, 
two results would occur. First, loopholes are no longer present in 
those situations where both rules apply, but with contrasting 
language. Second, assuming all elements are met, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for an individual to argue that it was unclear 
whether their failure to comply with the certification mechanism 
would allow for criminal liability sanctions. 
C. The Yates Memorandum & Creating a Comprehensive Model  
Having a rule that reflects the Yates memorandum not only 
makes the rule easier to follow, but also sets good precedent for 
further states’ adoption and implementation. Responding to industry 
concerns, eliminating the possibility of loopholes, and creating 
precise language are key aspects of the new language. The next and 
final element is that the new language should reflect the tenor of the 
Yates memorandum, such that it makes the rule easier to follow, but 
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also sets a good precedent for other states to copy should they 
choose to implement their own state policies. 
Again, it bears repeating that the Yates memorandum, 
technically, has no bearing on the New York Attorney General’s 
Office or the NYDFS. After all, the Yates memorandum is part of 
the DOJ, and thus reflects federal policy. However, many New York 
banks have not worked solely within the confines of New York for 
quite some time: indeed, it is hard to recall when New York banks 
operated solely within the United States. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan 
and Deutsche Bank are just a few New York chartered organizations 
with international reach.158 As such, in their operations these 
institutions are subject to not just New York law, but federal law as 
well. Despite New York’s outsized influence within the financial 
sector, common practice for these organizations is to channel their 
resources towards federal law compliance.  
There is another advantage to this. By making the rule 
reflective of the Yates memorandum and easier to follow, it removes 
an incentive for an organization to move its banking charter from 
New York to another state with more relaxed banking standards. 
V.  THE NEW RULE 
If the current language and the proposed language of both 
the cybersecurity and AML certification policies are not adequate, 
then what is? This author proposes the following rules for the 
cybersecurity and AML programs, respectively. For cybersecurity: 
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable 
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services 
Law for failure to maintain a cybersecurity program complying with 
the requirements of this Part and or failure to file the Certifications 
required under Section 500.17 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer 
                                                 
158 See generally Report, New York State Chartered Institutions as of 
December 31, 2012, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/annual/annualbanklist.htm. 
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who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false 
Annual Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties for 
such filing. 
Then, for the AML: 
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable 
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services 
Law for failure to maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a 
Watch List Filtering Program complying with the requirements of 
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications required under 
Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false Annual Certification 
also may be subject to criminal penalties for such filing. 
This proposed language achieves two purposes. First, by 
giving explicit standards, the language makes clear that a criminal 
enforcement will only be triggered where an individual’s behavior 
manifests a level of intent beyond mere negligence. The Haider case, 
described supra, provides a clear example of when an individual 
director’s failure to provide adequate internal controls was a result of 
mere negligence. As illustrated by the Haider case, it would be unfair 
to punish all individuals for negligence or strict liability offenses and 
could lead to unintended consequences in an industry where 
complete prevention has proven impossible. Second, and relatedly, 
this proposed rule reflects the reality that AML and cybersecurity 
divisions at certain financial institutions face extraordinary difficulties 
and overlapping functions. The proposed rule is narrowly tailored to 
prevent the behavior seen in Haider, or rather, violations conducted 
by individuals intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; but not the 
behavior of otherwise good-faith individuals who mistakenly certify a 
compliance program. Distinguishing between negligent and reckless 
conduct may be difficult at times, but nonetheless, this proposed rule 
provides a minimum standard and guide for enforcement agencies to 
adhere to.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
AML and cybersecurity are separate policies, yet, closely 
intertwined and critical as a defense for financial institutions. These 
institutions are constantly under attack from outsiders, and 
unfortunately, bound to fall victim to a breach at some point. After 
all, even if 10,000 attacks occur and 9,999 of them fail, all it takes is 
one; hackers may still be successful in damaging a targeted institution, 
even when the breach is minimally intrusive.  
The New York State Department of Financial Services made 
a mistake in weakening the language of its proposed rules. The 
NYDFS was not responsive to industry concerns and the rules were 
not written clearly enough to meaningfully advise parties affected by 
the consequences of a failure to comply. By strengthening the 
language so that clear consequences are understood and established, 
and by setting a clear standard of what will trigger potential criminal 
liability, this Author’s proposed language will serve the dual purpose 
of reassuring individuals at firms of what actions would impose 
criminal liability, and would further ensure the New York State 
Department of Financial Services that its goal of increasing 
cybersecurity and AML regulations has been met. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 4th, 2014, Officer Sean Groubert of the South 
Carolina State Police pulled his police cruiser behind the vehicle 
driven by Levar Jones at a gas station in South Carolina. Officer 
Jones would later state the reason he pulled behind Jones was 
because he observed Jones was not wearing his seat belt. Jones would 
later state he removed his seat belt upon pulling into the gas station 
to exit his vehicle and enter the station. All of the following events 
were captured by the dash-cam in Officer Groubert’s car.1 
Levar Jones exited his vehicle and, with his car door still 
open, noticed the police vehicle behind him. His face exhibited 
surprise and confusion.2 Officer Groubert requested Jones’ license in 
a controlled speaking voice.3 Jones pats his pocket, and realizing his 
wallet is not there, does a rapid shoulder shift from facing Groubert 
to facing the inside of his vehicle.4 He then leans into the vehicle as 
an ordinary place to secure his wallet, which he had left sitting on the 
front seat.5 However, Officer Groubert (apparently) viewed the rapid 
shoulder shift as an aggressive and hostile act. In the next three 
seconds of film, he shouts “Get out of the Car!” twice, runs to cover 
behind Jones’ vehicle and fires four shouts at Jones.6 The first shot 
hits Jones while he is turning around with the wallet in his hand. He 
drops the wallet and backs away from the officer while putting his 
hands up while three more shots hit him. In the same dash-cam 
video, Groubert later describes the events to his supervisor.7 
Groubert describes Jones’ surprise and confusion as an act of 
“staring him down”; Jones’ leaning into his vehicle to secure his 
                                                 
1 This video can be found in many places on the internet. The one we will 
reference is available at: The State Newspaper, Sept 4 Groubert traffic stop, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RBUUO_VFYMs. 
2 Id. at time stamp :40. 
3 Id. at time stamp :42. 
4 Id. at time stamp :43 - :44. 
5 Id. at time stamp :45. 
6 Id. at time stamp :46 - :49. 
7 This longer video can be found at: Tony Santaella and Steven Dial, Trooper 
on Shooting: ‘He Kept Coming Towards Me’, WLTX19 (Sept. 27, 2014), 
http://www.wltx.com/story/news/local/2014/09/26/sean-groubert-gives-his-
account-of-shooting-levar-jones/16295527/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). 
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wallet as an act of “diving into his vehicle”; Jones’ acts of walking 
backwards while putting his hands up as “he kept coming at me”; and 
Jones’ wallet as a perceived weapon.8 
On the one hand we could assume these to be self-serving 
and dishonest statements by Officer Groubert. This assumption is 
not necessary and it is far more probative to view them as the honest 
(mis)perception of a shooter in a perceived hostile environment. 
Under that lens, Groubert’s statements reflect a perception of an 
African American male as a potential hostile in an asymmetric 
battlefield-like environment,9 and give a rare insight into a shooter’s 
psyche – a rapid, stress-filled situation.   
The landscape of modern asymmetric conflicts, such as the 
war in Afghanistan, is also murky. The Soldier, like the police officer, 
is burdened with the reality that he does not know who the bad guy is 
and who the innocent is. But the rules governing the Soldier are 
starkly different than those governing the police officer for sound 
and logical reasons. In a New York Times editorial, U.S. Marine Corps 
Captain Timothy Kudo discusses his own use of force in 
Afghanistan.10 While a commander, he was asked permission by his 
Marines to kill two Afghans: “The voice on the other end of the 
radio said: ‘There are two people digging by the side of the road. Can 
we shoot them?’” The presumption is the two were implanting an 
improvised explosion device – known as an IED – to kill or injure 
Afghan or coalition Soldiers. Captain Kudo gave permission and the 
two diggers were killed.11 There was an ever-present possibility the 
diggers were merely irrigating their farm land and not sowing seeds of 
violence toward Captain Kudo, his Marines, and the Afghan State. 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 The attitude of police in the United States towards African American 
males has been the subject of much commentary and literature and is not the 
subject of this piece. We mention it as a basis of comparison to the view of Soldiers 
towards potential threats in the modern asymmetric battlefield. 
10 Timothy Kudo, Editorial, How We Learned to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2015, New York Edition at SR1. 
11 Id. 
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How we assess the use of force and whether force is 
appropriate in any given situation is instrumental to how we function 
as a deliberative democracy. While we might all agree Officer 
Groubert’s actions are reprehensible and probably criminal, Captain 
Kudo’s are less open to clear judgment. Should the judgment depend 
on whether Captain Kudo was ultimately correct; that is, the diggers 
were, in fact, bad guys, rather than innocent farmers making a living? 
If Levar Jones had held up a gun rather than a wallet upon exiting his 
vehicle, the authorities would probably have viewed Officer 
Groubert’s actions differently. But the true (rather than perceived) 
battlefield is a significantly different legal reality where far greater 
uses of force have been permitted, including knowingly causing the 
death of innocents.12 Evaluating Captain Kudo’s actions is made 
problematic by the blending of warfighting with peacekeeping and 
even battlefield law enforcement mandated by asymmetric warfare.   
Among the volumes written on when force can be exercised 
by Soldiers during armed conflict in the name of the State, the trend 
over the last century has been to curtail a Soldier’s use of force and 
rightfully so. The adoption by virtually every State13 of The Hague 
Conventions in 1907,14 the Geneva Conventions15 in the wake of 
World War II, along with their Protocols in 1977,16 has been with a 
                                                 
12 Under the concept of proportionality, lawful combatants can knowingly 
cause the incidental death of innocent noncombatants if the military advantage 
gained exceeds their loss. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
13 The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter “ICRC”] tracks 
the current signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
at https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions (The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by every 
member state of the United Nations). 
14 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 
2277, October 18, 1907. 
15 Jean S. Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 462 (1951). 
16 Additional Protocol I and Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”]. 
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singular purpose: to limit the devastation inflicted by armed conflict. 
Armed conflict, however, persists. Whether it is the war in 
Afghanistan or the crisis in the Ukraine, bloodshed of both innocent 
civilians and lawful combatants/privileged belligerents17 is a 
persistent reality. In the modern era, complicating the calculus of 
how to limit the destruction of war, many of these armed conflicts 
are fueled by actors who refuse to wear military uniforms, carry their 
arms openly, and become privileged belligerents; these actors lurk 
amongst civilians and never show their true intent until they strike. 
In the last decade, the trajectory of some courts, academics, 
and even military leaders of States18 is to limit the force States’ 
militaries can use during conflict. The intent of these limits on what 
force, including lethal force, militaries can use to accomplish the 
mission is quite noble. The logic is the less force used by a Soldier, 
the less death and destruction inflicted upon innocents. However, 
these limitations are tainted by misunderstandings and mistakes 
concerning the principles and goals of the Just War Theory, 
particularly in the evaluation of battlefield conduct: jus in bello. 
Academics and jurists have extrapolated familiar concepts 
from criminal law jurisprudence, those used to evaluate Officer 
Groubert’s conduct, such as intent, necessity, and proportionality, 
and attempted to apply them to evaluate the acts of the privileged 
belligerent.19 The attempt to make the dissimilar into the similar is 
understandable because man habitually tries to characterize the 
unfamiliar by extrapolating from a familiar paradigm. However, while 
the same terms may be used,20 the meaning of those terms differ 
                                                 
17 “The term “privileged belligerent” means an individual belonging to one 
of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(6). 
18 Examples of each are discussed later in this chapter. 
19 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING 
HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2008) [hereinafter “Defending Humanity”] for an extrapolation of criminal law 
concepts to jus ad bellum, an extrapolation that makes much more sense than to jus 
in bello. 
20 Both the criminal law and the jus in bello paradigms include common 
terms such as self-defense and necessity, but the meanings can vary significantly. 
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significantly between law enforcement and war.21 This extrapolation 
manifests itself in applying human rights law norms and the universal 
reach of an individual’s right to life. Criminal law exists to preserve 
the peace, whereas jus in bello works to end conflict.22 
Exacerbating the problem is the other half of the Just War 
Theory, jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is a set of international principles 
regulating when the State can initiate armed conflict. Extrapolating 
criminal law jurisprudence to evaluate jus ad bellum actions is rational 
because the goals and core concepts of the two paradigms are nearly 
identical:23 In both systems, the “citizens” (individuals in criminal law, 
States in jus ad bellum) lose the ability to use violence to achieve their 
aims except in rare circumstances where the violence is legally 
authorized (law enforcement and U.N. Security Council Resolution) 
or justified (self-defense of the individual and the state). Further, 
both share a common fundamental goal: preserving the peace. 
Therefore, using criminal law concepts and jurisprudence to evaluate 
jus ad bellum action, as proposed by George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin in 
Defending Humanity, is proper.24 The reason: the words and meaning are 
the same. What is not defensible, morally or legally, is using this 
similarity as a gateway to then apply criminal law concepts to jus in 
bello where these substantive and goal similarities do not exist. The 
words may be the same, but the meaning is different. 
                                                 
21 A good example of this divergence is the concept of self-defense. In the 
criminal law paradigm, the individual’s right of self-defense is limited by, among 
other things, the responsibility to not cause the death of anyone but the aggressor, 
and the ability to use force in self-defense is limited to the timeframe of the 
aggression. In contrast, on the battlefield, a lawful combatant can knowingly cause 
the death of an innocent in self-defense, provided the death is incidental and that it 
is exceeded by the military advantage of staying alive. Further, the lawful combatant 
can engage in status rather than conduct based self-defense. 
22 “The object of war has been understood to be the submission of the 
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.” The Department of DOD LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL, June 2015, [hereinafter “DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL”] paragraph 
1.4.1 citing 1940 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶22 (“The object of war is to 
bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of 
regulated violence.”); 1914 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶10 (same). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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This extrapolation of criminal law concepts to the battlefield 
is not defensible because in armed conflict a commander’s calculus 
revolves around military necessity--defined as “the necessity of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, 
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of 
war.”25 The commander must balance, on one hand, the necessary 
precautions to protect civilians with, on the other hand, the 
commander’s conclusion of military necessity. Imbedded in this 
conclusion is military judgment. This concept simply does not exist in 
domestic criminal law. And with any judgment, especially one which 
stems from whether necessary precautions were taken in light of the 
military action in the name of military necessity, there is the element 
of subjectivity. The modern trend has been to extend “the domestic 
law of negligence to the battle zone – where civilian norms of duty of 
care” are applied to military decisions.26 This means civilian criminal 
standards are being applied to decisions made in war. The 
manifestation of this trend is to focus on the results of the military 
decision after the fact (e.g., were civilians killed?), rather than focus on 
the rationale of the military act under current International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL).27 
Conflating civilian criminal standards with the rationale of a 
military act under IHL comes at a high cost for democratic armies 
and has, in these authors’ opinion, not been fully debated. The 
biggest cost is to the effectiveness of a State’s military to bring an end 
to armed conflict. Efforts to protect the enemy belligerent and 
innocent civilians by limiting the Soldier’s lethality acts to defeat a 
                                                 
25 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.2.1 citing, among multiple 
other sources, General Order No. 100, the Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, commonly known as the Lieber Code art. 
14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the 
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the 
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”). 
26 Thomas Tugendhat & Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the 
Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power, Policy Exchange (2013) at 11, 
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
27 International Humanitarian Law is synonymous with the Law of War and 
the Law of Armed Conflict. This body of international law regulates the conduct of 
forces when engaged in war and armed conflict. 
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fundamental goal of jus in bello, bringing about an end to the war; 
therefore causing an increase, rather than decrease, of violence. 
Unrealistic limitations on the Soldier means there are rules he 
can never overcome. If the acid test is to kill no civilians, for 
example, then closing with and killing or capturing an amorphous 
enemy who looks and acts like a civilian is profoundly difficult, if not 
impossible. Placing limitations on the Soldier limits their ability to 
exercise the principle of military necessity and, therefore, defeats one 
of the core principles of the Just War Theory.    
This article will argue the right of the Soldier to engage and 
destroy military objectives is inherent to warfare; efforts to stem or 
limit this force need to be fully understood and carefully considered 
within jus in bello instead of the criminal law paradigm. Failure to do 
so may actually increase violence rather than decrease it, as well as 
violate the State’s sacred obligation to its designated belligerents: 
Soldiers. 
Even though the Soldier is legally and morally blameless for 
his presence on the battlefield, he loses the protections of the civilian 
criminal law against violence. In exchange for this sacrifice, the 
Soldier gains the right to use violence to execute the mission and 
bring about an end to the war. Forcing the Soldier to waive his right 
to the protections of the law while simultaneously denying him the 
ability to effectively accomplish his mission reduces him to nothing 
more than a designated target for those who oppose his State. 
This article will start with a brief introduction to the core 
principles of the Just War Theory and use these to identify its 
fundamental goals. This section will examine the differences between 
privileged belligerents and civilians and highlight why the rights of 
privileged belligerents cannot tether to the concepts or goals of 
domestic criminal law. The second part of the article will then 
examine five specific trends which are part and parcel to the 
pervasive wave against the use of force and the actual or potential 
cost to how Soldiers behave in conflict; that is, jus in bello. The 
authors will ultimately conclude that until war itself is fully eliminated 
from the human experience, the lex specialis of jus in bello within the 
Just War Theory is pragmatically justified and a morally mandated 
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duty of the international community of States to privileged 
belligerents. 
II.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE JUST WAR THEORY AND A 
COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
The Just War Theory has traditionally28 been divided into the 
morality of a State or group’s decision to engage in armed conflict, jus 
ad bellum, and the manner in which armed conflict is conducted, jus in 
bello.29 
Jus ad bellum has evolved from the right of states to use war to 
achieve political ends, enforce treaties, and in reprisal, to the far more 
restrictive modern approach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, which requires States to “…refrain from the threat or use of 
force against .. any state” in order to “…maintain international peace 
and security.”30 The only commonly recognized exceptions to this 
prohibition are the use of force authorized by the Security Council31 
and the use of force in self-defense under Article 5132 of the same 
charter. In this regard, jus ad bellum mirrors the paradigm of civilian 
criminal law in both goal (preserving peace) and substance (the 
                                                 
28 Modern academics have posited a third area of concern within the Just 
War Theory, that of jus post bellum, or the responsibility of belligerent states after the 
conclusion of armed conflict. 
29 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (Basic Books, 3RD ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
“Walzer”]: “War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states 
have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind 
of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. 
The second is adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly.” 
30 Charter of the United Nations, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 article 2(4) 
[hereinafter “UN Charter”]. 
31 Id. at article 24(2) “The specific powers granted to the Security Council 
for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.” 
These powers include the ability to use force for Chapter VI peacekeeping, or 
Chapter VII peace enforcement. 
32 Id. at article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”  
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individual’s ability to use force is limited to situations justified by an 
external imminent threat). 
A. The Uniqueness of Jus in bello 
Unlike jus ad bellum, which evolved almost entirely based on 
international agreement,33 jus in bello is primarily the product of 
custom. Modern treaties, such as the four Geneva Conventions and 
its Protocols, have acted to codify rules evolved from core principles 
developed by the practice of professional warfighters over centuries.34 
These principles include Distinction, Military Necessity, and 
Proportionality. 
1. The Principle of Distinction.35  
Any analysis of jus in bello should begin with the principle of 
distinction, because it is the springing condition for the lex specialis. 
Said another way, without the application of the principle of 
distinction, the substance of traditional criminal law is an entirely 
adequate tool to determine the legality of a given act. The principle 
subdivides into: A) the responsibility of combatants to distinguish 
themselves from civilians; and B) the responsibility to target only 
enemy combatants and military objectives with attacks.36 
                                                 
33 Prior to its conclusion in the U.N. Charter, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg identified the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 as a source of 
restrictions on the power of jus ad bellumjus ad bellum for signees. 
34 The Lieber Code is often cited as the first documentation of the modern 
laws of war. This code was not a creative work, but rather the result of Francis 
Lieber working on a committee of military professionals to codify existing 
customary practice that had been developed over centuries. 
35 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.5. 
36 Id. 
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(i) The Responsibility of Combatants to Distinguish Themselves from 
Civilians.  
International law grants combatants the legal and moral 
authority to commit violent acts that would otherwise be abhorrent 
and punishable under traditional criminal law.37 This privileged 
belligerency allows them to shoot and kill enemy Soldiers based on 
their mere status as members of the enemy military force.38 Criminal 
law would only allow this attack if properly imposing a death 
sentence on the victim39 or if the victim was posing an imminent 
threat to the shooter (or another) and the shot was a proportional 
response to that threat40 (e.g., without a current imminent threat, 
Officer Groubert could not shoot Levar Jones even if Jones was the 
worst criminal in history). 
Further, except in the case of a death sentence and in 
preventing the escape of an individual who poses a significant threat 
of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others,41 law 
enforcement officers have no greater privilege to use deadly force 
than an ordinary citizen. The privileged belligerent does not suffer 
any of these limitations. She can kill her victim while he sleeps from 
one thousand miles away, facing no imminent threat whatsoever.42 
For this privileged belligerent to gain this legal authority to target and 
do violence to others, however, she must first set herself out as a 
                                                 
37 The specific language used denotes privileged belligerency as a ‘right.’ 
“Members of the armed forces…have a right to participate directly in hostilities.” 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43(2). 
38 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol I 1453 (¶4789) “Those 
who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.” 
39 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) the United States Supreme 
Court overturned its decision of four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972), and held that capital punishment was a lawful use of force and not 
prohibited by the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
40 Model Penal Code [MPC] §3.04 “…the use of force upon or toward 
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 
such other person.” & 3.05 “…the use of force upon or toward the person of 
another is justifiable to protect a third person when…the actor would be justified 
under Section 3.04 in using such force to protect himself.” 
41 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985). 
42 Tugendhat & Croft, supra note 26. 
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lawful target,43 such that she can also legally be killed while sleeping 
by an enemy she has never met, let alone threatened. Combatants 
that distinguish themselves from civilians are the only individuals 
authorized to commit these violent acts of war authorized by jus in 
bello; 44 all others must comply with the mandates of criminal law. 
(ii) The Responsibility to Target only Enemy Combatants and Military 
Objectives.  
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the restriction to limit 
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives applies only to 
combatants – privileged belligerents. This does not mean civilians – 
noncombatants – can target other civilians at will. It means if they are 
not a combatant, a civilian cannot target anyone, except when their 
conduct would be justified by traditional criminal law. Only the 
privileged belligerent can step outside the constraints of traditional 
criminal law, but when they do so, they must limit the targets of their 
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives.45 
B. The Principle of Military Necessity46 
In addition to the principle of distinction, the concept of 
privileged belligerency is inextricably linked to a second principle of 
jus in bello, military necessity. Distinction clarifies what one must do to 
qualify for the privilege, and military necessity identifies what violent 
powers one is granted. In simplest terms, the principle of military 
necessity authorizes the combatant to do acts of violence against the 
enemy military that are needed to bring about the complete 
submission of that enemy and an end to the war.47 Once again, 
                                                 
43 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 
12 August 1949 [hereinafter “Geneva III”] at Art. 4. 
44 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, paragraph 5.5.8. 
45 It is this second part of the Principle of Distinction that prohibits 
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, it is often referred to as the Principle of 
Discrimination. The authors view this as a subset of Distinction rather than a 
separate Principle. 
46 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25. 
47 Id. 
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however, this does not apply to civilians or civilian law enforcement. 
Officer Groubert may have the mission to apprehend a violent felon, 
but without probable cause of a significant threat to the officer or 
others, he is authorized to only use ordinary force to make an arrest.48 
The principle of military necessity has both a permissive and a 
restrictive aspect, as well as providing the lawful combatant a moral 
foundation for his acts of violence. 
1. The Privilege of Strategic Justification for Acts of Violence.  
A civilian is authorized to do limited violence to rebuff an 
imminent threat. A civilian must justify each act of violence based on 
contemporaneous and proximate danger to themselves or others.49 
For the combatant, eliminating a threat to themselves is merely 
ancillary to their duty to win the war as rapidly as possible. Therefore, 
a combatant’s acts must be evaluated in the much broader context of 
how they affect the war effort and not just the narrow frame of time 
and place the act occurred. A combatant can blow up a bridge built 
by farmers to get to their fields, not because of any threat posed by 
those farmers, but because she has reason to believe the enemy plans 
to use the bridge to transport troops across the river two weeks in 
the future.   
2. The Restrictive Side of Military Necessity.  
This principle is both permissive, allowing the combatant to 
do all acts necessary to win the war, and restrictive, prohibiting 
violent acts which would otherwise be lawful, if they are not needed 
for victory. On the restrictive side is the prohibition against attacks 
that cause unnecessary suffering.50 Putting glass shrapnel in a grenade 
so subsequent surgery will be more difficult is an example of violence 
                                                 
48 See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. (This is the rule of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1 (1985)). 
49 MPC §3.04 & 3.05. 
50 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 70. 
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that goes beyond the principle of necessity.51 A second part of the 
restrictive side of military necessity (as well as the discrimination 
aspect of distinction) is the concept of humane treatment.52 Once 
Soldiers become hors de combat by being injured, surrendering, or 
evacuating a sinking boat or crashing plane, they are no longer lawful 
targets. Further, the capturing party has a plethora of responsibilities 
for their welfare.53 
3. The Combatant’s Raison d’Etre.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of military necessity is 
that it is inextricably linked to bringing about an end to hostilities. 
The lawful combatant is not a mercenary performing a service for a 
fee. Instead, she is the designated agent of the State sent to engage in 
and be the target of horrific violence. The lawful combatant loses the 
protections of the law and in exchange is offered immunity for their 
acts of combat. The moral individual would never stomach this loss 
merely so they can do greater acts of violence against strangers. They 
sacrifice, sometimes involuntarily,54 the protections of the law for the 
higher purpose of bringing about an end to the armed conflict 
through victory over the enemy. The principle of military necessity 
protects their ability to achieve victory and thus provides the 
foundational explanation for the very existence of the military. 
                                                 
51 Unnecessary Suffering is often cited as a separate Principle of jus in bello, 
but since it is merely the negative corollary of Military Necessity (One can do only 
that violence which is necessary, so causing suffering that is not is prohibited) we 
prefer to view it as a subset. 
52 Humanity or Humane Treatment is also often viewed as a totally separate 
Principle, but the authors view it as a subset of both Military Necessity and 
Distinction since its fundamental principles are again a limitation on unnecessary 
violence against noncombatants and the suffering thereof. 
53 Geneva III, supra note 43. 
54 The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1917) required 
registration for a draft, or the governmental act of forcing an individual into the 
military. 
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C.  The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires the anticipated result 
of any attack to bring about a military advantage exceeding the 
collateral damage to civilians and civilian property.55 Like military 
necessity, this principle is both permissive and restrictive. 
As noted above, the lawful purpose of a combatant’s acts of 
war is not to secure their personal safety, but to bring about the end 
of the conflict. The latter is much more difficult to achieve as well as 
significantly more important to the international community. As 
such, the combatants have been granted far greater leniency than 
civilians when the effects of their violent acts are legally analyzed. If a 
civilian knowingly brings about the death of a non-aggressing person, 
this is considered intentional homicide even if the actor did not desire 
death to occur.56 If Officer Groubert, while chasing a group of 
fleeing violent felons, knowingly drives his vehicle over and kills a 
bystander civilian to avoid losing his targets, this is murder regardless 
of his benevolent motive to stop the violent felons from escaping.57 
However, if a combatant blows up the enemy commander’s car, 
purposefully killing him and knowingly killing his three-year-old 
daughter who is riding with him, the attack would be perfectly legal 
under jus in bello if the concrete military advantage gained by the 
commander’s death outweighed the death of the innocent girl. As 
noted in the discussion of the principle of distinction, above, the 
combatant could never target the little girl, but under the principle of 
proportionality, her collateral death could be legally acceptable under 
jus in bello. Like military necessity, this concept of legally acceptable 
collateral damage is limited to the privileged belligerent. The civilian 
is not authorized to attack the enemy commander even if the girl is 
not present. 
                                                 
55 Additional Protocol I, art. 52. 
56 MPC §210.2. 
57 Id. 
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1. The Goals of the Just War Theory.  
The two sides of the Just War Theory, jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, have significantly different, though sequential and convergent 
goals. Both strive to limit the costs of armed conflict. The former 
attempts to achieve this by the singular goal of preventing the 
occurrence and existence of armed conflict. If jus ad bellum fails and 
armed conflict begins, it falls to jus in bello to limit the violence 
through three goals: ending the conflict, limiting the cost to lawful 
combatants, and limiting the violence done to noncombatants. 
The goal of jus ad bellum is overt – to maintain international 
peace and security by preventing armed conflict.58 This parallels the 
civilian government’s law enforcement mission of maintaining peace 
and security by preventing violent (and nonviolent) crime. 
The goals of jus in bello, though less obvious, can be gleaned 
from the three core principles discussed above. When viewed 
together, the requirement to distinguish oneself under the principle 
of distinction, the ability to do violence strategically motivated under 
military necessity, and the increased lenience towards collateral 
damage encapsulated within proportionality, coalesce into the 
purpose of bringing about a rapid end to the armed conflict. The 
concepts of privileged belligerency and humane treatment combine 
to evince a second purpose – limiting the cost of war paid by its 
participants. A third purpose, shown by the requirement of 
discrimination, is to limit the cost of war paid by the innocent 
civilian. 
Each of these is a noble and laudable purpose integral to the 
Just War Theory. However, it appears that in the modern asymmetric 
environment, some want to prioritize the third goal to the detriment 
of the first two. Comments and decisions by leaders, academics, and 
jurists who desire to prevent military violence, while laudable, reflect 
a lack of appreciation of the first two purposes in the jus in bello 
paradigm as well as the core legal concepts within this lex specialis. 
                                                 
58 Preamble to the UN Charter. 
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2. The Required Gap Between Civilians and Privileged Belligerents 
Under the Lex Specialis of Jus in bello.  
The foundation of all jus in bello is the concept of privileged 
belligerency. The legal gap between the privileged belligerent and the 
civilian is arguably greater than any other that could be drawn 
between two people. While the police officer may have more legal 
authority to use some force than the citizen, it pales in relation to the 
Soldier’s license to kill. The death-row convict may have forfeited his 
fundamental right to life based on his prior acts, but he still stands 
closer to the ordinary citizen than the Soldier whose life becomes 
legally forfeit through no act of his own.59 This gap is why the first 
and most important question of evaluating the legality of any act of 
combat is: was the actor a privileged belligerent? 
If the answer to this antecedent question is no, there is no 
need to look to the lex specialis of IHL to evaluate their conduct; 
criminal law is fully capable of this adjudication. However, if the 
answer is yes, the actor was a privileged belligerent, then criminal law 
is irrelevant and only IHL should be used to evaluate their acts of 
combat.60 
If a person is unprivileged (i.e., a civilian), he is prohibited 
from the use of violence against persons or property of another 
except when that conduct is legally justified or excused and a 
proportional response to an imminent threat. This prohibition is the 
product of the comparatively consistent jurisprudence of criminal law 
developed over millennia. In contrast, the privileged belligerent (i.e., 
the Soldier) is permitted to use violence to destroy property and kill 
people. Further, these acts of violence can be grossly disproportional 
to a threat that is distant in both time and place. For example, a 
privileged belligerent controlling a piece of field artillery in an armed 
conflict can use the weapon to kill 1,000 enemy Soldiers 20 miles 
                                                 
59 As stated above, even involuntary membership in the armed forces makes 
you a lawful target of the enemy privileged belligerent. 
60 The legal maxim is “lex specialis derogat legi generali” so the lex specialis of 
IHL takes precedence over the more general criminal law. 
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away even if they are sitting down to dinner and have no plans to 
attack him.61 
For the civilian, the battlefield, in and of itself, does not grant 
him any additional legal authority to use force. Legally, a citizen on 
the battlefield operates under the same restrictions as one caught in a 
gunfight between police and a group of bank robbers. The situation 
may give rise to the legal ability to use violence based on justification 
(self-defense) or excuse (necessity), but this will be factually 
dependent and temporarily linked to the existence of a given 
imminent threat.62 
The Soldier goes through a dramatic legal conversion once 
armed conflict begins. The Soldier morphs from a civilian legally 
indistinguishable from any other concerning the use of force, to a 
new type of legal entity authorized by the world community to use 
deadly force. As noted above, the Soldier is even authorized to 
knowingly kill innocent civilians, provided their deaths are 
outweighed by the concrete military advantage gained.   
Criminal law prohibits a civilian from using force or violence 
except in narrow circumstances such as self-defense. Therefore, the 
principles embedded in jus in bello – military necessity, proportionality, 
and distinction – do not provide any additional legal guidance with 
which to evaluate their acts. A civilian is not allowed to use violence 
to achieve his goals, military or otherwise, so the principle of military 
necessity never applies. A civilian is prohibited from knowingly or 
recklessly causing the deaths of innocent civilians, or damage to their 
property, so any argument that the loss was proportional to what he 
hoped to gain will fall on deaf ears. Concerning distinction, a civilian 
is not authorized to use unjustified violence against any target, 
                                                 
61 The concept of proportionality limit collateral damage to civilians and 
civilian property, it does not limit damage to lawful targets. Members of the enemy 
military are lawful targets at all times unless they become hors d’combat by 
surrendering, being wounded to the point they can no longer fight, becoming 
unconscious, entering the water after their warship is sunk, or parachuting from a 
destroyed aircraft for safety. 
62 MPC §3. 
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whether it be military or civilian, so limiting his strikes to military 
targets is legally insignificant.63 
A Soldier can be killed on the battlefield, but she is immune 
from prosecution or punishment for her lawful acts of combat, (i.e., 
as long as her battlefield acts do not violate jus in bello she cannot be 
criminally judged even if her side loses the war). The rationale is 
Soldiers have no control over if or when they will be sent to armed 
conflict; therefore, it is patently unjust both to punish them for that 
collective decision (jus ad bellum) and to use rules which are applicable 
domestically (criminal law instead of jus in bello). 
III.  PART II – CONFLATION & MISUNDERSTANDING ERRORS IN 
THE TREND AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
The errors in the trend against the use of military force fall 
into five general categories: 1) a conflation of jus in bello with jus ad 
bellum; 2) a morphing of the military mission away from traditional 
war-fighting responsibilities, thereby frustrating the jus in bello goals of 
a rapid end to the conflict and limiting the cost to the warfighter; 3) a 
conflation of jus in bello concepts with similar terms in the traditional 
criminal law paradigm; 4) an attempt by some academics to revise 
time-tested principles in IHL that are the product of centuries of 
customary practice, and, 5) a general lack of military deference in 
modern courts by jurists with no military experience or valid frame of 
reference. 
The costs of these errors are high: an ineffective military 
prolongs armed conflict through impotence and indecision, and 
victimizes the modern warfighter by leaving her outside the 
protections of the law; denying her the higher purpose of ending the 
armed conflict; and, reducing her to the legal peer of the criminals64 
she is forced to oppose. 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 This refers to the enemy combatants that disregard the principles of jus in 
bello by failing to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and carrying arms 
openly, among other violations. They can be labeled as criminals because they do 
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A.  Trend 1: the Jus ad bellum’s Veneer Over Jus ad bello 
As already outlined and discussed throughout this article, jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello are separable concepts. The public is 
comfortable and familiar with evaluating the merits of a given side in 
an armed conflict; it is a regular part of the political discourse and the 
fundamentals of jus ad bellum are similar to the restrictions on the use 
of force they face in everyday life. Public discourse is a good thing 
and the decision to enter an armed conflict should be widely and 
publicly debated. However, politicians, commentators, jurists, and 
academics then allow this jus ad bellum decision to enter an armed 
conflict to color and affect how they discuss and evaluate the legality 
of the combatant’s acts in jus in bello. The conflation of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello is both legally and morally problematic.65 The two 
concepts are distinct but can become blurred when the reasons 
behind why a State entered an armed conflict are suspect or without 
merit. 
World War II is a perfect example to compare one State’s 
Soldier with another: the German Soldier and his American 
counterpart. The German Soldier was a product of an evil State. But 
the rules governing the German Soldier in combat are identical to the 
rules that govern the U.S. Soldier in combat. The validity of a jus ad 
bellum claim that a war is unjust is totally irrelevant to the legality of a 
given warlike act of a Soldier. As the Just War Theorist Professor 
Michael Walzer notes, just wars can be fought unjustly and unjust 
                                                 
not possess privileged belligerency and therefore all of their acts of violence, to 
include the killing of uniformed enemy, are subject to criminal prosecution.   
65 This issue has been identified in the DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL: 
“As a general matter, jus in bello and jus ad bellum address different legal issues 
and should not be conflated. Conflating jus in bello and jus ad bellum risks 
misunderstanding and misapplying these concepts. For example, in jus ad bellum, 
proportionality refers to the principle that the overall goal of the State in resorting 
to war should not be outweighed by the harm that the war is expected to produce. 
However, proportionality in jus in bello generally refers to the standard that the 
expected incidental harm to the civilian population and civilian objects should not 
be disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage from an attack. Therefore, 
although a jus ad bellum proportionality analysis might consider the harm suffered by 
enemy military forces in the fighting, a jus in bello proportionality analysis would 
not.” Id. at 3.5.1. 
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wars can be fought justly.66 While politics are a necessary part of jus 
ad bellum,67 we should be careful to keep politics from affecting any jus 
in bello legal determinations and adjudication just like we try to keep 
politics out of our domestic criminal law decisions. 
This task is difficult enough without being linked to the 
modern international criminal tribunal whose jurists do not share a 
common polity with the defendant or even with each other. While 
these same conditions existed at Nuremberg, many of those judges 
were military officers fully aware that the decisions they made would 
affect their profession. Conversely, few judges at the international 
tribunals have any military experience.68 This lack of military 
experience is evident in many of our politicians, commentators, 
jurists, and academics; the result is that they tend to be far more 
familiar with and accepting of the criminal law and jus ad bellum goals 
of maintaining the peace rather than the jus in bello mission of rapidly 
ending the war. 
B. Trend 2: The Current Mindset for War: From the Management 
of Violence to the Management of Governance 
The role of the modern military is changing and today’s 
militaries face great uncertainty. New technologies and capabilities to 
inflict harm are not only held by States but are in the hands of non-
State actors.69 In War From the Ground Up, Emily Simpson divides 
modern conflict into two categories: war fought “to establish military 
                                                 
66 WALZER supra note 29, at 21. 
67 For example, the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution give the 
power to declare war to the most political of the three branches of the Federal 
Government: Congress. 
68 For a discussion of the cost of a lack of military experience among 
Tribunal judges, see Richard V. Meyer, Following Historical Precedent: An Argument for 
the Continued Use of Military Professionals as Triers of Fact in Some Humanitarian Law 
Tribunals, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 43 (2009). 
69 A byproduct of the post-industrial information age is that the raw 
materials and the knowledge to manufacture or develop potent weapons are both 
readily available to the general populace.   
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conditions for a political solution;”70 and war fought to “directly seek 
political, as opposed to military, outcomes.”71 The Gulf War from 
1990 to 1991 is a modern example of the first type while Afghanistan 
is an example of the second. The reality of having a strategy that 
needs “to consider military actions in terms of their likely political 
interpretations”72 will persist. As Simpson correctly notes, General 
Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009, restricted the use of 
both indirect fires and air-delivered bombs not because “they are . . . 
effective in military terms; they are. However, their political effect is 
often more harmful than their military value.”73 McChrystal put it in 
more general terms in his tactical directive: “the carefully controlled 
and disciplined employment of force entails risk to our troops – and 
we must mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of 
force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater 
risk.”74 The political and the military become blurred: “A policy 
decision only to fight wars with clear military solutions would mean 
to decline involvement in several situations in which enemies, 
especially non-state actors, refuse to engage in conventional battle 
against Western military forces.”75 
In 1957, Professor Samuel Huntington wrote The Soldier and 
the State, in which he outlined what constituted a professional 
Soldier.76 Professor Huntington opined the Soldier’s purpose was 
“the management of violence.”77 But the modern Soldier is asked to 
do much more. Today’s Soldier is asked to manage governance: 
Soldiers build schools, teach judges, manage power plants, grow 
                                                 
70 Sir Michael Howard, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 13, 2013) 
(reviewing ERNIE SIMPSON,’ WAR FROM THE GROUND UP: TWENTY-FRIST-
CENTURY COMBAT AS POLITICS (2013 [hereinafter “Simpson”]). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 4. 
73 Id. at 234. 
74 Declassified excerpt from NATO’s Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009, 
released by NATO ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009. 
75 Howard, supra note 70, at 11 
76 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE (1957). 
77 Id. at 16. 
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crops.78 Even in non-permissive environments, Soldiers are expected 
to mitigate violence. In concept, mitigating violence is attractive, but 
in practice, the asymmetric enemy is unlikely to give the Soldier any 
indication that he or she is a belligerent. 
One example of this thinking is the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps manual for counterinsurgency (COIN).79 
Understanding the asymmetric reality of both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the military decided in the mid-2000s to redraft the COIN manual. In 
particular, the situation in Iraq had deteriorated and the insurgency 
was gaining momentum. The manual, published in June 2006, 
acknowledged “[a]t its core, counterinsurgency warfare is a struggle 
for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the 
center of gravity for friendly fire.”80 One of the enumerated 
‘unsuccessful practices’ in the counterinsurgency manual was the 
warning not to place a “priority on killing and capturing the 
enemy. . .”81 The goal instead is to engage and protect the population. 
Counterinsurgency is an example of the second form of 
warfare discussed by Simpson; Counterinsurgency’s core mission is 
to make a political reality happen. This means political factors are 
primary. In the case of Afghanistan, it was the popular legitimacy of 
the government. In the words of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, 
“[b]roadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect 
civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, 
and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation 
government able to deliver essential human services.”82 
The COIN doctrine allows the use of force, to include lethal 
force, but the entire narrative of the manual is to constrain the use of 
force: 
                                                 
78 Dominic Tierney, Op-Ed., Jefferson’s Army of Nation Builders, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2010. 
79 Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication 3-33.5, December 2006 [hereinafter “COIN Manual”], at Preface. 
80 Id. at 1.1. 
81 Id. 
82 Karl W. Eikenberry, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: 
The Other Side of the COIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 59, 63. 
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[a]ny use of force generates a series of 
reactions. . . .the type and amount of force to be 
applied, and who wields it, should be carefully 
calculated by a counterinsurgent for any operation. 
An operation that kills five insurgents is 
counterproductive if the collateral damage or the 
creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of 
fifty more.83 
This rationale and logic was clear in the 2011 tactical directive 
of the Commander of ISAF, General John R. Allen, which stated: 
[c]onsider all use of force carefully. Ensure that the 
use of force is necessary and proportionate to the 
threat faced, and when applied it is precisely 
delivered. We must never forget the center of gravity 
in this campaign is the Afghan people; the citizens of 
Afghanistan will ultimately determine the future of 
their country.84 
During the same time frame the COIN concept was being 
developed within the Department of Defense, the Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enacted a breathtaking change 
to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE): individual Soldiers no 
longer enjoyed the personal right of self-defense.85 Individual self-
defense became a subset of unit self-defense and exercised by the 
unit commander: “unit commanders may limit individual self-defense 
by members of their unit.”86 The theoretical foundation of individual 
self-defense is premised on three pillars: the force used is necessary; 
the amount of force used is proportional; and the threat is imminent. 
In the previous editions of the SROE, the U.S. recognized each 
                                                 
83 COIN Manual, paragraph 1-141 
84 ISAF Tactical Directive, 30 November 2011, found at 
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%
20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf. 
85 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of 
Engagement, 13 June 2005 at para. E.2.a. 
86 Id. 
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Soldier possessed the “inherent right to use all necessary means 
available and to take appropriate actions to defend oneself. . . .” 87 
The suspension of an individual Soldier’s right of self-defense 
and the ascent of the COIN doctrine are inextricably related; the 
concept of limiting the use of force is woven throughout the 
counterinsurgency manual.88 The suspension and ascent are related by 
time, effect, and circumstances on the ground in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq in 2004 and 2005. There was a conclusion that military 
commanders could not use violence to win the conflict. And the 
COIN doctrine, by its very nature, and the suspension of self-
defense, limits the use of force. 
The COIN doctrine during an insurgency is not ill-advised; 
this doctrine is a legitimate means to execute a war. But the desire to 
limit force has a profound effect on a State’s military. The 
management of violence by the Soldier under COIN is the exception; 
now, under Simpson’s second paradigm, the Soldier is focused on 
managing governance. The military activity is no longer clearly 
distinguishable from the political activity by the Soldier on behalf of 
State. This means we enter a conflict where military violence is 
eschewed. Conditions allowing the use of force to be confined and 
constrained is, however, a policy decision. Counterinsurgency policy 
does not change the law that applies to combatants in conflict. It 
does, however, change the public’s mindset of what war constitutes. 
The public begins to think we can produce results with limited force. 
It then becomes the expectation – especially from the public, via the 
press – that any force which results in a death of an innocent is the 
exception. It drives the public to believe the resultant damage or 
death is the salient factor in considering if a force was justified to 
begin with. 
In other words, civilian criminal law standards start to apply 
to privileged belligerents on the battlefield. Terms like self-defense, 
necessity, and proportionality exist both within criminal law and jus in 
bello. This leads some to think the jus in bello standards imbedded in 
                                                 
87 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of 
Engagement, 15 January 2000 at Enclosure A, para. 5.a. 
88 COIN Manual, supra note 79. 
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IHL are the same language: the same concepts and meaning 
extrapolated from civilian criminal law. The media, commentators, 
and even jurists are guilty of this mistake. The fact is, although the 
vocabulary may be similar, the meaning of these terms is tectonically 
different. This category of conflation error has recently arisen within 
the decisions of the international tribunals. 
C. Trend 3: Criminalization of the Use of Force by International 
Courts 
Military objectives are central to the use of violence by a 
military commander. Military objectives are “limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”89 The sad reality is that civilians, 
who are protected by IHL, will inevitably be in areas of armed 
conflict and exposed to harm. It is therefore universally recognized, 
in the words of Professor Geoffrey Corn, “that the principle of 
military objective is insufficient to provide adequate protection for 
civilians from the harmful effects of hostilities.”90 With this reality in 
mind, military professionals, through customary practice, developed 
the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. These 
were recorded by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions Additional 
Protocol, which prohibits 1) attacks that are intentionally against 
civilians and 2) attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in 
relation to the concrete military objective.91 
The first prohibition is intent based; the second is a balancing 
of military objectives and the civilian casualties and determining if the 
latter was excessive. The first violates the principle of distinction, 
while the second violates the principle of proportionality. Distinction, 
as noted earlier, is the obligation of military personnel to delineate 
                                                 
89 Additional Protocol I, 52(2). 
90 Expert Report of Professor Geoffrey Corn to the ICTY for the case of 
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-06-90, at 
12. 
91 Additional Protocol I, 48 & 51(5)(b). 
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between combatants and civilians. Proportionality is a much more 
ambiguous concept because it is subjective; proportionality is 
violated, in essence, when it is determined that the harm to civilians 
was excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from attacking a lawful military objective. Professor Jens 
David Ohlin of Cornell University concludes, “that there are almost 
no examples of [proportionality-based] prosecutions before 
international tribunals that might provide guiding precedent on the 
nature of proportionality.”92 Professor Ohlin maintains that 
proportionality “has so rarely been applied by international tribunals” 
because prosecutors “squeeze almost all of the targeting cases into 
the first [prong], thus accusing the commander in question of directly 
targeting civilians. . . .”93   
Outlining a series of cases with the International Tribunal of 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Professor Ohlin concludes the 
common law concept of intent—acting with purpose or 
knowledge—required under the first prong of intentionally attacking 
civilians within the ICTY has morphed to the lower standard of 
recklessness. In other words, the court never has to grapple with the 
murky world of proportionality found in the second prong. The case 
that crystallizes this lower standard is The Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar.94  
In Strugar, the defendant, Lieutenant General Strugar, was a 
leader in the then Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.95 The Yugoslav 
government, in an attempt to hold Yugoslavia together, was 
attempting to suppress the Croatian people from breaking away.96 As 
part of this suppression, General Strugar shelled areas of Dubrovnik, 
Croatia in late 1991.97 These artillery attacks killed several civilians 
                                                 
92 Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 
at 86 [hereinafter “Ohlin”]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. citing Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf. [hereinafter 
“Strugar”]. 
95 Id. at 1. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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and destroyed many historic buildings.98 The defendant was charged 
with murder and the intentional attacks on civilians. He was found 
guilty and sentenced to eight years.99 The Trial Chamber held: 
. . . where a civilian population is subject to an attack 
such as an artillery attack, which results in civilian 
deaths, such deaths may appropriately be 
characterized as murder, when the perpetrators had 
knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause 
death.100 
The mere probability the attack would cause death is enough 
to trigger a charge of an intentional harming of civilians. The concept 
of intent—acting with either purpose or knowledge—under Strugar 
expanded to recklessness. This lower standard means a commander 
who launches an attack where there is a probability civilians might be 
injured or killed is violating IHL; in other words, the commander 
launching the attack is a war criminal because of mere probability and 
the accompanying result that the harm occurred. In war, it would be 
hard to fathom a situation where harm might not befall the civilian 
population, especially in an age of asymmetric warfare where the 
enemy refuses to distinguish himself from the civilian population. 
What is occurring is that the law is being driven by the 
results, not the intent. War causes death and destruction and some of 
those harmed will be civilians. To minimize those losses is of 
paramount import, but to make the standard of culpability one of 
recklessness subject to an after-the-fact review is to impose an 
unrealistic limitation on the military. And conceptually, it flips IHL 
on its head. Professor Ohlin states the conceptual underpinnings of 
IHL: “envisioning the killing of civilians and coming to some 
conclusion as to whether the number of deaths will be proportionate 
or not disproportionate – does not violate the principle of 
distinction. Simply envisioning the deaths of civilians does not mean 
the commander has directed the attack against the civilians.”101 If that 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 198. 
100 Id. at 110. 
101 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 113. 
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were the case, no Soldier would be immune from the reality that in 
war civilians will be killed and thereby making Soldiers criminally 
liable to this reality. 
Even the mental element in Article 30 of the Rome Statute of 
1998—the Statute that established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)—states “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court [ICC] only in the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.”102 A plain reading of Article 
30 seems to suggest the defendant must act with purpose or 
knowledge to be culpable. In fact, recklessness as a standard to meet 
culpability was considered by the drafters of the Rome Statute and 
squarely rejected: the mental element of recklessness was banished 
from the Statute.103 Put differently, even if an accused foresees the 
possibility of his or her act causing death and still persists, regardless of 
the possible consequences, the person is not guilty of a war crime 
unless the accused had knowledge civilians would be killed and he or 
she meant to kill those civilians.   
But some judges and commentators cite Article 30 and the 
“unless otherwise provided” clause to conclude recklessness is 
enough to find culpability. Recklessness, they argue, is a level of 
intent that is an acceptable standard under customary international 
law and therefore, otherwise provided; that is, it is an acceptable 
mental state for war crimes.104 Professor Ohlin notes, however, “it is 
not clear how customary international law could provide a basis to 
support a lower mental element.”105 This revisionist interpretation of 
what Article 30 means is critical because it changes the focus from 
what the Soldier thinks will happen to what an objective person 
thinks might happen. Those are two starkly different perspectives. The 
former is a mental state possessed by the Soldier when he uses force, 
while the latter is about the degree of risk the Soldier takes. Any 
military mission will have risks that the Soldier’s acts could cause the 
                                                 
102 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (entered into force 
July 1, 2002) at Article 30 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”]. 
103 Id.; Ohlin supra note 92, at 101. 
104 Strugar, supra note 94, at 110. 
105 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 108. 
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death of a civilian – if that is the acid test, however, then any mission 
will be judged under the first prong of willfully targeting civilians. 
Under this analysis, the courts approach a strict liability: the dead 
civilian is presumptively a war crime. 
The courts’ decisions and even the far better justified opinion 
of Professor Ohlin both make the same conflation error; attempting 
to use traditional criminal law concepts to explain terms in jus in bello. 
Professor Ohlin falls for the trap of using the common law definition 
of intentional (including purpose and knowledge) to define the term 
within the Protocol and opening this door invites the subsequent step 
down to recklessness. This first prong actually has two parts: A) who 
or what was targeted, and B) were they or it a legitimate military 
target? 
Part A is entirely subjective. Who were you targeting? 
Combatants are prohibited from conducting indiscriminate attacks. 
Instead, each attack must have a specific legitimate military target. 
Thus, for the first prong, the standard is that of motivated purpose. 
As the then Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
noted, “International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit 
belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military 
objectives even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries 
will occur.”106 To use any other standard would be to completely 
eliminate the principle of proportionality. That principle forces the 
attacker to balance the military advantage with the collateral damage, 
meaning the attacker has knowledge a civilian target will be damaged 
and yet can still strike if the military advantage outweighs the 
collateral cost. The crux is who or what did they plan for the 
projectile to hit? 
For part B, if the target was a valid military target, this part 
has not been violated even if the strike (knowingly) killed dozens of 
innocent civilians collaterally, though this would probably violate the 
second prong of proportionality. More problematic is if the shooter 
                                                 
106 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, letter concerning the situation in Iraq, Office of 
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, February 9, 2006, p. 5, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2006.pdf. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
142 
subjectively believed the target to be a valid military target, but in fact 
it was not. For example, Captain Kudo shot the two diggers on the 
side of the road in Afghanistan believing they were planting a bomb, 
but afterwards we determine they were only digging an irrigation 
canal. It is in this second prong that a level of intent less than 
purpose might be appropriate. On a static battlefield (e.g., trench 
warfare) segregated from the civilian population, it might be 
justifiable to issue an order to shoot anything moving in the no man’s 
land between the trenches since there is little or no chance it is a 
civilian and taking the time to verify it is an enemy may place the 
Soldier at risk. This would be in contrast to a modern asymmetric 
nonlinear global battlefield. Given these opposite poles of possibility 
and correlative responsibility, the sliding scales of recklessness or 
negligence seem to provide the best vehicle to balance the myriad of 
factors and concerns. However, post hoc evaluation of any such 
decision must give full credence to the factual situation for that 
belligerent: would a reasonable privileged belligerent with the 
knowledge, training, time, resources, and experience of the defendant 
have believed the target was lawful? Note this does not open the door 
to question if the attack was tactically required at that time under this 
prong, but only if the belief of the shooter that the target was a 
military target was reasonable under the circumstances. 
On at least one occasion, the ICTY grappled with the second 
prong: attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in relation to 
the concrete military objective. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ante 
Gotovina, et al.107, Colonel General Ante Gotovina, a Croatian 
commander, was indicted for ordering an illegal artillery attack 
against four towns—Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac.108 Each 
city was in the Croatian Serb break-away region of Krajina. Croatia 
launched an offensive—Operation Storm—in 1995 to bring this 
region back under Croatian control. The Croatian forces commenced 
to put the towns of Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac under 
fire.109 The objective of Operation Storm was to expel Serbian forces 
from the region. The Croatian forces succeeded under General 
                                                 
107 The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-
06-90 [hereinafter “Gotovina”]. 
108 Id. at 9. 
109 Id. at 601. 
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Gotovina; they seized Knin, the capital of Krajina, on August 5, 
1995.110 
The Tribunal’s indictment of General Gotovina for violations 
of the laws and customs of war hinged on his shelling of the four 
towns. The Trial Chamber found General Gotovina guilty of 
violating these laws and customs. As one academic concluded, 
“Gotovina’s conviction turns on the lawfulness vel non of the 
artillery fires against targets in the[se] Krajina towns. . . .”111 
The Trial Court’s judgment of Gotovina appears to be 
premised on both prongs of liability: the attacks were intentional (i.e., 
deliberately toward civilians), and the attacks were indiscriminate (i.e., 
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated).112 As Major General Walter B. 
Huffman, the former Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, 
noted, “the court apparently embraced a hybrid theory of both 
deliberate and indiscriminate targeting in violation of Protocol I, 
Articles 51(2) and 51(5)(a).113 Under Article 51(2), the first prong—
”civilians [] shall not be the object of attack”—Gotovina “deliberately 
targeted civilian areas.”114 Under Article 51(5), the second prong—the 
balancing of the military advantage gained to the amount and severity 
of civilian casualties —Gotovina’s shelling “constituted an 
indiscriminate attack on these towns. . .”115 
Both prongs are premised on an inference that shells that 
landed more than 200 meters from a known military objective were 
deemed unlawful (deliberate or indiscriminate) attacks on civilian 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Walter B. Huffman, Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the Ruling in the 
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, 211 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinafter “Huffman”]. 
112 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 12; Additional 
Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b). 
113 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28. 
114 Gotovina, supra note 107, at 973 
115 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28. 
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areas.116 With little evidentiary support, the Trial Chamber concluded 
“a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that those artillery 
projectiles which impacted within a distance of 200 meters of 
identified artillery targets were deliberately fired at that artillery 
target.”117 The court then extrapolated from this norm that any 
projectile falling outside the 200-meter range was disproportionate.118 
The Trial Chamber’s decree of a 200-meter rule—without 
receiving any evidence on this point—is deeply troubling: “the court 
had to make broad assumptions, treat the absence of evidence as 
evidence of absence, and resolve ambiguities in favor of the 
prosecution to be able to apply its 200 meter standard.”119 The logic 
in the Gotovina case extends the trend outlined by Professor Olin that 
the threshold of liability is lowered, but in this case, it goes to the 
second prong. International Tribunals’ attempt to shoehorn all 
civilian deaths into an intentional act, even if reckless, under the first 
prong (the military commander knew there would be civilians 
casualties), is driven by the prosecutor’s theory of the case. Opening 
the aperture to recklessness is concerning and fraught with dangers. 
In essence, the court’s focus is on the post-hoc effects of the 
military’s attack instead of what is required by IHL; that commanders 
act in good faith to do all within their capabilities and limitations to 
minimize civilian casualties while accomplishing their mission.120 The 
Gotovina Court, however, introduces a per se rule into the subjectivity 
of proportionality. The court dictates that since the commander 
exceeded the 200-meter rule, he is per se excessive under the second 
prong. 
When triggering a per se rule, an international tribunal never 
has to contend with the commander’s intent and examine his good-
faith precautions to spare innocence. Like reducing intentionality to 
mere recklessness, the court sidestepped the rigorous balancing 
                                                 
116 Gotovina, supra note 107 (Summary at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415_summary.pdf). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Huffman, supra note 111, at 36. 
120 ICRC Commentary on International Humanitarian Law, note 22 at para. 
2215. 
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analysis required under the principle of proportionality. Instead, the 
Gotovina Court relied on a strict liability of violating some abstract 
rule of distance to find liability. To abandon this balancing test is 
problematic to say the least. 
As General Huffman concludes, “[a] hallmark of international 
humanitarian law is its consistency with the actual practice of warfare 
by civilized nations.”121 The court’s per se 200-meter rule, made out 
of whole cloth, alters the timeframe to be examined; in other words, 
the moment in time for consideration is shifted from the time of 
attack to the time the collateral damage occurs. This is contrary to 
IHL in that the question of whether the commander killed or injured 
civilians becomes the locus of judgment instead of examining the 
commander’s military necessity at the time of attack. Even the 
commentary to the Additional Protocols acknowledges that under the 
second prong, when determining if the harm to civilians is excessive 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from an 
attack of a lawful military objective, the perspective to be examined is 
the military commander’s before the attack.122 It is the prosecution’s 
obligation under the customs and laws of war to show there was a 
criminal intent by the commander when he ordered the attack. The 
destructive results are evidence but nothing in the law requires, nor 
should it, the results be the driver. It is the commander’s intent at the 
time. 
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
conviction and found the 200-meter rule to be arbitrary; it further 
concluded the civilian casualties were not excessive compared to the 
military advantage from shelling the four towns.123 As one military 
and artillery expert opined, “I can state unequivocally that a circle of 
200 m[eters] around a target could never serve as a realistic or proper 
                                                 
121 Huffman, supra note 111, at 45. 
122 Commentary to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions at 
pp. 683,684. 
123 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov.. 16, 2012) at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf at pp. 
19-21. 
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standard for a sound assessment of cannon and rocket fire. . . .”124 
Although set aside, the Gotovina Trial Court opened the door for 
international tribunals to stitch new rules out of whole cloth that 
impose criminal liability on commanders. As General Gotovina’s 
appeal correctly asserts the judgment “has far-reaching significance 
beyond [his] case. . . . The Judgment is an unreasonable and 
unrealistic precedent that undermines that credibility and relevance of 
[international] humanitarian law. It imposes a standard so exacting 
that it renders lawful warfare impossible for military commanders.”125 
Professor Corn submitted an expert report before the trial 
court and in subsequent writings opined that the Tribunal was left 
with differing opinions on the reasonableness of General Gotovina’s 
judgment.126 Professor Corn’s concern is that the International 
Tribunal seemed to base its reasonableness of Gotovina’s actions on 
an assessment of whether a commander considered evidence in 
support of his decision.127 But this should not be the standard in a 
criminal proceeding for reasonableness. Instead, the gravamen of the 
proceedings should be “on the quality of the evidence that supported 
the [commander’s] decision.”128 In a nutshell, Professor Corn makes 
the point that, “[i]nstead of focusing on the question of whether the 
commander reasonably believed the object of attack was a military 
objective, the Tribunal has focused on the question of whether the 
commander knew the object of attack was a civilian or civilian 
property.”129 
The reality is that any criminal judgment of a Soldier using 
force will be after the fact—post hoc. The test must be one of 
                                                 
124 Huffman citing Comments and Conclusions by GenMaj (ret.) Rolf Th. 
Ocken, German Army, on the Subject “Croatian Army use of Artillery in KNIN, 
CROATIA on 4-5 August 1995,” (Nov. 19, 2011). 
125 Notice of Appeal of Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, May 16, 
2011, found at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom6/en/110516.pdf at 
pp 4-5.  
126 Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of 
Information Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 
Brook. L. Rev. 437, 456-457. 
127 Id. at 458. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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reasonableness, but the analysis should start with what information 
did the commander have at the time? Professor Corn was “struck by 
the inherent arbitrariness of [the court’s] assessment.”130 Professor 
Corn writes, “[w]hile it seemed relatively apparent that the Presiding 
Judge was determined to critique the reasonableness of General 
Gotovina’s judgments by carefully considering all the facts and 
circumstances prevailing at the time, there was never any discussion 
of the amount of proof required to render those judgments 
reasonable.”131 
This lack of standard will inevitably drive a judicial appraisal 
to make determinations on what occurred after the fact vice the 
considerations and deliberations of the Soldier before the fact. The 
real question is: do the military actions have a reasonable basis in 
military necessity? The presumption must be yes. To presume 
otherwise would lead to the post hoc critiquing of a commander’s 
actions based on what occurred, instead of the commander’s intent as 
expressed by his orders. 
D. Trend 4: Revising Jus in bello Without Considering the Effect on 
the Innocent Warfighter 
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary 
practice. Professional warfighters with battlefield experience have 
balanced humanitarian goals with the moral and legal mandate to end 
the conflict as quickly as possible and the rights and respect owed the 
individual warfighter to create the principles of jus in bello. By 
developing through customary practice, these principles were able to 
evolve without threatening the military mission or unjustly 
victimizing the warfighter. The battlefield is so dissimilar to everyday 
life because its denizens operate outside the protections of the law. 
The battlefield is not the place for external academic, untested, new-
idea-driven change. Sadly, this has not dissuaded some from 
attempting exactly that. 
                                                 
130 Id. at 457. 
131 Id. 
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In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) sent a shock wave across the international legal community. 
The ICRC published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law. In this Interpretive Guidance, written by Nils Melzer, the 
following recommendation was proposed: 
Restraint on the use of force in direct attack 
In addition to the restraints imposed by international 
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of 
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions 
that may arise under other applicable branches of 
international law, the kind and degree of force which 
is permissible against persons not entitled to 
protection against direct attack must not exceed what 
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.132 
It was the phrase “must not exceed what is actually 
necessary”133 that caused the firestorm. The ICRC recommended a 
use-of-force continuum theory, or as some academics refer to it, the 
‘least harmful means rule.’ In the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC 
goes on to explain what it meant by necessary: 
[i]n sum, while operating forces can hardly be 
required to take additional risks for themselves or the 
civilian population in order to capture an armed 
adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of 
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving 
him or her an opportunity to surrender where there 
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.134 
                                                 
132 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, adopted February 26, 2009. at 
996. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1043. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Maxwell & Meyer 5:1 
149 
The footnote substantiating this claim quotes the writings of 
Jean Pictet, once the President of the ICRC and the lead editor of the 
authoritative commentary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Pictet 
opined: “[i]f we can put a Soldier out of action by capturing him, we 
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding 
him, we must not kill him. . . .”135 
Other academics have also advanced a ‘least harmful means 
rule.’ Professor Goodman of New York University used the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance as a springboard to argue a ‘least harmful 
means rule,’ “should be understood to have a solid foundation in the 
structure, rules, and practices of modern warfare.”136 His argument is 
grounded in Article 41(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which 
mandates the safeguarding of hors de combat—those combatants 
outside the fight.137 Goodman argues, like the Interpretive Guidance, 
“a Soldier who is rendered defenseless or incapable of resistance 
should not be subject to attack.”138 He expands the conceptual 
definition of hors de combat and argues an enemy combatant should 
be treated like a hors de combat when “there is clearly no military 
benefit (including any risk to one’s own forces) to be gained from 
killing rather than capturing an individual.”139 This includes situations 
where the enemy combatant could still physically engage in hostilities 
but does not. Like the Interpretive Guidance, Professor Goodman 
suggests that considerations of military necessity and humanity 
should guide the determination of how to conduct an engagement.140 
His theoretical basis for abandoning the well-entrenched rule that 
members of an enemy belligerency qualify as lawful objects of attack 
at all times and all places for as long as they remain under the 
operational command and control of enemy leadership and are 
physically capable of acting on that authority141 is to limit the scope of 
                                                 
135 Id. at 1044 
136 Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. 
INT’L .L. 819 (2013) [hereinafter “Goodman”]. 
137 Id. & Additional Protocol 1, Art. 85(3). 
138 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830. 
139 Id. at 839. 
140 Id. 
141 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 
536, 538 (2013) [hereinafter “Corn et al.”]. 
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military necessity.142 In other words, an enemy belligerent who would 
do no harm; that is, defenseless, is not militarily necessary to kill. 
Other academics echo this conclusion: 
[T]he current interpretation of ‘necessary’ as including 
what is less costly or less risky or even merely 
convenient allows too broad a discretion for forces to 
attack available—rather than clearly ‘necessary’—
targets. To bring the term ‘necessary’ closer to its 
literal meaning, it should include a least-harmful 
means component; it is entirely possible to conceive 
of ‘necessary’ as the least measure of harm by which 
to achieve a desired end.143 
The challenges with the ICRC’s rationale, along with the 
scholarship of Professor Goodman, are fourfold. First, there is 
absolutely no requirement under state practice or international law, 
namely the 1977 Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, for 
a combatant to do a ‘military necessity’ analysis of an enemy 
belligerent; the Soldier need not to look to a ‘least harmful means 
rule’ as to whether the Soldier should capture the enemy belligerent 
or kill him. Given that military necessity “justifies those measures not 
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing 
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible,”144 killing 
an enemy belligerent is per se permissible. The enemy belligerent takes 
a status under IHL of being a military target. The rationale is simple: 
“military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed 
enemies.”145 As noted Law of War expert Hays Parks concluded, 
“[t]here is no ‘military necessity’ determination requirement for an 
individual Soldier to engage an enemy combatant or a civilian 
                                                 
142 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830. 
143 Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 
161 (2011). 
144 See Note 25. 
145 W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: 
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 804 
(2010) [hereinafter “Parks”]. 
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determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any more than 
there is for a Soldier to attack an enemy tank.”146 
The second challenge is one of shifting burdens. Under 
current international law, the burden is on the enemy belligerent to 
indicate his surrender affirmatively. This assumes the enemy 
belligerent is not a hors de combat—”rendered unconscious or is 
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is 
incapable of defending himself.”147 Professor Michael Schmitt of the 
Naval War College makes the point, “[a] rule that prohibits an attack 
whenever the individual can be captured would shift the burden from 
the fighter to the attacker in a way that warfighting states would have 
been, and remain, unlikely to countenance.”148 These States would 
not adhere to such a shift in burden because it would add a layer of 
complexity to military operations—training, implementation, 
accountability—that is simply unsustainable. The reality is, “the 
historic consequence of combat is that combatants lawfully may kill 
their enemies and are at constant risk of being killed by them.”149 
Related to the shifting burden States would eschew, the third 
troubling point about the ICRC’s proposal is its lack of practicality. 
In the words of Professors Geoffrey Corn, Laurie Blank, Chris Jenks, 
and Eric Talbot Jensen: 
once the law requires that Soldiers assess the actual 
threat an enemy combatant poses, the inevitable 
consequence of a rule that requires less harmful 
means based on the absence of an actual threat, the 
effectiveness of combat capability risks dilution, and 
tactical clarity will be degraded. . . . [and] [d]iluting 
tactical clarity will inevitably dilute . . . moral clarity.150 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Additional Protocol 1, Art. 41. 
148 Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s 
‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L .L.  855, 858 (2013). 
149 Parks, supra note 145, at 829. 
150 Corn et al., supra note 141, at 567-568. 
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Once the element of subjectivity enters the equation, moral 
clarity—whether it is at the tactical, operational, or strategic level—
exits. Professors Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen make a compelling 
case that not giving the Soldier the clarity of whether he can engage 
and shoot an enemy belligerent will result in hesitation, confusion, or 
create a chilling effect on what the Soldier is asked to do: engage with 
and destroy the enemy. The second-guessing with the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight will cripple a Soldier’s certainty that when he 
engages with the enemy, his mission, as has been the mission of 
Soldiers for centuries before him, is to kill the enemy. And “the 
assurance and knowledge that the always difficult decision to take 
another human life was legally and operationally justified. . . .”151 is 
critical to a Soldier’s mental and moral compass. The authors of this 
article go one step further: the ‘least harmful means rule’ would 
eviscerate moral clarity in the fog of war. 
The fourth concern is that the ‘least harmful means rule’ is 
actually the conflation of two legal regimes: IHL and domestic law 
norms outlined within human rights law (HRL). Under HRL, known 
as the law enforcement regime, the use of lethal force is one of last 
resort. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable alternatives, 
he or she must exercise them. The criminal suspect in a domestic 
context never takes a status of a military target; in laymen’s speak, the 
criminal cannot be killed merely because of what he is suspected of 
having done criminally. The compact in the law enforcement 
paradigm is “to protect individuals from abuse by their State”152 of 
which the suspect is a member. And when lethal force is used in the 
domestic setting, it must be necessary, proportional, and imminent; 
that is, the officer triggers a right of self-defense for himself or others 
in the vicinity. 
In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court has held that the use 
of deadly force is reasonable under the Constitution and therefore 
authorized when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect 
                                                 
151 Id. at 620. 
152 ICRC, The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay between the 
Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms at 7, found at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf [hereinafter 
“Interplay”]. 
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is dangerous and can escape and a verbal warning, if feasible, is 
given.153 On the other side of the equation, the Court has held that 
“[w]here a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no 
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him 
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”154 It is the 
criminal’s conduct that will drive the actions of the police officer. 
The moral compact of the officer with the society they serve is the 
basis for their authority: “human rights law regulates the resort to 
force by State authorities in order to maintain or restore public 
security, law and order.”155 Minimum force or a ‘least harmful means 
rule’ in this context makes sense—lethal force is a measure of last 
resort because of what the police officer is entrusted to accomplish. 
This is not the logic behind IHL. The driving force behind 
IHL is not to ensure public security, although that could be one the 
military’s tasks; the main goal is to set parameters for Soldiers as 
agents of the State on how to destroy the enemy. The cardinal rule of 
the combatant is distinction—”parties to an armed conflict must at 
all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one 
hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand and 
direct their attacks only against the latter.”156 Given this limitation on 
the use of force, the Soldier, as an agent of the State, is told by the 
State how to accomplish the goal of destroying the combatants and 
military objectives. The use of force to accomplish the mission is 
driven by the State. This collective action by the State uses the Soldier 
to effectuate this goal because the State tells the Soldier what are the 
policy limits of ‘military necessity’ to accomplish the mission. The 
role and purpose of the police officer is fundamentally different, and 
it is why the law enforcement paradigm is troubling in an armed 
conflict scenario. 
                                                 
153 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). 
154 Id. 
155 Interplay, supra note 152, at 7. 
156 See note 33. 
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E. Trend 5: Challenging the Use of Force by the Military in Civil 
Courts that Lack Subject Matter Competence 
Scholars and international organizations that would make it 
more difficult for Soldiers to engage the enemy are but one prong of 
the trend against the use of military force. The other prongs stem 
from the legal profession: one of those prongs is the access litigants 
have to the courtroom to challenge decisions made by military 
personnel. The civil litigation exposure prong is best evidenced by a 
string of recent cases emerging from the United Kingdom. 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), drafted in 1950, states signatories “shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this 
Convention.”157 The Convention, in its first substantive article, 
Article 2, outlines a central pillar of human rights law: the right to 
life.158 The Convention mandates that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall 
be protected by law.”159 It does, however, give its signatories a caveat: 
“[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force 
which is not more than absolutely necessary. . . .”160 To judicially 
enforce these rights and freedoms, the convention established a 
court: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).161 This court, 
which virtually all European countries have ratified, to include the 
UK, can and has trumped the rulings of domestic courts. 
The real battle line of when States have violated one’s right to 
life has been the elasticity of the concept of jurisdiction; in other 
words, does the right to life provision contained in Article 2—or any 
other provision within the Convention, for that matter—have 
extraterritorial application outside Europe? Of particular import is 
whether this human rights norm applies to conflict areas like 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In late 2001, the case of Bankovic et al. v. Belgium 
et al was brought before the ECtHR by six citizens from the Federal 
                                                 
157 Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights (2010). 
158 Id. at Article 2. 
159 Id. at Art. 2(1). 
160 Id. at Art. 2(2). 
161 Id. at Art. 19-51. 
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Republic of Yugoslavia against 17 European members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).162 The claim flowed from 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force. This operation was an air campaign 
directed at Yugoslavia in an effort to force Yugoslavia to remove its 
forces from Kosovo.163 In the morning raid of April 23, 1999, NATO 
bombs killed and injured scores of Yugoslavians.164 The claimants, 
whose relatives died, alleged a violation of the right to life under 
Article 2.165 The question for the ECtHR was whether there was 
jurisdiction to allow the case to go forward. The ECtHR said 
individuals killed by missiles or bombs fired from an aircraft outside 
an area under the effective control of a State were not within the 
State’s jurisdiction.166 
The defendants in the Bankovic Case, the 17 NATO States, 
argued that the term “jurisdiction” meant an “assertion or exercise of 
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form 
of allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that 
State’s control.”167 The ECtHR seemed to agree. It proclaimed that 
“the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.”168 
The Court went on to articulate that “Article 1 of the Convention 
must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial 
notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional 
and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case.”169 If extra-territorial jurisdiction was to exist, then the 
State must militarily occupy or exercise all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that territory’s government.170 
                                                 
162 Bankovic, Stojanovic, Stoimedovski, Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at 41 I.L.M. 
517 [hereinafter “Bankovic v. Belgium”]. 
163 Id. at pp 518-519. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 522. 
166 Id. at pp. 523-524. 
167 Id. at 522. 
168 Id. at 526. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 528. 
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In other words, a fair reading of Bankovic is that the 
Convention’s extraterritorial jurisdiction must be exceptional. 
Professor Marko Milanovic of the University of Nottingham, 
however, traces the ECtHR’s slow abandonment of this norm.171 In 
2007, for example, the ECtHR in Pad and others v. Turkey found 
jurisdiction when an Iranian family living near the Turkish-Iranian 
border was killed by a missile.172 It was disputed where the attack 
occurred but “the Court clearly thought that it would have been 
entirely arbitrary for the application of the [European Court of 
Human Rights] to hinge on the applicants’ location within a few 
hundred metres.”173 
Ten years after Bankovic, the ECtHR heard the case of Al-
Skeini v. United Kingdom.174 In Al-Skeini, six Iraqis brought suit against 
the United Kingdom. The six claimants asserted the British failed to 
conduct a full and thorough investigation into the deaths of their 
family members; this, they maintained, was a procedural violation of 
Article 2, the right to life.175 Five of the dead Iraqis died in fire fights 
with the British troops. According to the British Government, British 
troops were patrolling the streets of Basra one evening in August 
2003 when they heard gunfire. As the Soldiers approached the 
gunfire, the patrol leader saw several Iraqi men, including Mr. Al-
Skeini, with weapons; one of the Iraqi men pointed his weapon at 
him and his unit. In self-defense, the British Soldier shot and killed 
the Iraqi men. A subsequent investigation found that the Soldiers’ 
actions were a valid exercise of self-defense.176 The Iraqi testimony is 
starkly different: the British Soldiers killed the Iraqis without 
provocation and the reason one of the deceased Iraqis had a weapon 
was because he was walking to a funeral and discharge of weapons at 
                                                 
171 Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L 
.L.  121 (2012) [hereinafter “Milanovic Al-Skeini”]. 
172 Id. at 124. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 121. 
175 Id. at 125. 
176 ECtHR, Al-Skeini et al. v. UK, App. No. 55721/07,7, 7 July 2011 at para. 
34-62. 
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funerals is common.177 In other words, the Iraqis maintained that 
those killed never threatened the British Soldiers. 
The sixth claimant in Al-Skeini drew the most scrutiny. Like 
the other claimants, Mr. Baha Mousa’s father, on behalf of his son, 
claimed that there had been an inadequate investigation. For Mr. 
Mousa, however, is was for the asphyxiation death of Mr. Mousa in a 
British detainment facility in Basra.178 
The British House of Lords dismissed the claims of the five 
Iraqis involved in the firefight.179 The majority applied an “effective 
control” test. The United Kingdom never exercised effective control 
over Basra, even though the British were an occupying power in 
Basra and southern Iraq. The insurgency and the limited number of 
British troops made effective control in Basra not possible. The Law 
Lords cited Bankovic for the notion that the mere killing of an 
individual does not trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction.180 The House 
of Lords did find jurisdiction regarding the death of Baha Mousa, but 
on the grounds that a British prison was like an embassy and 
jurisdiction attached.181 
The question before the ECtHR was what does “within their 
jurisdiction” mean: when and where do the obligations outlined in 
the ECHR—specifically the right to life under Article 2—apply? The 
ECtHR, in essence, expanded Bankovic and opened the jurisdictional 
aperture as follows: 
. . . following the removal from power of the Ba’ath 
regime and under the accession of the Interim 
Government, the United Kingdom (together with the 
United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some 
of the public power normally to be exercised by a 
sovereign government. In particular, the United 
                                                 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at paras. 63-71. 
179 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for 
Defense (2007) UKHL (2008) AC 153. 
180 Id. at para. 83. 
181 Id. at paras. 97 & 132. 
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Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the 
maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these 
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that 
the United Kingdom, through its Soldiers engaged in 
security operations in Basrah during the period in 
question, exercised authority and control over 
individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link 
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.182 
This holding is extraordinarily expansive and can be read to 
mean that when there are boots-on-the-ground Soldiers conducting 
security operations, the reach of the ECTHR will extend to that 
battlefield. Every army has “public power.” One principle mission of 
a Soldier is to engage in security operations, especially in light of 
COIN operations. The Al-Skeini Case extends jurisdiction, allowing 
individual claimants to challenge the conduct of how the military 
conducts its operations. This ability to second-guess a military’s 
operations will have profound impact on how a nation’s military 
conducts its operations worldwide. But there are second and third 
order effects, as well. The United Kingdom felt the brunt of Al-Skeini 
in two ways: one tactical and one strategic. The claims were allowed 
to go forward, costing the British Government a handsome sum of 
money. But more fundamentally, it opened the floodgate of claimants 
that would challenge how the British Army does business on the 
battlefield. This second point was acutely realized with the case of 
Smith (No. 2) v. The Ministry of Defence.183 
The facts of Smith are chilling both factually and legally—in 
large measure because the claimants are members of the British 
military.184 The claimants alleged a violation of Article 2—right to life. 
They claimed the equipment they were provided while deployed to 
Iraq was not suitable.185 On 15 July 2005, a British squad-sized unit 
                                                 
182 Note 171 at paras. 143-148. 
183 R (on the application of Smith and others) v. Secretary of State for 
Defense (2013) UKSC 41. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at paras. 9-12. 
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patrolled Al Amarah in Iraq. The vehicle used by the patrol was a 
“Snatch Land Rover.” This vehicle had not been fitted with an 
electronic countermeasure to protect it from improvised explosive 
devises, known as IEDs. While on patrol, the Snatch Land Rover hit 
an IED; three Soldiers died and two were injured. Seven months 
later, in the same town, another Snatch Land Rover hit an IED and 
two more Soldiers lost their lives. The second vehicle had been 
outfitted with an electronic countermeasure, but there was a part 
missing to the system and therefore it did not work.186 
The families of the fallen Soldiers sued Her Majesty’s 
Government, asserting that the Ministry of Defence breached the 
right to life under the ECtHR because the government neglected its 
duty for care. The government’s legal defense centered on combat 
immunity.187 This legal concept, developed through case law, stands 
for the proposition that “while the armed forces are in the course of 
actually operating against the enemy, they are under no ‘actionable’ 
duty of care as defined by common law to avoid causing loss or 
damage to their fellow Soldiers, or indeed to anyone who may be 
affected by what they do.”188 
The UK Supreme Court did not agree. The salient issue 
before the Court was whether the European Convention on Human 
Rights applies extraterritorially to protect British troops abroad, to 
include in combat areas of operation like Iraq.189 The Court had 
already answered this question in the negative. But in light of the 
ECtHR ruling in Al-Skeini, the British High Court reversed itself and 
made a marked departure from its precedence. The Court, in a 4-to-3 
decision, allowed the claim to proceed under Article 2 of the ECtHR 
as its basis. The majority opinion, written by Lord Hope, took great 
efforts to make its legal trepidations known: 
[the battlefield] is a field of human activity which the 
law should enter into with great caution . . . [i]t risks 
undermining the ability of a state to defend itself, or 
                                                 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at para.13. 
188 Tugendhat, supra note 26, at 31. 
189 Supra note 178. 
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its interest, at home or abroad. The world is a 
dangerous place, and states cannot disable themselves 
from meeting its challenges.  Ultimately democracy 
itself may be at risk.190 
The Court, however, held that the claims may go forward and 
granted jurisdiction to the families of the fallen Soldiers to pursue 
their Article 2 claims. The Court found jurisdiction under these facts, 
but it limited jurisdiction “in connection with the planning for and 
conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which 
are unrealistic or disproportionate.”191 In other words, the egregious 
facts of this case drove the result. This ‘middle ground,’ a word 
choice of Lord Hope,192 was a direct extension of the expansive 
scope of Al-Skeini. 
Lord Hope’s sentiment that “operations conducted in the 
face of the enemy are inherently unpredictable”193 is a truism. This 
judgment allows individuals, Soldiers in this case, to question and 
challenge the decisions of the military’s leadership. The middle 
ground is no ground at all. The reality must be clear: legal mission 
creep will occur. The law and its profession is a product of examining 
events after the fact—ex post facto. The profession of arms and the 
law that supports it under IHL are not; International Humanitarian 
Law is a product of using judgment before force is used. This is why 
Soldiers train and prepare for conflict knowing the moment they see 
conflict, all plans will morph once there is contact with the enemy. As 
Lord Hope acknowledges: 
[t]hings tend to look and feel very different on the 
battlefield from the way they look on such charts and 
images as those behind the lines may have available to 
them. A court should be very slow indeed to question 
                                                 
190 Id. at para. 66. 
191 Id. at para. 76. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at para. 64. 
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operational decisions made on the ground by 
commanders, whatever their rank or level seniority.194 
However, the door has been opened and with it, an inevitable 
breed of military officer who is hesitant and timid. War is foggy and 
unpredictable. If courts, through litigants, are allowed to second-
guess military decisions that ultimately lead men and women to their 
deaths, then conservatism and restraint will descend upon military 
decisions. Both concepts are and should be an anathema to the 
warrior ethos.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
International Humanitarian Law was created so that Soldiers 
did not bear the responsibility of the actions of the public; it allows 
the Soldier to commit acts on behalf of the State that would be illegal 
otherwise. When we narrow what the Soldier can do, we eliminate 
their ability to effectuate the end of the war. The five trends 
discussed, if brought to fruition and taken collectively, suffocate the 
Soldier. They leave a Soldier virtually helpless. The advantage goes to 
the actor who fails to follow the rules and is asymmetric in his 
infliction of violence. Instead of probing how to hold the hostile 
civilian accountable, the trend is to impose rules on the lawful 
combatant that mirror what would be imposed on a police officer. 
The trend is pushing jurisprudence in the wrong direction. The 
asymmetric fighter will not change tactics, and, in fact, limiting the 
Soldier will embolden these fighters. Giving such a profound 
advantage to the enemy, limits a Soldier’s ability to determine what is 
militarily necessary and in the process, prolongs the war and prolongs 
the Soldiers’ exposure to harm. 
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary 
practice by countless military professionals. Its core principles of 
distinction, military necessity, and proportionality provide the proper 
balance between mission and humanity in an armed conflict. They are 
entirely separate and morally and legally distinct from the concept of 
                                                 
194 Id. 
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jus ad bellum. If properly applied, they protect the warfighter from the 
blending of the management of governance and the management of 
violence. They do not require supplement by the very dissimilar 
jurisprudence of traditional criminal law to properly analyze actions 
on the battlefield. They continually evolve, but in a careful, deliberate 
manner as the cost of error is too great for not only the warfighter 
but also the community of international States. However, because the 
principles are concepts rooted in the totally unique human 
experience, they should only be adjudicated by courts with a level of 
military competence and experience, not any criminal court that 
extends its jurisdiction in order to make a public statement about a 
given conflict. 
Returning to our two incidents from the introduction – one 
in South Carolina, one in Afghanistan -- the rules that govern the two 
are profoundly different. In armed conflict, the three core principles 
of jus in bello in the Just War Theory are effective in analyzing the 
legality of Captain Kudo’s decision; these principles are simply 
irrelevant for judging Officer Groubert’s actions. For Captain Kudo’s 
scenario, his subjective belief was that the two diggers were either 
Taliban or civilians directly engaged in armed conflict because they 
were actively planting an IED in the road. If the belief is true, they 
are lawful military targets and the attack would also comply with 
military necessity and proportionality since there is no evidence of 
any collateral damage to civilians. Even if it turns that Captain Kudo 
was incorrect and the diggers were civilian farmers, the attack would 
still be lawful if his belief was objectively reasonable when viewed 
through the eyes of a professional warfighter in a same or similar 
situation. 
In armed conflict, unlike the law enforcement situation in 
South Carolina, when the attacks are done by members of uniformed 
military as part of an armed conflict, privileged belligerency would 
apply to those acts. Those privileged belligerents are authorized by 
the principle of military necessity to make attacks based on the status 
of the targeted victim as a military target. As members of a force 
engaged in armed conflict with the coalition, the diggers would 
qualify as lawful military targets. The elimination of enemy forces is 
an integral part of the mandate from military necessity to secure “the 
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complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible”195 and 
thereby end the conflict. Therefore, an attack would turn on a 
question of proportionality: did the concrete military advantage 
exceed the collateral cost in terms of damage to civilian lives and 
property? However, it is important to limit the proportionality 
analysis to the facts known by the attackers at the time of the attack. 
Any post hoc judgment based upon the results of the attack is unjust. 
The principle of proportionality is based upon the expected concrete 
military advantage gained and the expected collateral damage, not the 
result. Even if the attackers knew that civilians would die in the 
attack, the attack would still be lawful if the expected military 
advantage outweighed the expected collateral damage to civilians. 
These protection under IHL have no relevancy for Officer 
Groubert; his situation requires a self-defense analysis under 
common criminal law. Captain Kudo’s situation is not nor should it 
be subject to the same analysis. 
War is arguably the evilest practice of mankind and all of 
humanity should work to prevent any and all future wars. Until that 
day arrives, however, we must be careful to preserve and enforce all 
three goals of jus in bello. The goals of bringing about a rapid end to 
the conflict and limiting the cost to the belligerents are every bit as 
important as the goal of avoiding civilian deaths and property 
damage. 
 
                                                 
195  See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 277 (2010) (citing U.S. 
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956) 
para. 3. a. at 4). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century, the use of drones in military 
combat operations is one of the most legally controversial issues 
confronting international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC).1 This article argues that drones should be 
treated as any other component of the United States’ (U.S.)2 arsenal. 
A drone can be considered to be a weapons platform or singular 
weapon system. This article further argues that drones indeed offer 
extensive and enhanced opportunities for compliance with LOAC 
and other relevant laws governing the use of certain weapons. 
Particularly, drones are well suited to execute theories of self-defense 
in international affairs. In fact, drones can be used for a wide variety 
of tasks other than kinetic operations, such as: observation and 
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, target acquisition, search and 
rescue, delivery of humanitarian aid, and transportation of 
equipment.3 The appearance of new and advanced weapons in 
warfare is hardly a new challenge in the history of armed conflict.4 
The epic poem Mahabharatha, [200 B.C.-200 A.D.] forbids the use of 
‘hyper-destructive’ weapons: the warrior Arjuna, observing the law of 
war, refrained from using the pasupathastra5 because when the fight 
was restricted to ordinary conventional weapons, the use of 
                                                 
1 Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT'L. 
L. J. 294 (2011-12). 
2 Hereinafter, United States referred to as U.S. 
3 David Turns, Droning on: some international humanitarian law aspects of the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary armed conflicts, CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 
TO THE LAWS OF WAR, 199 (2014). 
4 Rayan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 103 (2010-2011). 
5 See generally, Section XL, http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/m03/ 
m03040.htm, Pasupathastra: capable of destroying all beings and creation itself, this 
weapon should not be hurled without adequate cause; for if hurled at any foe of 
little might it may destroy the whole universe. In the three worlds with all their 
mobile and immobile creatures, there is none who is incapable of being slain by this 
weapon. And it may be hurled by the mind, by the eye, by words, and by the bow. 
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extraordinary or unconventional weapons was not even moral, let 
alone in conformity with religion or recognized rules of warfare.6  
At different times in history, developments such as the 
crossbow, gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, noxious 
gasses, nuclear bombs, and a number of other deadly inventions 
irreversibly changed the landscape of warfare and required 
combatants to reassess the laws governing armed conflict.7 Drones 
have become a central instrument in armed conflict, and an 
increasing number of states and even non-state actors have deployed 
them in some way or another – although Western armies clearly have 
a significant technological advantage in this respect.8 Legal scholars 
have expressed a variety of opinions on the use of drones.9 On one 
hand, scholars argue that drones are lawful weapons under 
international law in a time of armed conflict, while on the other hand, 
critics argue that drones are being used in ways that violate 
international law.10 The legality of drones has been questioned for a 
variety of reasons, some more grounded in fact than others, but 
despite this criticism there is little question that the use of drones in 
surveillance and combat roles is on the rise.11  
The recent proliferation of drones has spawned intellectual 
debate on whether a country has the right under the LOAC and 
international law to unilaterally deploy these remotely controlled 
aircrafts abroad for military purposes. The use of drones in support 
of combat operations – particularly striking distant terror operatives – 
has become the most controversial legal topic.12 Many of the most-
frequently expressed criticisms about drones and drone warfare do 
not hold up well under serious scrutiny or, at any rate, there’s nothing 
                                                 
6 GRAY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 7 (2010). 
7 Vogel, supra note 4 at 103. 
8 Ferderic Megret, The Humanitarian Problem with Drones, 5 UT. L. REV. 1284 
(2013). 
9 Shani Dann, Drone Strikes and IHL, (Nov. 6, 2014) 
http://humanityinwarblog.com/2014/11/06/drone-strikes-and-ihl/. 
10 Id.  
11 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.  
12 Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of and Case for Combat Drones in the 
Fight Against Terrorism, 2:1 NAT'L L.J. 2 (2013-2014). 
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
168 
uniquely different or worse about drones when compared to other 
military technologies.13 Consider the most common anti-drone 
argument: drones kill a disproportionate number of civilian non-
combatants.14 However, drones kill fewer civilians, as a percentage of 
total fatalities, than any other military weapon.15 According to the 
U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)16 2012 report, the number 
of Afghan civilian casualties caused by the United States and its allies 
did not increase in 2012, in fact, they decreased by 46 percent. More 
specifically, civilian casualties from 'aerial attacks' fell 42 percent.17 
The UNAMA report found that drones released 506 weapons in 
2012, compared to 294 from the previous year.18 Five incidents 
resulted in casualties with sixteen civilians killed and three wounded, 
up from just one incident in 2011.19 Even as drone attacks increased, 
the U.N. reported an overall decrease in civilian deaths by airstrikes 
with the U.S.-led coalition implementing stricter measures to prevent 
innocent people from being killed.20 In another empirical report 
concerning drone strikes cited by The New York Times, 522 strikes 
have killed an estimated 3,376 militants and 476 civilians, decimating 
al-Qaida leadership even as the loss of innocent life intensifies anti-
American sentiment in nations where strikes occur.21 Further, 
according to The Long War Journal, an estimated 801 militant deaths in 
                                                 
13 Rosa Brooks, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted 
Killing: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Subcomm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights, and 
Human Rights, 113TH CONG., 2 (April 23, 2013) (Statement by Professor Rosa 
Brooks, Geo. U. L. Center), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewconte 
nt.cgi?article=1114&context=cong 
14 Id.  
15 William Saletan, In Defense of Drones, SLATE, (Feb. 2013) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/dron
es.  
16 Hereinafter, U.N.’s mission in Afghanistan referred to as “UNAMA” or 
“UNAMA’s”. 
17 Saletan, supra note 15.  
18 Kim Gamel, UN: Drones killed more Afghan civilians in 2012, YAHOO NEWS, 
(Feb. 19, 2013) https://www.yahoo.com/news/un-drones-killed-more-afghan-
civilians-2012-145931602.html?ref=gs. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Steven Simon, In Defense of Drones, MSNBC (Apr. 26, 2015), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/defense-drones. 
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Pakistan occurred from U.S. drone strikes in 2010.22 This figure is 
significantly higher than the 195 drone-caused deaths occurring from 
2004 to 2007.'23 
In contrast, several claims of civilian casualties caused by 
conventional aircrafts and weaponry have gone underreported. For 
example, an interview conducted by The Economist with twenty 
residents of the Pakistani tribal areas confirmed that many residents 
view individual drone strikes as preferable to the artillery barrages of 
the Pakistani military.24 The residents insisted that the drones do not 
kill as many civilians—a view starkly at odds with mainstream 
Pakistani opinion.25 An elder from North Waziristan stated, “No one 
dares to tell the real picture. Drone attacks are killing the militants 
who are killing innocent people.”26 Jet planes, artillery attacks, and 
bombings are the problem, not drones. Critics often assert that U.S. 
drone strikes are morally wrong because they kill innocent civilians.27 
This is undoubtedly both true and tragic, but nonetheless, it does not 
validate the arguments against drone strikes.28 War kills innocent 
civilians, period.29 But the best evidence currently available suggests 
that U.S. drone strikes kill fewer civilians than most other common 
means of warfare.30 The operational effectiveness of drones is 
undisputed. Martha McSally, former fighter pilot and drone squadron 
commander for the U.S. Air Force, stated in her April 23, 2013 
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, “once a decision has 
been made that it is a legal and wise strategy to conduct a target 
strike, the [drone] platform is usually the hands-down best choice to 
maximize precision, persistent intelligence, responsiveness, and 
                                                 
22 Jang, supra note 12. 
23 Id. 
24 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, Three Deep Flaws in Two New 
Human-Rights Reports on U.S. Drone Strikes, NEW REPUBLIC, (Oct. 24, 2013) 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115329/amnesty-international-human-rights-
watch-drone-reports-are-flawed  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Brooks, supra note 13.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
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oversight by commanders, intelligence and legal experts. It also has 
the benefit of minimizing civilian casualties without risk of U.S. 
casualties and at relatively low cost.”31 Additionally, drone pilots 
located in air-conditioned trailers on secure bases are far less likely to 
err than fighter pilots, who have to deal with numerous other factors 
while on missions.32 According to one international legal expert: 
There is little reason to treat drones as distinct from 
other weapons systems with regard to the legal 
consequences of their employment. Nor is there a 
sound basis for heightened concern as to their use. 
On the contrary, the use of drones may actually, in 
certain cases, enhance the protections to which 
various persons and objects are entitled under 
LOAC.33 
The use of drones must therefore be carefully weighed 
against the fact that it creates enemies, even as it destroys them. 
Under that logic, the same argument might as well be used against all 
airstrikes, or for that matter, artillery strikes.34 Both of these 
alternatives tend to be more indiscriminate in their effects than 
drones.35  
This article argues that drones should be treated as any other 
component of the U.S. arsenal. A drone can be considered a weapons 
platform or a single weapon system. In addition, this article argues 
that drones indeed offer extensive and enhanced opportunities for 
compliance with LOAC and laws governing the use of certain 
weapons. Particularly, drones are well-suited to execute theories of 
self-defense in international affairs.  
                                                 
31 Martha McSally, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes 
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG, (last updated Apr. 29, 2015) 
http://drones.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=001894. 
32 Simon, supra note 21.  
33 MICHAEL SCHMITT, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 313 (2010). 
34 Simon, supra note 21.  
35 Id. 
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The first part of the article provided a general overview of 
drones and their modern day implications. The second section will 
discuss the definition of drones and the technological capabilities of 
an armed drone. The third section will discuss the legality per se of 
drones as a weapon system in association with general principles of 
LOAC (i.e. military necessity, humanity, distinction and 
proportionality). In addition, the third portion will also explore the 
application of just war theory and its two components, jus as bellum 
and jus in bello. In the fourth section, this article demonstrates how 
effective drones can be in executing self-defense operations, 
illustrated by a case study of the U.S. drone strategy during the War 
on Terror. Generally, this article examines the legality of drone strikes 
under LOAC based upon the geographical location of a given target. 
Finally, the article will conclude by exploring military command 
responsibility for the violations of LOAC during drone operations 
and the legal status of the drone operator.  
II.  DRONES 
The term “drone” is consistently and materially employed 
throughout this article, as such, there is a need to stipulate to a 
working definition because of the term’s importance here. 
A.  What Exactly is a Drone?  
To ensure the same basic understanding of the term from the 
outset, this preliminary definition should help readers in addressing 
the legal issues that underlie the use of drones. Categorically, "drone" 
refers to any unmanned, remotely-piloted, flying craft ranging from 
something as small as a radio-controlled toy helicopter, to the 32,000-
pound, $104 million Global Hawk military drone.36 In determining 
what exactly constitutes a drone under this language one considers 
whether the vehicle or flying craft at issue (1) flies and (2) is 
                                                 
36 Kelsey D. Atherton, Flying Robots 101: Everything You Need to Know About 
Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/ 
2013-03/drone-any-other-name. 
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controlled by a pilot on the ground; if the vehicle meets this criteria it 
falls under the everyday-language definition of drone.37 The U.S. 
Army officially defines a drone as “a land, sea, or air vehicle that is 
remotely or automatically controlled.”38  Military drones are also 
referred to as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or hunter-killers.39 The history of 
drones is that of a watchful eye turned weapon.40 The drone is not a 
projectile, but a projectile-carrying machine.41  
B.  Technology Used in Armed Drones & their Capabilities   
Before learning about the legal aspects governing drones, it is 
important to discuss the relevant technology used in armed drones 
for a better understanding of their legality. The key difference 
between human soldiers on the ground and a drone hovering above 
is that humans have to distinguish and make targeting decisions 
instantly. In contrast, drones give commanders “tactical patience” - 
the ability to see, think, and act in a controlled manner. Drones are 
controlled by a crew often miles away from the dangers of combat, 
and are capable of acting as both a combatant and a combat support 
vehicle in the hairiest of battles.42 Drones combine several 
complimentary technologies on a single platform. 43 For example, a 
single drone can contain highly advanced surveillance systems, live-
feed video cameras, infrared cameras, thermal sensors and radar, and 
various types of other equipment including global positioning 
systems (GPS), and precision munitions.44 The high-tech cameras on 
                                                 
37 Id.  
38 Department of defense, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 
109 (Aug. 2011). (Original Gregoire Chamayou, Translated by Janet Lloyd, A 
THEORY OF THE DRONE 27 (2015). 
39 Lewis, supra note 1, at 294.   
40 GREGOIRE CHAMAYOU, A THEORY OF THE DRONE 11 (2015). 
41 Id. 
42 Robert Valdes, How the Predator UAV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, (Apr. 
1, 2004) http://science.howstuffworks.com/predator.htm. 
43 James Igoe Walsh, The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and 
Counter terrorism Campaigns, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE AND U.S. ARMY WAR 
COLLEGE PRESS, V (Sep. 2013). 
44 Surveillance Drones, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones. 
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drones can scan entire cities, or alternatively, zoom in and read a milk 
carton from 60,000 feet.45  Surveillance data gathered by a drone can 
be relayed to satellites that then send it down to ground forces to 
help form attack strategies and identify enemy vulnerabilities.46 
Armed drones carry highly accurate missiles that have the capacity to 
target individuals, automobiles, and sections of structures such as 
rooms in a large house.47 These missiles can be guided by the 
intelligence obtained by the sensors discussed above or through real-
time, on-ground intelligence.48  Drones’ low profile and relative fuel 
efficiency combine to permit them to spend more time on target than 
any other manned aircraft.49 Some military drones can stay airborne 
for hours or days at a time.50 Drones also carry Wi-Fi crackers and 
can act as fake cell phone towers to determine a target’s location or 
intercept texts and phone calls.51 Given the ongoing convergence of 
drones and emerging technologies, it may even become possible for 
drones to perform facial recognition, identify behavior patterns, and 
monitor individuals’ conversations.52 
 A typical drone is made of light composite materials to 
reduce weight and increase maneuverability.53 Drones can fly at 
extremely high altitudes to avoid detection54 and their navigational 
systems can be programmed to operate autonomously, from takeoff 
to landing.55 Drones have distinct advantages over manned aircraft 
vehicles, cruise missiles, and Special Operations attacks.56 The use of 
drones actually permits for far greater precision in targeting than 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 V. Shalem Pravas, Aerial Assassins: Drones, Read & Digest, (accessed Sept. 
1, 2015), http://readanddigest.com/what-is-a-drone/. 
47 Id. 
48 Walsh, supra note 43. 
49 Robert Valdes, supra note 42. 
50 Surveillance Drones, supra note 44.   
51 Id.   
52 Chris Cole & Jim Wright, What are drones?, DRONE WARS U.K. (Jan. 20, 
2010) wars.net/aboutdrone/" http://dronew 
ars.net/aboutdrone/. 
53 Pravas, supra note 46.  
54 Id.  
55 KENNETH R. HIMES O.F.M., DRONES AND THE ETHICS OF TARGETED 
KILLING 12 (2016). 
56 Id. 
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most other traditional manned aircrafts.57 Further, drones can handle 
what humans cannot: G-Force speed, tedium, and boredom.58 
Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the 
enemy of human targets; they don’t get tired, thirsty, or hungry; and 
are relatively inexpensive.59 In a worst-case scenario, if a drone is lost 
in battle military personal can simply "crack another one out of the 
box" and have it up in the air shortly without the trauma of casualties 
or the fear of pilots becoming prisoners; both of which being 
common concerns when more-traditional aircraft or operation 
failures occur.60 Without a doubt, drones are of great benefit to the 
counterterrorism effort.61  
III.  THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
All warfare is governed by IHL, also known as the Law of 
Armed Conflict (LOAC).62  
A.  What is the Law of Armed Conflict? 
The LOAC comes from both customary international law 
and treaties.63 Customary international law, based on a practice that 
nations have come to accept as legally required, establishes the 
traditional rules that govern the conduct of military operations in 
armed conflict.64 The Law of Armed Conflict “arises from a desire 
among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and 
                                                 
57 Brooks, supra note 13. 
58 Alan W. Dowd, Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings, U.S. ARMY WAR 
COLLEGE (2013), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/ 
Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf. 
59 Id.  
60 Valdes, supra note 42.  
61 Himes, supra note 55.  
62 James Foy, Autonomous Weapons Systems Taking the Human Out of 
International Humanitarian Law, 23 DAL. J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 53 (2014).  
63 Rod Powers, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), THE RULES OF WAR, 
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm 
64 Id. 
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destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war.”65 
Indeed, modern LOAC is largely driven by humanitarian concerns.66 
As a part of public international law the LOAC regulates the conduct 
of armed hostilities, but only among consenting nations.67 It also aims 
to protect civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked.68 The LOAC regulates, among other things, the means 
and methods of warfare – the weapons used and the tactics 
employed.69 At its foundation, the LOAC is based on four key 
principles: distinction, proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and 
military necessity. All of which undergird the spirit and purpose of 
the law and drive determinations in areas such as targeting, detention, 
and treatment of persons.70 The legality of drones can also be 
justified under the principles of weapon laws and targeting laws. The 
four fundamental LOAC principles are discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
When determining the overall lawfulness of a weapon system 
under LOAC, there are two distinct aspects of the law that need to 
be analyzed: weapons law and lawful use of drones.71 The former 
verifies that the weapon itself is lawful.72 Weapon laws determine 
whether the use of the weapon system during hostilities might be 
prohibited in some manner under the law of armed conflict.73 A 
weapon must satisfy two legal aspects before it may lawfully be used 
on a battlefield;74 the weapon should (1) prevent unnecessary 
suffering, and (2) be capable of effectively distinguishing targets. The 
overarching principle that pertains to weapon systems is the 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 Solis, supra note 6, at 7.  
67 Powers, supra note 63. 
68 Id. 
69 Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to to Use Drones?,  
7 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 27 (2015). 
70 Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone strikes impact the law of war?, 
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. vol. 33:3, 681 (Feb. 14, 2012). 
71 Jeffrey Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 4, (January 18, 2013), https://www.asil.org 
/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
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prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.75 Weapons 
that cannot be directed at specific military objectives, or weaponry 
considered overly dangerous by nature, can violate the principle of 
distinction and found to be unlawful per se.
76 Moreover, even if a 
specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se, or is not specifically 
prohibited by particular treaties, governments are prohibited from 
improperly employing a weapon in a manner that would result in 
unnecessary suffering or in the targeting of civilian populations.77 
Such use is also unlawful under the relevant rules of the LOAC.78 
The two rules governing weapon laws are discussed in detail in the 
following section.  
1. General Principles of the LOAC. 
In this section, the principles of the LOAC will be applied to 
the use of drones in combat and combat support operations. This 
analysis falls squarely within LOAC principles. Again, the LOAC 
revolves around four core principles: distinction, proportionality, 
preventing unnecessary suffering, and military necessity. Application 
of any weapon depends upon these four general principles of the 
LOAC. Additionally, targeting law governs the circumstances of the 
use of lawful weapons and includes general principles of the LOAC. 
The following arguments help establish a basis for the conclusion 
that LOAC rules are sufficient to regulate drones. 
(i) Distinction 
“Distinction” means persons employing force must 
distinguish between lawful military targets (e.g., opposing 
combatants, equipment, or facilities), protected persons (e.g., 
civilians, medical personnel, chaplains, or persons who are hors de 
                                                 
75 Gross, supra note 69. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Sehrawat 5:1 
177 
combat), property, and unlawful targets.79 Greater awareness of the 
distinction principle has coincided with technological developments 
that enable increasingly precise targeting.80 According to Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention,  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants, and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.81  
Through its language, Additional Protocol I prohibits the use 
of weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”82  
Far from bombing entire industrial valleys or cities, which 
would inevitably lead to civilians being caught in the crosshairs, new 
technology has allowed states to be far more discriminate.83 Indeed, 
the adoption of drones equipped with precision-guided munitions is 
the most recent improvement.84 Drones equipped with modern 
imaging technologies enable operators located thousands of miles 
away to view details as fine as individual faces; this allows operators 
to distinguish between civilians and combatants far more effectively 
than most other weapons systems.85 According to General (Ret.) 
James E. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, "advances in high band-width satellite communications, sensing 
                                                 
79 Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing 
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189 (2010). 
80 JOHN KAAG & SARAH KREPS, DRONE WARFARE 81 (2010). 
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), ICRC (8 June 1977) 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/4e473c7bc8854f2ec12563f60039c738/8a9e7e14c63c7f30
c12563cd0051dc5c?OpenDocument,. 
82 Rule 71, ICRC, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ 
v1_rul_rule71. 
83 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 81. 
84 Id. 
85 Brooks, supra note 13. 
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technologies – particularly full motion video – combined with 
existing aircraft technology has allowed armed drones to emerge as 
the platform of choice in this counter terror mission space.”86  On 
April 30, 2012, CIA Director John Brennan, said, “with the 
unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target a 
military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could 
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows U.S. to 
distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaida terrorist and 
innocent civilians…[.]”87 Therefore, because drones can effectively 
distinguish between targets, it can be concluded that drones meet the 
standard of distinction under the LOAC. 
(ii) Proportionality 
The LOAC principle of proportionality requires that the 
expected loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property 
incidental to attack not be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from striking the target.88 Article 
35 of Additional Protocol I declares that “in any armed conflict, the 
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited[;]” this basic principle was officially codified 
by the 1907 Hague Convention, however, studies suggest that similar 
albeit informal principles were commonly observed by combatants 
prior to the Hague Convention.89 The principle focus of 
proportionality seeks to minimize incidental casualties during war and 
operationalizes the LOAC’s fundamental premise that the means and 
methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited.90 The key here is 
the word “incidental,” meaning outside of the military target.91 
Importantly, however, the law does not prohibit all civilian deaths—
                                                 
86 John Brennan, Should the United States Continue Its Use of Drone Strikes 
Abroad?, PROCON.ORG (Apr. 29, 2015), http://drones.procon.org/view.a 
nswers.php?questionID=001894. 
87 Id.  
88 Basic Principles of LOAC and their Targeting Implications, CURTIS E. LEMAY 
CENTER, https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-60-D33-Target-LOAC 
.pdf (last updated Jan. 10, 2014).  
89 Blank, supra note 70, at 681-82. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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and in fact accepts some incidental civilian casualties.92 Armed drones 
offer the advantage of less destructive weapons and greater command 
and control over firing decisions. Drones can employ Hellfire 
missiles that weigh one-hundred pounds with a warhead of 
approximately thirty five pounds.93
 That is one-twentieth the size of a 
standard laser-guided bomb or cruise missile and less than half the 
size of the smallest precision ordnance dropped from conventional 
aircraft.94 Proportionality inherently covers the notion to control and 
limit collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. This is a 
venerable concept. Grotius writes, “one must take care of, so far as is 
possible, to prevent the death of innocent persons, even by 
accident.”95 Even when a target is purely militant, the element of 
proportionality is still considered when prosecuting a target. 
Proportionality brings with it an obligation to consider all options 
when making targeting decisions: verification of the target; timing of 
the attack; the chosen weapon of choice; and warnings and 
evacuations for civilian populations.96 Drones, with their ability to 
see, think, and act in a controlled manner, provide ample opportunity 
to consider all options before engaging a target. Drone operators, 
after duly considering all options and taking all mitigating maneuvers 
into account, are able to minimize damage to civilian life and 
property.  
(iii) Unnecessary suffering 
The principle of humanity, also commonly referred to as the 
principle of unnecessary suffering, aims to minimize suffering in 
armed conflict.97 The core LOAC concept of unnecessary suffering, a 
concept created to limit damage to civilians while killing combatants, 
is codified in Additional Protocol 1, Article 35(2) “it is prohibited to 
employ weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of 
                                                 
92 Id.   
93 Michael W. Lewis and Emily Crawrord, Drones and Distinction: How IHL 
Encouraged the Rise of Drones, 44 Geo. J. INT'L L. 1151(2012-2013). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 275.  
96 Id. 
97 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
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a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”98 Once 
a military purpose has been achieved, the infliction of further 
suffering is unnecessary.99 A weapon is not banned on the ground of 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering merely because it causes 
great, or even horrendous suffering or injury.100 There is nothing 
unique about the armaments and munitions carried by drones and 
used by their pilots. Thus, Alston, who served as the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
acknowledged in his Study on Targeted Killings that, "a missile fired 
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon, 
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires 
missiles." 
Compliance with the principle of unnecessary suffering 
depends upon the kind of weapon used and the kind of suffering that 
it might cause. Weapons can be specifically chosen to satisfy this 
principle; however, compliance with the LOAC depends upon the 
features of the weapon used and the competency of those employing 
the weapon to carry out a particular mission. Also, it is difficult to 
determine what constitutes “unnecessary suffering” because there is 
no globally accepted standard.  
(iv) Military Necessity  
 Finally, “military necessity” means that combatants may only 
employ force against legitimate military objectives.101 The principle of 
military necessity recognizes that a military has the right to use any 
measures not forbidden by the laws of war that are indispensable for 
securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as 
possible.102 Military necessity requires combat-forces to only engage 
                                                 
98 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 80. 
99 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
100 Solis, supra note 6, at 270. 
101 Toscano, supra note 79.  
102 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
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in acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective.103 It 
further permits the killing of enemy combatants and other persons 
whose death is unavoidable.104  The principle of military necessity is a 
principle of controlled violence.105 Military necessity permits the 
destruction of property if that destruction is imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war.106 Destruction of civilian property as an end 
in-itself is a violation of international law.107 There must be a 
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the 
overcoming of enemy forces.108 International humanitarian law also 
prohibits weapon systems that cannot be directed at a specific 
military target.109 Over the past few years several U.S. Government 
officials have confirmed that drones are an invaluable tool against Al-
Qaeda, the Islamic State, Taliban, and associated terrorist forces.110 In 
some areas, drones are particularly useful because of their ability to 
find and identify targeted persons, and then reach into territory that 
ground forces cannot enter due to either military or political 
reasons.111 In one reported case, the United States targeted a senior 
Taliban official in the impenetrable border region of Pakistan while 
he was resting on the roof of a house with his wife and hooked up to 
an IV-drip for kidney problems.112 The Taliban member was wanted 
for his involvement in a number of suicide bombings and the 
assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.113 
                                                 
103 ANTHONY FINN & STEVE SCHEDING, DEVELOPMENTS AND 
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109 Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International  
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY J., 10 (2013), 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-
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110 Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
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112 Id; See also, Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, A More Aggressive 
CIA, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2010),  http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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In such situations, and others like it, drone strikes offer a "definite 
military advantage."114 Drones, because of advanced technology can 
be very precise in targeted killing. Commanders and their legal 
advisors have ample to make informed decision to go after a target. 
They can easily assess the situation, and are capable of controlling the 
violence.  
B.  Drones as Lawful Weapons 
This section is intended to determine whether current 
weapon laws of LOAC are capable of regulating drones. In modern 
times, LOAC governs the choice of weapons and prohibits or 
restricts the use of certain weapons. Rule 71 of Customary IHL, 
which applies to both international and domestic conflicts, 
establishes the norm that the use of weapons which are 
indiscriminate by nature is prohibited; this norm of customary 
international law is applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts.115 In addition, many of the basic rules 
and specific prohibitions and restrictions on means and methods of 
warfare may be found in customary intentional law.116 These 
restrictions can be traced back to treaties and customary international 
law, and are justified on the grounds that weapons which are either: 
(i) indiscriminate in their effect, or (ii) cause unnecessary suffering 
should be prohibited.117  
The Declaration of Saint Petersburg is the first formal 
agreement prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war. “The 
Declaration to that effect adopted in 1868, which has the force of 
                                                 
114 Id.   
115 Rule 71 (Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, (accessed 7 July 2015)  
https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rul 71, 
116 Kathleen Lawand, A Guide to Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and 
Methods of Warfare, Measure to implement article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 (2006), 
ICRC, Revised, Geneva, (accessed 22 July 2015) 
http://www.article36.org/wpontent/uploads/2011/12/icrc_002_0902.pdf. 
117 A.G. Houston, Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict, 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Ed. 1, 4.4,  (2006) http://www.defence.gov.au/ 
adfwc/documents/doctrinelibrary/addp/addp06.4-lawofarmedconflict.pdf. 
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law, confirms the customary rule according to which the use of arms, 
projectiles and materials of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering is 
prohibited.”118 Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 serves as a 
further reference found in international treaties for the need to carry 
out legal reviews of new weapons, means, and methods of warfare. 
The Protocol provides that:  
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption 
of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a 
High Contracting Party (describes a party to any 
international agreement which has both signed and 
ratified the treaty) is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by 
any other rule of international law applicable to the 
High Contracting Party (HCP).119  
“Means of warfare” are weapons and weapon systems, 
whereas “method of warfare” refers to the tactics, techniques and 
procedures by which hostilities are conducted.120 Also, international 
law prohibits two categories of weapons in armed conflict: 
indiscriminate weapons and weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering.121 The first prohibition appears in Article 51(4) of 
Additional Protocol I, which defines indiscriminate attacks as: (1) 
attacks “not directed at a specific military objective;” (2) attacks 
“which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a military objective;” or (3) attacks “which employ a 
method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol.”122 It is prohibited to “use weapons that are 
                                                 
118 Treaties and State parties to such Treaties, DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE 
USE, IN TIME OF WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES 
WEIGHT. SAINT PETERSBURG, 29 NOVEMBER / 11 DECEMBER 1868, ICRC 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument. 
119 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 
TREATIES, ST., PARTIES & COMMENT. (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross), at Article 
35, available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044?OpenDocument. 
120 Schmit, supra note 109, at 27. 
121 Blank, supra note 70, at 682. 
122 Id.  
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incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”123 
Examples of inherently indiscriminate weapons are the rockets that 
Hamas and Hezbollah have fired into Israel for many years, cluster 
munitions, and nuclear weapons that destroy all life within the area of 
the detonation. 124 Additionally, weapons that cause unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury are prohibited.125 Expanding bullets 
and blinding lasers offer two examples.126 Peter Maurer, the president 
of the International Committee of Red Cross has stated: 
[U]nder international humanitarian law the rules of 
war, i.e. the set of laws governing armed conflict, 
drones are not expressly prohibited, nor are they 
considered to be inherently indiscriminate or 
perfidious. In this respect, they are no different from 
weapons launched from manned aircraft such as 
helicopters or other combat aircraft. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that while drones are not 
unlawful in themselves, their use is subject to 
international law.127  
Therefore, it appears drones comply with the various weapon 
laws, however, when a drone is acting as a “weapons platform,” the 
ordinance carried by the drone is still governed by other specific areas 
of weapons law. For example, if a drone is armed with chemical 
weapons, the applicable law is the convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical 
Weapons and their Destruction.128 Alternatively, if armed with 
‘conventional’ munitions, then the general law of targeting would 
apply (be that treaty law, customary international law, or both).129 
                                                 
123 See, Id. 
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127 Peter Maurer (the president of the ICRC), The use of armed drones must 
comply with laws, ICRC, (May 10, 2013) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources 
/documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.  
128 M.N. SCHMITT, LOUISE ARIMATSU, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 137 (Aug. 5, 2011), (Ian Henderson, chapter: 
Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the use of Armed Drones). 
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Usually, drones carry Hellfire missiles, which are not banned by any 
international treaty or convention and do not have any characteristics 
that cause unnecessary injury. By both measures of weapon laws — 
indiscriminate targeting and preventing unnecessary suffering—
armed drones pass muster.130  
As discussed above, a drone can have advanced technical 
features and extensive surveillance capabilities, and when combined 
with precision-guided Hellfire missile, drones should be considered a 
discriminate weapon system. The ability to track a target for hours, 
even days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and 
enhances the protection of civilians by allowing drone operators the 
ability to choose the time and place of attack with an intent of 
minimizing civilian casualties or damage.131 Therefore, because armed 
drones can easily target pure military objectives, and have effects that 
can be limited, as much as possible, to military objects, drones thus 
meet the standards of Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I.132 
C.  Lawful Use of Drones Under the LOAC 
Drones, like any weapon, can be used for unlawful purposes, 
especially outside a combat zone. However, because drones are 
lawful weapons, the next step is to analyze their use according to the 
principles of the LOAC; or more particularly, the principles of 
distinction, proportionality, and precaution.  
1. Distinction.  
As discussed above, advanced technology places drones in a 
better position to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants. Historically, distinction was fairly easy; combatants wore 
uniforms and non-combatants did not. Now, the ‘global war on 
terrorism’ has raised new concerns because terrorists do not wear 
traditional uniforms, and it has become harder to distinguish between 
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civilians and terrorists. Terrorists often take advantage of civilian 
populations and hide themselves among them. The situation has 
raised new challenges for drone operators in regards to distinction. 
State militaries wishing to assert compliance with a legal regime that 
regards human shielding and intermingling with the civilian 
population as unacceptable were pressured to ensure that their 
attacks became increasingly more discriminate and that their 
intelligence became more accurate.133 The challenge found in non-
state armed conflict is identifying the legitimate target. As discussed 
above, Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that: 
in order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.134  
Distinction is also emphasized in Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol 
I:  
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate 
attacks are: 
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific 
military objective; 
(b) Those which employ a method or means of 
combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective; or 
(c) Those which employ a method or means of 
combat the effects of which cannot be limited 
as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a 
                                                 
133 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1153. 
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nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.135   
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all 
violations of distinction constitute “grave breaches”(foot note 
explaining or one brief sentence) of the Protocol, and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court similarly criminalizes 
attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks.136 However, states 
have historically virtually ignored the principle of distinction by 
employing artillery, rocket launchers, and bombers in assaults on 
irregular forces occupying densely populated areas, resulting in tens 
of thousands of civilian casualties.137 However, in order to minimize 
collateral damage and comply with the principle of distinction states 
began to employ more precise weapons than those designed to defeat 
a more traditional military opponent.138 This is where drones enter 
the picture.139  
The United States has consistently asserted that it complies 
with the LOAC in its battle against Al-Qaeda.140 Examining how the 
U.S. responds to Al-Qaedas’ practice of hiding amongst the civilian 
populations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen serves as a 
good illustration of how a state military may seek to comply with the 
LOAC's distinction requirements.141 Persons who are members of an 
organized armed group, but dress the same as civilians, either for a 
lack of uniforms or specifically to blend into the civilian population 
for protection, are legitimate targets at all times.142 The United State’s 
need for more robust intelligence greatly increased the demand for 
drones, which were first employed in the conflict with Al-Qaeda as 
real-time intelligence gathering vehicles for distinction purposes.143 
                                                 
135 Article 51, Additional Protocol I, hl/WebART/470-750065" 
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136 Blank, supra note 70, at 691.   
137 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1152. 
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Drones are a better option as compared to boots on ground. Drone 
strikes give militaries more time to analyze the situation; operators 
and decision makers can use the ‘pattern of life’ method to pursue a 
target (analysis, using evidence collected by surveillance cameras on 
the unmanned aircraft and from other sources regarding individuals 
and locations).144 Further, ground forces face the challenge of 
distinguishing between civilians and terrorists more promptly than 
drones, with less situational awareness. Drones may also reduce the 
emotional element for the humans behind the “joy sticks” when 
engaging targets.145 
2. Proportionality. 
Proportionality is closely linked with the principle of 
distinction and correctly identifying objects as military and civilian.146 
For an action to be considered proportional, the anticipated military 
gain must exceed the anticipated damage to civilians and their 
property.147 Article 51(b) of Additional Protocol I proscribes that “an 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated” is disproportionate.148 Thus, a 
commander must refrain from any attack in which the expected 
civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military 
advantage gained.149 Loss of life and damage to property incidental to 
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage expected to be gained.150 The key here is the word 
                                                 
144 Emptywheel, Pattern of Life drone strikes, SHADOW PROOF, (May 7, 2010) 
https://shadowproof.com/2010/05/06/pattern-of-life-drone-strikes. 
145 P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, 25, 40-
41 (Winter 2009), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20090203 
_TNA23Singer.pdf/.  
146 Kaag & Kreps, supra note 80, at 94. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.  
149 Blank, supra note 70, at 682.  
150 Four basic principles, LOAC (accessed March 21, 2017) 
http://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/; See generally  
U.S. Army Field Manual FM27-10: Law of Land Warfare. 
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“incidental,” meaning outside of the military targets or more 
commonly known as “collateral damage.”151 However, if a target is 
purely military (i.e. no civilian component) proportionality is not a 
requirement.152 Proportionality is a necessary consideration in attacks 
on civilians, not on combatants.153 Proportionality brings with it an 
obligation to consider all options when making targeting decisions: 
verifying the target, timing the target, identifying the weapons used, 
warning and evacuating civilian populations.154 Grotius writes, “one 
must take care of, so far as is possible, to prevent the death of 
innocent persons, even by accident.”155 According to CIA Director 
John Brennan: 
Compared against other options, a pilot operating this 
aircraft remotely, with the benefit of technology and 
with the safety of distance, might actually have a 
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, 
including the presence of innocent civilians. It’s this 
surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to 
eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qaida 
terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it, 
that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.156 
3. Taking Precautions. 
The principle of precaution is important because it provides 
constant consideration and implementation of precautionary 
measures that reinforces moral clarity for the warfighter thrust into 
terribly complex tactical and operational environments.157 The 
principle of precaution can be further understood by reviewing 
Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention: 
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In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps 
should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices 
devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, 
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided they are not used at the same time for 
military purposes. The besieged should indicate these 
buildings or places by some particular and visible 
signs, which should previously be notified to the 
assailants.158 
Also, Article 2(3) of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) further 
states, “[a] commander shall take all due measures in order that the 
town may suffer as little harm as possible.”159 Article 57(2)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I mandates that those who plan or decide upon 
an attack "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects."160 Additionally, according to article 57 (3) 
of Additional Protocol I, “when a choice is possible between several 
military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the 
objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be 
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects.”161 The primary variables of Article 57 may be identified as 
“the time necessary to gather and process the additional information, 
the extent to which it would clarify any uncertainty, competing 
demands on the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance system in 
question, and risk to it and its operators’.162 Finally, according to 
article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the Parties to the conflict shall, to 
the maximum extent feasible: 
                                                 
158 Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale 
.edu/19th_century/hague02.as#art27. 
159 Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention, available at http://avalon.law.yale 
.edu/20thcentury/hague09.asp. 
160 Article 57 (2) (ii) of AP I, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih 
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c. 
161 Article 57 (3) of AP I,  available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih 
l.nsf/9ac284404d38ed2bc1256311002afd89/50fb5579fb098faac12563cd0051dd7c. 
162 Frederik Rosén, Extremely Stealthy and Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and 
Legal Responsibility, J CONFLICT SECURITY L. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://jcsl.oxford 
journals.org/content/early/2013/10/16/jcsl.krt02. 
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(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth 
Convention, endeavor to remove the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian 
objects under their control from the vicinity of 
military objectives; 
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas; 
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect 
the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects under their control against the 
dangers resulting from military operations. This 
principle of avoidance (also known as "taking 
precautions") means that it is not enough not to 
intend to kill civilians while attacking legitimate 
targets.163  
Indeed, a deliberate, affirmative effort has to be made not to 
harm civilians.164 This may mean, for example, that certain targets 
ought to be attacked only during certain hours (e.g., at night, when 
no civilians may be around),’ that some attacks may need to be 
conducted from a certain angle, and that advance warnings to the 
civilian population must be issued by the attacker prior to the 
strike.165 In this regard, drone technology removes a number of 
classic dilemmas related to precaution. Drones leave plenty of time 
for the consideration and execution of precautionary steps.166 Drones 
allow commanders to incorporate precautionary measures in strategy 
formulation, executing signature strikes, and targeted killings.167 
Hours, days, or weeks of surveillance may lie ahead of a drone 
attack.168 It has been argued that there is “strong evidence that drones 
are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.”169 The 
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factors mentioned above do not eliminate the risk of civilian 
casualties, but they certainly represent feasible precautions that can 
minimize incidental loss of civilian life.170 Conversely, drones may not 
be used when other means or methods of warfare that would result 
in less collateral damage with an equivalent prospect of mission 
success are available.”171  
The rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon 
system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the 
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict--
such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs—so long as they 
are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war.172 In all three 
areas of distinction, proportionality, and precautions—drones’ unique 
and advanced capabilities suggest great potential for adherence to 
LOAC obligations.173 Drones are not automatons; they depend on 
human operators, analysts, and decision makers to comply with the 
laws of war. 
D.  Just War Theory 
The Just War Theory formalizes the moral justifications for 
war.174 It is a lens fixed in the Western philosophical tradition.175 
From the start, Just War theorists have focused on two central 
                                                 
170 Stuart Casey-Maslen, Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and 
international human rights law, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, NO. 886 AT 601 
(Summer 2012), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-886-
casey-maslen.pdf. 
171 Blank, supra note 70, at 686 
172 Galloway Family Foundation, Lawful Use of Drones by Non-State Actors: 
Who can Kill, (Jan. 8, 2014) http://www.gallowayfoundation.org/lawful-use-of-
drones-by-non-state-actors-who-can-kill/. 
173 Blank, supra note 70, at 701.  
174 Ethan A. Wright, Of Drones and Justice: A Just War Theory Analysis of the 
Unite States’ Drone Campaigns, URSINUS COLLEGE, at 12 (2015) 
http://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003& 
context=ethics_essay. 
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questions: (1) when is it appropriate to go to war (jus ad bellum), and 
(2) how should the war be fought (jus in bello).176  
1. Jus Ad Bellum. 
Jus ad bellum means the legality of the use of force by a 
territorial state. Jus ad bellum governs the legality of recourse to 
military force (including drone strikes) by one state against another, 
and against armed non-state actors.177 As a threshold matter, the jus 
ad bellum inquiry depends on whether the territorial state has 
consented to the drone strike.178 However, recent history has 
demonstrated that consent of a state is not necessarily required when 
conducting drone operations.179 Article 2(4) is properly interpreted as 
prohibiting all uses of force above a certain minimal level.180 Minimal 
uses of force such as firing a single shot across an international 
boundary might violate the principle of non-intervention, but is 
probably too minor to come within the purview of Article 2(4).181 
The threshold for the occurrence of an armed attack by another state 
thus appears to be relatively high, going beyond a mere frontier 
incident between members of the armed forces of two states (or 
armed groups operating in one state with limited support from 
another state).182 It might even be argued by some that a very limited 
and targeted drone strike by one state, against individuals located in 
another state, would not constitute an armed attack under the UN 
Charter or customary law.183 This argument is based on the highly 
contested concept of anticipatory self-defense (self-defense will be 
                                                 
176 Erich Freiberger, Just War Theory and the Ethics of Drone Warfare, E-INT’L 
REL., (July 18, 2013), http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/18/just-war-theory-and-the-
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177 Maslen, supra note 170, at 601.  
178 Laurence Shore et al., The Legality Under International Law of Targeted 
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179 Maslen, supra note 170, at 601.  
180 Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A CASE STUDY 
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discussed separately in a later section).184 If there is consent, there is 
no infringement on sovereignty.185 Although a definitive answer to 
this factual question is impossible without access to confidential 
material, the publicly available information suggests that states186 have 
given their consent to U.S. drone strikes.187 Because some state have 
publicly withheld their consent, the U.S. must consider whether 
alternative justifications provide a legal basis for continued U.S. 
drone strikes under Just War theory.188 
(i) Jus in Bello 
Jus in bello analysis provides a legal basis for states in 
determining who is an acceptable target, and who is not. The typical 
distinction is between “combatants,” who may be the targets of 
wartime operations, and “non-combatants,” who are exempt from 
being targets of such attacks.189 In essence, jus in bello is the 
foundation for the principles of distinction, proportionality, and 
necessity discussed above. Most legal scholars agree that drone strikes 
are legal under jus in bello as long as they occur during armed 
conflict.190 Nothing is inherently illegal about using drones to kill 
during warfare, just as other airplanes are not forbidden.191 Drones by 
themselves are not really weapons, and the armaments they do carry 
are generally lawful.192  
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185 Shore et al., supra note 178, at 8-9. 
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187 Shore et al., supra note 178, at 9. 
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AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 62 (Mar. 12, 2014), available at 
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IV.  SELF-DEFENSE THEORY 
This section demonstrates the effectiveness of drones in 
executing self-defense operations, illustrated by a case study of the 
U.S. drone strategy during the War on Terror. U.S. national security 
strategy has encompassed the pre-emptive self-defense doctrine since 
the domestic attack that took place on September 11, 2001; 
commonly referred to as “9/11.” This doctrine argues that it is legal 
for a state to launch a pre-emptive attack when it reasonably believes 
that another entity is planning an attack on the state.193 However, the 
U.S. has long recognized the importance of defending its interests, 
both domestically and abroad. In 1854, a U.S. diplomat was attacked 
in the town of San Juan del Norte (Greytown)194, Nicaragua.195 At the 
time of the attack, Greytown had been forcibly seized by forces that 
were politically unrecognized by the U.S., and engaged in other acts 
of violence against U.S. nationals.196 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy 
ordered the bombardment of the town after the enemy force’s refusal 
to adhere to the U.S.’s demand for redress.197 The presidential 
authorization of the military force used in Greytown was later 
challenged in U.S. courts, with each ruling being appealed until the 
case arrived at the Supreme Court.198 Justice Nelson of the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in the opinion that the President had the 
power to order the responsive use of armed force as part of a power 
of “protection” of U.S. nationals abroad against “acts of lawless 
violence” and “an irresponsible and marauding community.”199 At the 
                                                 
193 Kate McCann & Christopher Hope, Are UK drone strikes in Syria legal? 
THE TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/middleeast/syria/11852228/Are-UK-drone-strikes- in-Syria-legal.html.  
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195 Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of 
U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19.2 J. OF TRANSNATIONAL L. & POL’Y, at 245 (also 
see, Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). Due to lack 
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time of the ruling, the U.S. did not consider the ongoing conflict with 
Nicaragua, Greytown, or its unrecognized government as “war”.200  
The customary law of a state’s right to self-defense is 
enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.201 Article 51 states: 
[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  
Article 51 of the Charter expressly affirms the right of a state 
to respond defensively “if an armed attack occurs.”202 “Armed 
attack” is the operative phrase of the text; a state may use force 
against both state and non-state aggressors under a theory of self-
defense. And further, nothing in the language of Article 51 or any 
otherwise relevant customary international law requires consent of 
the state from which a non-state actor attack is emanating, and on 
whose territory a self-defense action takes place against the non-state 
actor.203 Article 51 provides that nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.204 The United States has justified its 
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drone operations occurring outside the context of an armed conflict 
with another state on the basis of this right.205 
In fact, with respect to permissible measures of self-defense 
under Article 51, a form of consent from each member of the United 
Nations already exists in advance by treaty.206 For example, with 
respect to the U.S. use of drones in Pakistan to target Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban forces, it is clear that the U.S. would not need the express 
consent of Pakistan to carry out self-defense targeting.207 It is also 
clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under 
Article 51 of the Charter in self-defense to protect U.S. interests from 
continuous Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks launched from Pakistan.208 
There is a growing body of law that generally recognizes the actions 
taken by the U.S. as legal according to international standards. 
According to public reports, U.S. officials have regularly consulted 
with Pakistani authorities when drones have been employed for strike 
operations in Pakistan.209 However, Pakistan maintains only limited 
control over large swaths of its territory, and thus, as a result, 
terrorists have used that ungoverned space to their advantage; in 
response, President Trump and former-President Barack Obama 
have made clear that the United States will act if and when Pakistan 
cannot.210  
V.  GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF DRONE STRIKES AND LOAC 
Under the LOAC, in military operations, the location of a 
strike matters. The LOAC cannot apply places where armed conflict 
does not exist, and the determination of whether armed conflict does 
in-fact exist is based upon the intensity of the violence occurring in 
that given place, in addition to the level of organization employed by 
the forces involved, as laid out in the Tadic opinion.211 The 
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appearance of drones in the arsenal of armed conflict has stimulated 
renewed attempts to define the parameters of the modern 
battlefield.212 The location in which military operations are actually 
taking place at any given time is known as the ‘area of operations,’ 
“the theatre of war,” or simply, the ‘battlefield.’213 Conventional 
LOAC contains references to “zones of military operations,” the 
‘zone of combat,’ and ‘battlefield areas’ although these terms remain 
ambiguous.214 The ever-increasing use of drones in the pursuit of the 
“war on terror” has raised concerns over the emergence of a global 
battlefield whereby the entire planet is subject to the application of 
the LOAC.215  
For the past several years, the geographical location of drone 
attacks has expanded at a rapid rate; Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Libya have all been subject to drone strikes under the 
blanket justification of fighting terrorism.216 Some of these strikes, 
such as those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya, fall within the 
generally recognized parameters of an armed conflict. Others, such as 
those in Yemen and Somalia, raise more complicated questions 
regarding where force is being used and what that means in terms of 
the application of the LOAC.217 These concerns primarily stem from 
frequent drone strikes occurring outside the ‘active battlefields’ of 
Afghanistan and into the bordering regions of Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia.218  
Drone strikes blur the geographical boundaries of the 
battlefield. In traditional conflicts, military operations were confined 
to the territories of the actors and were not supposed to spillover to 
neutral states.219 The law of neutrality generally “defines the 
relationship under international law between states engaged in an 
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armed conflict and those that are not participating in that conflict.”220 
Neutrality law thus led to a geographic-based framework in which 
belligerents can fight on belligerent territory or the commons, but 
must refrain from any operations on neutral territory.221 In essence, 
the battle space in a traditional armed conflict between two or more 
states is anywhere outside the sovereign territory of any of the neutral 
states.222 However, because the U.S. drone program largely targets 
non-state actors that freely move across borders, laws of neutrality 
have become less effective. 
The U.S. government operates two drone programs.223 The 
military’s version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the 
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of 
the U.S. military stationed there. As such, the program is an extension 
of conventional warfare.224 The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror 
suspects around the world, including countries where U.S. troops are 
not based.225 The program is classified as covert, and the intelligence 
agency declines to provide any information to the public about where 
it operates, how it selects a target, who is in charge, or how many 
casualties the program has led to.226 It is contended that drone strikes 
in places like Yemen and Pakistan violate international law because 
there is no currently recognized conflict between these states and the 
US.227  
However, just a few weeks after the attacks of 9/11, 
President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of the 
whole world as a battlefield when he pronounced, “our war on terror 
will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the 
past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or 
plan.”228 The Obama Administration has not specifically adopted that 
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same language calling for a global battlefield, but has actually 
significantly expanded the use of drone strikes outside of 
Afghanistan.229 Al-Qaeda maintains a strong presence in a number of 
countries, most notably Yemen and Somalia, and uses such states to 
recruit, train, and plan attacks against the United States and its allies. 
The United States has repo1rtedly conducted limited drone 
operations in such countries.230 Somalia and Yemen present an even 
more compelling case (than say Pakistan) of a neutral status; both 
states are considered “failed states” and are unable to consent or 
object to U.S. actions and the U.S. has not formally acknowledged 
the use of force in these states.231  
However, according to Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) passed by Congress in the days following 9/11: 
the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons.232  
If consent was given by a state and U.S. personnel engaged a 
target authorized by the AUMF, the strike would arguably be covered 
under AUMF authority and fall within the LOAC.233 Therefore, the 
U.S. is not territorially limited when conducting operations against 
non-state participants.234 Moreover, there is no question that 
Pakistan's territory falls within the greater AUMF theater of conflict. 
U.S. officials have argued that the fight with AUMF enemies is 
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global, not confined to the territory of one country.235 In fact, most 
of the leadership and many of the fighters intended to be covered by 
the AUMF are located outside of Afghanistan and within Pakistan's 
borders.236 
Thus, location matters, but it is not overly prohibitive.237 The 
U.S. has consistently made the case that the war with Al-Qaeda and 
its terrorist associates is of global reach.238 The epicenter is in 
Afghanistan (and to a lesser extent Iraq), but Al-Qaeda and its 
offshoots, as transnational non-state actors, operate in and wage war 
from states across the world.239  
VI.  COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY DURING DRONE OPERATIONS 
 Under the LOAC and international criminal law, military 
personnel are criminally responsible for any war crimes they commit 
during war.240 In the case of drones, the most controversial aspect of 
a drone program is the legal status of the operator.241 Military 
commanders often consult their staff judge advocates (SJAs), 
especially in the escalation of conflict.242 Seeking legal advice is 
increasing and has become prevalent, even in the battle space.243 “It is 
also clear from the commanders . . . that legal advice is essential to 
effective combat operations in the current environment—legal advice 
is now part of the tooth not the tail.”244 
 
                                                 
235 Id.   
236 Id.   
237 Vogel, supra note 110, at 132. 
238 Id.  
239 Id. 
240 Nathalie Weizmann, Autonomous Weapon System under International Law, 
ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 8, at 3 (Nov. 2014).  
241 Vogel, supra note 110, at 134. 
242 Edward Major, Law and Ethics in Command Decision Making, U. OF PENN., 
61 (June 2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl 
/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Major.pdf. 
243 Id.  
244 Id. 
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Even those who support nearly every other aspect of drone 
warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian personnel performing 
combat functions.245 According to Peter Maurer, the president of the 
ICRC:  
Although the operators of remote-controlled 
weapons systems such as drones may be far from the 
battlefield, they still run the weapon system, identify 
the target and fire the missiles. They generally operate 
under responsible command; therefore, under 
international humanitarian law, drone operators and 
their chain of command are accountable for what 
happens. The fact of their being thousands of 
kilometers away from the battlefield does not absolve 
drone operators and their chain of command of their 
responsibilities, which include upholding the 
principles of distinction and proportionality, and 
taking all necessary precautions in attack. Drone 
operators are thus no different than the pilots of 
manned aircraft such as helicopters or other combat 
aircraft as far as their obligation to comply with 
international humanitarian law is concerned, and they 
are no different as far as being targetable under the 
rules of international humanitarian law.246  
Military drone operators live and work in the US, leading 
relatively normal civilian lives outside of their occupation.247 Unlike 
deployed personnel who remain in a combat environment 
continuously, drone operators maintain more stereotypical 
employment; they come in to work each day, gather intelligence, 
execute strikes when required, and return home for dinner.248 All the 
while, military drone operators and their chain of command are 
subject to the laws of war. 
 
                                                 
245 Vogel, supra note 110, at 134.   
246 Maurer, supra note 123. 
247 Wright, supra note 174, at 12.  
248 Id. 
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However, command responsibility is not as clearly defined 
when drone operations are conducted by the CIA. The CIA follows, 
or at least professes to follow, the laws of armed conflict.249 As 
discussed above, the CIA operates one of the two drone programs 
for the U.S. The CIA program is not considered a military program, 
is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same 
international protocols on the conduct of war” as the Department of 
Defense.250 The clandestine and largely unaccountable nature of the 
CIA program creates the most ambiguities for Just War theorists.251 
According to Philip Alston U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions: 
Intelligence personnel do not have immunity from 
prosecution under domestic law for their conduct. 
They are thus unlike State armed forces which would 
generally be immune from prosecution for the same 
conduct.... Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted 
for murder under the domestic law of any country in 
which they conduct targeted drone killings, and could 
also be prosecuted for violations of applicable U.S. 
law.252  
Alston is not alone in this assessment of CIA drone pilots’ 
status. As noted by Rayan Vogel, a Foreign Affairs Specialist, and 
member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. 
Department of Defense:  
The CIA is a civilian agency and not a branch of the 
U.S. Armed Forces. Even under a liberal reading of 
Article 4 from GC III, the CIA would not meet the 
requirements of lawful belligerency as a militia or 
volunteer corps because, while they do report to a 
responsible chain of command (albeit not always a 
military chain of command), as a group they do not 
wear uniforms or otherwise distinguish themselves, 
                                                 
249 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1158. 
250 Wright, supra note 174, at 7.  
251 Id.  
252 Lewis & Crawrord, supra note 93, at 1158. 
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nor do they carry their arms openly. CIA personnel 
are therefore unprivileged belligerents in this 
conflict.253 
Gary Solis agrees with this assessment and has opined at 
some length on the status of CIA drone operators as unprivileged 
belligerents:  
Those CIA agents are, unlike their military 
counterparts but like the fighters they target, unlawful 
combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they 
are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly 
participating in hostilities, employing armed force 
contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if they 
are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians 
violating the requirement of distinction, a core 
concept of armed conflict, as they directly participate 
in hostilities...it makes no difference that CIA civilians 
are employed by, or in the service of, the U.S. 
government or its armed forces. They are civilians; 
they wear no distinguishing uniform or sign, and if 
they input target data or pilot armed drones in the 
combat zone, they directly participate in hostilities--
which means they may be lawfully targeted .... 
Moreover, CIA civilian personnel who repeatedly and 
directly participate in hostilities may have what recent 
guidance from the International Committee of the 
Red Cross terms "a continuous combat function." 
That status, the ICRC guidance says, makes them 
legitimate targets whenever and wherever they may be 
found, including Langley.254 
When the laws of armed conflict were developed, there was 
no technology such as drones used in the battlefield. Perhaps, new 
laws should be developed, especially to protect and guide drone 
operators. Drones are different than traditional forces that must react 
promptly to various hostile situations and make decisions within their 
                                                 
253 Id. at 1159. 
254 Id. at 1159-60.  
DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Sehrawat 5:1 
205 
own judgment. In the case of drones, it is conceivable that the 
President may become involved with the assistance of military and 
legal advisors before authorizing a drone operator to engage a target. 
Therefore, the laws delineating command responsibility in both 
drone programs need to be updated and promulgated to ensure 
operations conform with the LOAC.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that current laws are capable of 
governing drone warfare. The fundamental principles of the law of 
armed conflict, specialized weapons treaties, The Hague and Geneva 
conventions, customary law, and the UN Charter all provide a 
thorough legal backdrop to govern the usage of drones.255 As with all 
weapons, it is essential to ensure that drone attacks are launched only 
against legitimate military objectives in accordance with the laws 
governing the use of force.256 The sole legal issue specific to drone 
operations under both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is weapon 
choice.257 As correctly noted by Special Reporter Alston, “a missile 
fired from a drone is no different from any other commonly used 
weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship 
that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each 
weapon: whether its specific use complies with LOAC.”258 Drones 
provide a legally permissible use of force to support self-defense.259 
Drone attacks can occur against state or non-state actors located in a 
foreign country from which the armed attacks emanate even though 
there is no special consent of the foreign state, no imputation of the 
non-state actor’s attacks to the foreign state, no armed conflict 
between the foreign state and the United States, and the foreign state 
                                                 
255 Vogel, supra note 110, at 137.   
256 Blank, supra note 70, at 716-17.  
257 Michael Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello: 
Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’, at 13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1801179. 
258 Id.  
259 Jordan Paust, Operationalizing use of drones against non-state terrorists under the 
international law of self-defense, 8 ALB. GOV’T L. REV., 203 (2013), (last accessed in 
2015).   
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is willing or unable to stop the attacks.260 However, the legal status of 
drone operators remains as a challenging legal question while the 
field continues to develop.  
 
 
  
 
                                                 
260 Id.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Drone usage has been a topic of significant debate in recent 
years.1 The use of drones has fostered discussions regarding their 
privacy implications,2 public safety concerns,3 and even their use to 
conduct military airstrikes in foreign nations.4 However, a unique 
trend is emerging regarding drone use that raises novel policy 
concerns: recent reports have concluded that drones are now being 
used as a method of trafficking narcotics from Mexico into the 
United States.5  
While Mexican cartels have been known to utilize creative 
methods when smuggling narcotics,6 the new method of using drones 
                                                 
1 Melanie Reid, ARTICLE: GROUNDING DRONES: BIG BROTHER’S 
TOOL BOX NEEDS REGULATION NOT ELIMINATION, 20 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 9 (2014). 
2 Robert Holly, States Restrict Drone Use Because of Privacy Concerns, MIDWEST 
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://investigatemidwest.org/2014/03/21/states-restrict-drone-use-because-of-
privacy-concerns/. 
3 See Dan Loumena, Drone crashes into stands during U.S. Open match; N.Y. 
teacher arrested, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sep. 4, 2014, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/la-sp-sn-us-open-drone-crash-20150903-
story.html (drone crashes into stands at sporting event); see also, Kevin Cokely, 
FAA to Consider New Restrictions for Drones, NBC DFW (Sep. 14, 2015, 11:33 PM), 
http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/FAA-to-Consider-New-Restrictions-for-
Drones-327616521.html (describing a drone that nearly crashed into a private 
aircraft.). 
4 See i.e. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, U.S. drone strike kills 15 Pakistani Taliban in 
Afghanistan, REUTERS (Sep. 11, 2015, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-afghanistan-drones-
idUSKCN0RB1OW20150911. 
5 Nick Valencia & Michael Martinez, Drone carrying drugs crashes south of U.S. 
border, CNN (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/drug-drone-crashes-us-mexico-border/ 
(“U.S. authorities acknowledge a new smuggling strategy may be emerging on the 
border.”). 
6 Drug delivery drone crashes in Mexico, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30932395 (“Other methods [of 
smuggling] included catapults, tunnels and ultra-light aircraft.”). 
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has important implications for a number of reasons.7 Notably, drones 
are a rapidly growing industry with the potential to significantly 
impact the economy. Domestic use of drones in the United States is 
predicted to have an economic impact of over $82 billion between 
2015 and 2025.8 The demand for drones is consistently increasing 
among recreational users9 and businesses,10 causing a steady rise in 
their supply as well. While supply and demand continues to increase, 
the lack of drone regulations in the United States and Mexico is a 
cause for concern. Further, those regulations that currently exist do 
not account for the use of drones as trafficking tools at the border. It 
is thus unsurprising that cartels are beginning to utilize drones to 
traffic narcotics from Mexico into the United States.  
Given the fact that the U.S.-Mexican border extends 
approximately 1,933 miles,11 and that the cartels have used drones to 
                                                 
7 Such implications include a lack of drone regulations, anti-drone security 
measures, and extradition issues regarding those using drones for drug trafficking 
between nations.  
8 Darryl Jenkins & Bijan Vasigh, The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Integration in the United States at 2, ASSOCIATION FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE 
SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL (2013). 
9 See Mitch Joel, The Booming Business of Drones, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/01/the-booming-business-of-drones (Industry 
analysts predict the drone market to double in less than a decade). 
10 A number of companies, including Amazon, Facebook, and Google, have 
invested in drone development for delivery of goods, sky-based computer 
networks, and even crop dusting in the agricultural community. See Jillian D’Onfro, 
Why Amazon Needs Drones More Than People Realize, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 30, 
2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-drones-2014-7; John 
Naughton, Why Facebook and Google are Buying Into Drones, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 
2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/20/facebook-
google-buying-into-drones-profit-motive; Mike Hanlon, Yamaha’s RMAX - The 
World’s Most Advanced Non-Military UAV, GIZMAG, 
http://www.gizmag.com/go/2440/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2004) (discussing 
Yamaha’s R-MAX drones which are used primarily used for crop-dusting in 
Japan.); Jeremy Bradley, It’s one delicious drone—the Burrito Bomber, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/21/tech/innovation/drone-burrito-bomber/ (last 
updated Jun. 21, 2013, 8:35 AM) (Discussing drones to be used to deliver burritos 
to homes.). 
11 JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21729, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS 2, (2006). 
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traffic narcotics an estimated 150 times per year,12 there is a dire need 
for a solution to this tactic before it becomes more prevalent. This 
comment will focus on the rising use of drones at the border to 
smuggle narcotics into the United States, and suggest possible 
solutions to curb this new tactic being utilized by the cartels. By 
taking steps to solve this problem before it becomes more recurrent, 
the United States can hinder the use of drones as an efficient method 
to smuggle narcotics across the border, and in doing so, decrease the 
influx of narcotics trafficked into the United States. This comment 
will also compare the current drone regulations of Mexico and the 
United States with those from various other countries, and discuss 
how such policies can be implemented at the United States-Mexico 
border.  
Part I of this comment has served as an introduction to the 
issue. Part II will briefly discuss the current state of the war on drugs 
at the border and how the United States and Mexico are working 
together to prevent the trafficking of narcotics by Mexican cartels. 
Part III will examine the current state of drone regulations in the 
United States and Mexico. Together, Parts II and III provide a 
background that exposes the severity of the issue of drones as 
trafficking tools. Finally, Part IV proposes possible solutions to 
prevent Mexican cartels from using drones to traffic narcotics. This 
section will also discuss drone regulations in several other countries, 
and which policies, if any, should be adopted and implemented at the 
border.  
II. DRUG TRAFFICKING AT THE UNITED STATES – MEXICO 
BORDER 
According to a 2013 survey, approximately 24.6 million 
Americans aged twelve or older (9.4 percent of the population) had 
used an illicit drug in the past month - a number that has steadily 
increased from 8.3 percent in 2002.13 This increase in demand for 
                                                 
12 See BBC NEWS, supra note 6. 
13 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUG FACTS: NATIONWIDE 
TRENDS at 1 (2015). 
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illicit drugs has been a catalyst for the trafficking of narcotics across 
the border, and has caused Mexico to become the number-one 
supplier of illicit drugs in the United States.14 The majority of 
methamphetamine available in the United States is produced in 
Mexico,15 and a 2010 report stated that ninety percent of the cocaine 
sold in the U.S. was transported across the border from Mexico.16 In 
fact, it has been speculated that more than eighty percent of all drugs 
that enter the United States are trafficked across the border by 
Mexican cartels.17  
A. Mexican Cartels 
The competing cartels at the United States-Mexico border 
include the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, and the Tijuana Cartel.18 
Additionally, Los Zetas provide a dominant presence in the drug 
violence and trafficking at the border.19 These drug cartels control the 
                                                 
14 S. Cody Barrus, Interview with Mexico Drug War Expert Sylvia Longmire, 
ALLTREATMENT.COM (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.alltreatment.com/blog/2011/interview-with-mexico-drug-war-expert-
sylvia-longmire/. 
15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 
DEA-DCT-DIR-002-15, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 19 
(2014), available at, http://www.dea.gov/resource-center/dir-ndta-unclass.pdf; see 
also COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT: COORDINATION AT THE FEDERAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL LEVEL: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON STATE, LOCAL, 
AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION OF THE S. HOMELAND 
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMM., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of 
John Leech, Acting Director for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security) (“[Mexico] is the primary source of foreign marijuana 
and methamphetamine, and a major source of heroin to the United States.”). 
16 See William Finnegan, Letter from Mexico: Silver or Lead. The Drug Cartel La 
Familia Gives Local Officials a Choice: Take a Bribe or a Bullet, THE NEW YORKER, May 
31, 2010, available at, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/31/silver-
or-lead. 
17 Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Its Role in Battle Against Mexico’s Drug 
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/world/07drugs.html?_r=0. 
18 Callin Kerr, COMMENT: Mexico’s Drug War: Is It Really a War?, 54 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 193 (2012). 
19 Id.; See also, Zetas, INSIGHT CRIME, http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-
organized-crime-news/zetas-profile (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (The Drug 
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territory surrounding the border and various drug routes it consists 
of, including extensive underground tunnels, waterways, roads, and 
walking paths.20 While the amount of narcotics trafficked into the 
United States annually is difficult to quantify, it is estimated that these 
cartels traffic between $19 and $29 billion in drugs each year.21 This 
has caused both the Mexican and United States governments to 
respond to the drug problem in a variety of ways.  
B. Existing Statutes 
1. United States.  
A number of statutes have been enacted in both the United 
States and Mexico to combat the trafficking efforts of the cartels. In 
the United States, the Controlled Substances Act22 prohibits any 
person from distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance.23 Additionally, 21 USC § 952 prohibits the 
importation of controlled substances from outside of the United 
States.24 In conjunction with this statute, the Drug Enforcement 
                                                 
Enforcement Administration has described Los Zetas as “the most technologically 
advanced, sophisticated and violent of these paramilitary enforcement groups.”). 
20 See Ken Stier, Underground Threat: Tunnels Pose Trouble from Mexico to Middle 
East, TIME (May 2, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1895430,00.html (describing the 
discovery of a tunnel financed by the Tijuana Cartel that is “2,400 feet long and 
about nine stories deep”). 
21 CNN Library, Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/ 
(last updated Sep. 23, 2015, 4:41 PM). 
22 21 USC § 841. 
23 Two men recently pled guilty under this statute for smuggling heroin 
across U.S.-Mexican border using a drone. See Kristina Davis, Two plead guilty in 
border drug smuggling by drone, Los Angeles TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-drone-drugs-20150813-story.html. 
24 21 USC § 952(a) (“It shall be unlawful to import into the customs 
territory of the United States from any place outside thereof (but within the United 
States), or to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any 
controlled substance in schedule I or II of title II, or any narcotic drug in schedule 
III, IV, or V of title II, or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or 
phenylpropanolamine…”). 
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Agency (“DEA”) has established Federal Tracking Penalties for 
numerous drugs based on their quantity and schedule.25 To further 
increase security at the border and help prevent the trafficking of 
narcotics President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act in 
2006.26 The purpose of this Act was to “establish operational control 
over the international land and maritime borders of the United 
States.”27 With regard to trafficking, the Act sought to prevent the 
unlawful entry of narcotics and other contraband into the United 
States.28 Under the Act, U.S. Border Patrol increased to 
approximately 20,000 agents throughout President Bush’s 
administration, essentially doubling the number of Border Patrol 
agents at the time.29 Another important statute here is 21 U.S.C. § 
881, which permits the seizure and civil forfeiture of a wide variety of 
property associated with narcotics trafficking.30 Relevant for purposes 
of this comment, this statute permits any drone used to transport 
narcotics to be seized by the United States. Finally, on January 25, 
2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order Number 
13,767: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements.31 Under the Order, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security is instructed to “immediately plan, design, and construct a 
physical wall along the southern border”32 in addition to hiring “5,000 
additional Border Patrol agents.”33 While the main focus of the order 
is on immigration, it nonetheless recognizes the importance of 
preventing drug trafficking at the border. Given the recent nature of 
                                                 
25 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 
FEDERAL TRACKING PENALTIES, http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ftp3.shtml, (last 
visited Sep. 24, 2015). 
26 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638. 
27 Id. 
28 120 Stat. 2638 §2(b). 
29 Bernd Debusmann, The U.S. Border and Immigration Reform, REUTERS (Oct. 
21, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/idUS234388556220111021. 
30 21 U.S.C. § 881 (Property that may be seized under this statute includes 
the drugs themselves, materials and equipment used to make or deliver the drugs, 
vehicles used to transport narcotics, real property used to facilitate drug trafficking, 
and any firearms related to these same crimes.). 
31 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
32 Id. at Sec. 4. 
33 Id. at Sec. 8. 
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this order, it remains unclear what effect it will have on narcotics 
trafficking into the United States.  
2.  Mexico.  
In Mexico, the predominant source of the Country’s drug 
laws is the Federal Criminal Code.34 Article 194 of the Code provides 
a twenty-five year prison sentence for the production, transportation, 
trafficking, sale, and supply of narcotics.35 Additionally, the Federal 
Law Against Organized Crime, which was approved in 1996, 
increased sentences for any crime committed as part of a criminal 
conspiracy.36 This law also established the concept of “preventative 
detention,” which has since been incorporated into Mexico’s 
constitution.37 “Preventative detention” allows for the detention of 
individuals on the basis of having suspected links to organized 
crime.38 Suspected individuals may be detained for up to 80 days 
without an arrest warrant or charge.39 Despite these laws, various 
critics believe the Mexican judicial system has failed to adequately 
address the crime and violence the nation faces at the border.40 In 
particular, Mexico’s judicial system has been characterized as 
corrupt,41 and generally weaker than the other branches of the 
                                                 
34 Código Penal Federal [CPF] [Federal Criminal Code], as amended, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 14 de Agosto de 1931 (Mex.). 
35 Id. art. 194. 
36 Ley Federal Contra la Delincuencia Organizada [LFCDO] [Federal Law 
Against Organized Crime], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 7 de 
Noviembre de 1996 (Mex.). 
37 Mexico, DRUG LAW REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA - TNI, 
http://www.druglawreform.info/country-information/mexico/item/205-
mexico#2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015). 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an 
Understanding of the Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juarez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 795, 808 (2005) (discussing the failure of the Mexican legal system to respond 
to the murders of women in Ciudad Juarez).  
41 Human Rights Watch, Mexico, in WORLD REPORT 380 (2015), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2015_web.pdf. (“The criminal 
justice system routinely fails to provide justice to victims of violent crimes and 
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Mexican government.42 The threat posed by narcotics trafficking at 
the border, in addition to the weak response by the Mexican 
government, has caused the United States and Mexico to begin 
working in a cooperative manner to address drug-related crime at the 
border. 
C.  Cooperation Between United States and Mexico 
The United States and Mexico signed an extradition treaty 
that went into effect in 1980.43 The objective of this treaty is “to 
cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to 
mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition.”44 While 
this treaty provides a general means for the nations to cooperate in 
matters of extradition, the principal policy between the United States 
and Mexico with respect to cartel drug trafficking and violence is the 
Merida Initiative.45 This initiative is described as a “partnership 
between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and 
associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the 
rule of law.”46 The Merida Initiative contains four pillars: (1) Disrupt 
Organized Criminal Groups; (2) Strengthen Institutions (e.g., the 
judicial sector); (3) Build a 21st Century Border; and (4) Build Strong 
and Resilient Communities.47 Under the Merida Initiative, the United 
States has provided over $2.3 billion in aid to Mexico, and $1.4 
billion in equipment and training.48 Such equipment includes 
                                                 
human rights violations. Causes of this failure include corruption, inadequate 
training and resources, and the complicity of prosecutors and public defenders.”) 
42 See Matthew C. Ingram et al., Assessing Mexico’s Judicial Reform, TRANS-
BORDER INSTITUTE 4 (2012), available at 
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-
reform1.pdf. 
43 Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, U.S.-Mex., 
May 4, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9656: 31 UST 5059. 
44 Id. 
45 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Merida Initiative (2012), available at https://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Mexico, The Merida Initiative - Overview, 
https://mx.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/the-merida-initiative/ 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
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helicopters, surveillance equipment and military gear.49 The funds 
appropriated to strengthen institutions under the second pillar focus 
primarily on strengthening Mexico’s justice system and the 
aforementioned problems that plague it.50 This is accomplished 
through the training of prosecutors, defenders, investigators, and 
forensic experts, and through judicial exchanges and partnerships 
between Mexican and U.S. law schools.51 The U.S. State Department 
has claimed that the initiative is responsible for the removal of key 
drug trafficking organization leaders, the seizure of tens of thousands 
of tons of illicit drugs, millions in currency, and tens of thousands of 
weapons.52 
D. Drone Use at Border 
Though the use of drones to traffic narcotics across the 
border is a relatively new tactic, the United States government has 
been utilizing drones at the border for nearly a decade.53 In particular, 
the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) operates 
ten unmanned aircrafts (“UAs”) for border surveillance and law 
enforcement purposes.54 The unmanned aircrafts conduct 
reconnaissance missions to gather data and intelligence on drug 
trafficking and specific individuals either crossing the border illegally, 
                                                 
49 See William A. Fix, Kendra J. Harris & Aida A. Montanaro, Offense, 
Defense, or Just a Big Fence? Why Border Security is a Valid National Security Issue: St. 
Mary’s University School of Law Center for Terrorism Law, 14 SCHOLAR 741, 756 (2012). 
50 The Merida Initiative, supra note 45; see also Eric Olson, Six Key Issues in 
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation, WILSON CTR. (2008), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/six_issues_usmex_security_coop.
pdf. 
51 Id.  
52 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States-Mexico Security 
Partnership: Progress and Impact (Mar. 23, 2010) (on file with Office of the 
Spokesman). 
53 Arthur Holland Michel, Customs and Border Protection Drones, CENTER FOR 
THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/customs-
and-border-protection-drones/. 
54 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS/CBP/PIA-018, 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 2 (2013), available at, 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp-
aircraft-systems-20130926.pdf. 
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or seeking to smuggle narcotics and other contraband into the United 
States.55 These efforts have been met by mild success, with 
unmanned aircrafts helping to seize 7,600 pounds of marijuana worth 
$19.3 million in 2012.56 While the CBP originally intended to expand 
their number of drones to twenty-four at an additional $443 million,57 
the Department of Homeland Security has recently published a 
report stating that the CBP drone program has not performed to 
expectations and is not worth the cost to maintain.58 In light of this 
report, it is unlikely that the CBP drone program will realize its 
projected expansion.59 Given the fact that the United States has been 
implementing the use of drones in its efforts to detect drug 
trafficking at the border, it is unsurprising that the cartels are 
attempting to level the playing field by utilizing drones in their drug 
trafficking efforts. With this brief background on the status of drug 
trafficking at the border, we turn now to the current state of drone 
regulations in Mexico and the United States.  
III. DRONE REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 
A. Drone Regulations in the United States 
Though public drone use is a relatively new phenomenon, the 
foundation for drone regulations in the United States was set in 1958 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Brian Bennett, Predator Drones Have Yet to Prove Their Worth on Border, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/28/nation/la-na-drone-bust-20120429. 
57 Andrew Becker, Border agency looks to expand drone fleet, CALIFORNIA 
WATCH (Nov. 19, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/border-agency-
looks-expand-drone-fleet-18678. 
58 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OIG-15-17, U.S. 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROGRAM 
DOES NOT ACHIEVE INTENDED RESULTS OR RECOGNIZE ALL COSTS OF 
OPERATIONS (2014), available at, 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-17_Dec14.pdf. 
59 Id. at 1 (“The $443 million CBP plans to spend on program expansion 
could be put to better use by investing in alternatives, such as manned aircraft and 
ground surveillance assets.”). 
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with the passage of the Federal Aviation Act.60 This act established 
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), which oversees all 
aspects of American civil aviation and is responsible for “the safe and 
efficient use” of the National Airspace System.61 Consequently, the 
FAA is the regulatory agency responsible for administering drone 
regulations in the United States.62   
The principal piece of drone legislation applicable in the 
United States is the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 (“‘FAA Modernization and Reform Act”).63 
This Act directed the FAA “to safely accelerate the integration of 
civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” by 
September 30, 2015.64 In other words, the FAA has been tasked with 
providing comprehensive drone regulations for various classes of 
drone users. The FAA missed this September deadline, however, and 
the deadline was extended into 2016.65 The extension of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act will be of paramount importance in 
combatting cartel drone use, as will be discussed in Part IV.  
“The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of 
airspace of the United States.”66 The FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act directs the FAA to implement three classifications of 
                                                 
60 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. 
61 Id. 
62 A federal statute specifies the general policy of the Department of 
Transportation. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101. The primary purpose of the FAA (today a 
part of the Department of Transportation) is to maintain safety “as the highest 
priority in air commerce.” 
63 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 
11 [hereinafter “FAA Modernization and Reform Act”]. 
64 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 332, 126 
Stat. 11, 73. 
65 See Aviation Pros, ARSA on FAA Extension: Time is Not on Our Side, 
AVIATION PROS (Sep. 29, 2015), http://www.aviationpros.com/press_release/ 
12120302/arsa-on-faa-extension-time-is-not-on-our-side; see also Mark Rockwel, 
FAA looks to 2016 for drone rules, 1105 MEDIA, INC. (Sep. 30, 2015), 
https://fcw.com/articles/2015/09/30/faa-drones.aspx (“A June 2014 Department 
of Transportation Inspector General report stated the agency would miss the 2015 
mark because of ‘significant technological barriers,’ including detection and 
standardized air traffic procedures and other issues.”). 
66 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a). 
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drones into this airspace: public, civil, and model/recreational.67 
Public drones are those owned and used by the United States 
government or the government of a state.68 Civil drones are all other 
drones not used by the government, but are not recreational.69 Model 
or recreational drones are those that are flown by the general public 
strictly for hobby or recreational use.70 Of these three categories, only 
public drones currently require certification from the FAA. It is 
important to note that while the FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act establishes the aforementioned categories of drones, as of August 
29, 2016, the FAA has implemented regulations that simply govern 
the use of “small” drones – those weighing less than 55 pounds.71 As 
a result, civil drones and model/recreational drones are currently 
treated in a similar manner (with minor exceptions for pilots), and 
can be flown without FAA certification, as long as the drone is 
registered and as long as those piloting them abide by the flight 
regulations expressed by the Small Unmanned Aircraft Rules.72  
1.  Public (Governmental) Drones.  
A number of qualifications must be met before a drone or 
aircraft can qualify for public status.73 “Whether an operation 
qualifies as a public aircraft operation is determined on a flight-by-
flight basis, under the terms of the statute.”74 Factors taken into 
consideration when determining public status include ownership, the 
                                                 
67 FAA Modernization and Reform Act, supra note 63. 
68 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(41) (Operators of public aircrafts include DOD, 
DOJ, DHS, NASA, NOAA, state/local agencies and qualifying universities.). 
69 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16). 
70 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336(c), 
126 Stat. 11, 77-78. 
71 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017). 
72 14 CFR 107. 
73 49 U.S.C. § 40125. 
74 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: PUBLIC OPERATIONS 
(GOVERNMENTAL), available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/public_operations/ (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
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operator, the purpose of the flight, and the persons on board the 
aircraft.75 A drone that qualifies as public must apply for a Certificate 
of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”) from the FAA.76 If the COA is 
issued, public agencies and organizations are then permitted to 
operate a particular aircraft or drone, for a particular purpose, in a 
particular area.77 It should be noted that a public drone operator 
using the drone in an active, restricted, prohibited or warning area 
airspace needs permission from the entity controlling that airspace to 
operate the drone in the secured area.78 Alternatively, if the 
governmental drone chooses to fly under the small UAS rules, it need 
not obtain a COA so long as it follows all rules established under 14 
CFR part 107.79  
2.  Civil Drones. 
Perhaps the most important category for purposes of this 
comment, civil drones are all drones that are not public or 
recreational. This includes drones used by businesses for commercial 
purposes. Currently, there are three methods of gaining FAA 
authorization to fly civil drones. First, a civil drone that weighs less 
than 55 pounds must be registered with the FAA, and the pilot of 
such a drone must meet certain requirements.80 Specifically, the pilot 
of a civil drone must be at least 16 years old, pass an initial 
aeronautical knowledge test, and be vetted by the Transportation 
                                                 
75 49 U.S.C. § 40125, supra. 
76 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, CERTIFICATES OF WAIVER OR AUTHORIZATION (COA), 
available at https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/ 
service_units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
77 Id. 
78 FAA, Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01: Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Operations in the U.S. National Airspace System 5 (2008). 
79 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS, 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2017). 
80 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: FLY FOR WORK/BUSINESS, 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/fly_for_work_business/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
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Safety Administration (TSA).81 Further, civil drones under 55 pounds 
are subject to various operating rules, however all are subject to 
waiver.82 Second, if the civil drone exceeds 55 pounds, the drone 
operator must petition for an exemption under section 333 of the 
Modernization and Reform Act.83 According to the FAA, a section 
333 exemption “provides operators who wish to pursue safe and legal 
entry into the NAS a competitive advantage in the UAS marketplace, 
thus discouraging illegal operations and improving safety.”84 Third, 
civil drone operators can obtain a Special Airworthiness Certificate 
(“SAC”).85 To obtain such a certificate, the drone must conform to 
the same airworthiness standards as that of any other type of 
aircraft.86 Additionally, applicants must be able to describe a number 
of details regarding the drone and the anticipated flight pattern.87 It 
                                                 
81 Id.  
82 Id. Operating rules include flying in a Class G airspace, under 400 feet, 
during the day, at or below 100 mph, and not over people or from a moving car. 
83 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS, 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2017). 
84 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: SECTION 333, available at  
https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/section_333/ (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017). 
85 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION: CERTIFICATION FOR 
CIVIL OPERATED UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND OPTIONALLY 
PILOTED AIRCRAFT (OPA), available at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/ 
airworthiness_certification/sp_awcert/experiment/sac/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
86 Brandon Bellow, COMMENT: FLOATING TOWARD A SKY NEAR 
YOU: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE FAA MODERNIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 2012, 78 J. Air L. & 
Com. 585, 601 (2013). 
87 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: CIVIL OPERATIONS (NON-
GOVERNMENTAL), available at http://www.faa.gov/uas/civil_operations/ (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2015) (“must be able to describe how their system is designed, 
constructed, and manufactured, including engineering processes, software 
development and control, configuration management, and quality assurance 
procedures used, along with how and where they intend to fly.”); see also Civil 
Flight Operations (Non-Governmental), B4UDRONE, available at http://b4udrone.us/ 
civil-operations/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) .  
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should be noted that civil drones may also receive a SAC in the 
experimental category to perform research and development, crew 
training, and market surveys.88 However, unlike other civil drones, 
carrying persons or property for compensation with an experimental 
SAC is strictly prohibited.89 
3.  Model or Recreational Drones.  
The FAA has enacted regulations requiring the registration of 
all drones between 0.55 and 55 pounds, even if used for recreational 
purposes.90 Those registering small recreational drones must be a U.S. 
citizen or legal permanent resident at least 13 years old.91 The failure 
to register such a drone may result in civil and criminal penalties.92 In 
addition to the federal registration process, operators of these drones 
must comply with a number of additional “small unmanned aircraft 
rules.”93 Specifically, all flights must occur during daylight, at or 
below 400 feet, may not exceed 100 mph, and the drone must be 
kept within sight of the pilot at all times.94 Further, drones are 
prohibited from carrying hazardous materials or being operated in a 
reckless manner.95 If a drone operator abides by these regulations, the 
pilot does not need FAA authorization to operate their drone. It 
should be noted however, that similar to civil drones, to fly a drone 
that weighs 55 pounds or more, operators must file for a Section 333 
                                                 
88 14 CFR §21.191. 
89 14 CFR § 91.319(a)(2). 
90 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: REGISTRATION, available at 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/registration/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
91 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: FLY FOR FUN, available at 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/fly_for_fun/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
92 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (SUAS) REGISTRATION 
SERVICE, available at https://registermyuas.faa.gov (last visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
93 14 CFR 107. 
94 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107), 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2017). 
95 Id.  
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exemption.96 Despite these limited provisions, “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Administrator 
to pursue enforcement action against persons operating model 
aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.”97 
4.  Additional Regulations.  
In addition to the above regulations, the government may 
classify airspace as prohibited, meaning “[n]o person may operate an 
aircraft within [the] area unless authorization has been granted by the 
using agency.”98 Additionally, foreign aircrafts, not part of the armed 
forces of a foreign country, may not navigate in the United States 
absent, among other factors, authorization from the Secretary of 
Transportation.99 Finally, various criminal penalties have been put in 
place for violations of registration requirements in connection with 
transporting a controlled substance by aircraft.100 
B.  Drone Regulations in Mexico 
Mexico’s drone regulations are provided in the Dirección 
General de Aeronáutica Civil (General Direction Manual of Civil 
Aeronautics). The Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil is a part of 
the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico 
(“Secretariat”), which in essence is Mexico’s Transportation 
Department.101 The Secretariat is responsible for enacting drone 
regulations in Mexico, which has been accomplished principally 
                                                 
96 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: BEYOND THE BASICS, 
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/#55 (last visited Feb. 9, 
2017). 
97 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336(b), 
126 Stat. 11, 77. 
98 14 CFR § 73.83. 
99 49 USCS § 41703. 
100 49 USCS § 46306. 
101 See generally, Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 
http://www.sct.gob.mx (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). 
DOCUMENT3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017 
2017 Shields 5:1 
225 
through revisions to Mexico’s Aviation Law, COAV23-10R2, in May 
2015.102 
COAV23-10R2 defines a drone as any vehicle capable of 
“transiting through air space.”103 The most important provisions 
within this regulation regarding drones are the drone classifications 
and the no permit requirement for the operation of small drones in 
daylight.104 Specifically, the regulation divides drones into three 
categories based on size: small-sized drones weighing 2 kilograms (4.4 
pounds) or less; medium-sized drones weighing between 2 kilograms 
and 25 kilograms (55 pounds); and large-sized drones weighing over 
25 kilograms.105 Small-sized drones are typically those used by 
hobbyists, and, as stated above, do not require any permit to fly, so 
long as they abide by the general flight laws.106 Medium-sized drones 
require a permit to operate, unless operated on the grounds of a flight 
club.107 Finally, large-sized drones require an operating permit, and 
the operator must also be a licensed pilot.108 
Notwithstanding the above categorizations of drones, small 
recreational drones must abide by a number of additional regulations. 
For example, all drone flights must be operated during daylight hours 
only.109 Additionally, all drones must stay 9.2 kilometers (5.72 miles) 
away from airports and 900 meters (0.56 miles) from helicopter pads. 
Further, small-sized drones are prohibited from flying above 122 
meters (400 feet).110 Throughout the duration of the flight, the 
                                                 
102 CO AV-23/10 R2, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/fileadmin/ 
DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf. 
103 Id. 
104 See Nancy Palencia, Mexico drones get green light, CAPITALMEDIA, available 
at http://thenews.mx/2015/04/mexico-drones-get-green-light (last visited Nov. 
12, 2015). 
105 CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7, p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/ 
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf. 
106 Id. at art. 8, p. 5. 
107 Id. at art. 9, p. 6. 
108 Id. at art. 10, p. 6. 
109 Id. at art. 7.2(k); see also Mexico Drone Laws, UAV SYSTEMS 
INTERNATIONAL INC. (Nov. 1, 2015), https://uavsystemsinternational.com/drone-
laws-by-country/mexico-drone-laws/. 
110 Mexican Drone Regulations, THE DRONE INFO (June 24, 2015), 
http://www.thedroneinfo.com/mexican-drone-regulations/. 
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operator or pilot must always keep the drone within his visual line of 
sight.111 Finally, the regulations provide that all drones may not carry 
any dangerous merchandise or prohibited substances,112 and pilots are 
responsible for any damage caused by an accident.113 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, Mexico’s drone laws 
are not only new, but are not completely developed. That being said, 
commentators have stated that Mexico’s drone laws are a step in the 
right direction, in part because they have closely modeled their 
regulations off of those currently in existence in the United States. 
However, both the drone regulations of Mexico and the United 
States are not fully comprehensive, leaving gaps for drones to be 
utilized in criminal activity, as displayed by the narcotics trafficking 
seen at the border.  
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT DRONES FROM BEING 
USED AS TOOLS FOR DRUG TRAFFICKING BY MEXICAN 
CARTELS 
The previous sections have established the importance and 
impact of the use of drones to traffic narcotics into the United States. 
Factors contributing to the severity of this issue include the 
expanding drone industry, lack of drone regulations, and significant 
quantity of narcotics smuggled into the United States from Mexico. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the trafficking of 
narcotics from Mexico into the United States is nothing short of an 
epidemic. While certain drone regulations have been established by 
both Mexico and the United States, these regulations were not 
enacted to control the use of drones as tools for transporting 
narcotics. Since evidence suggests that Mexican cartels have begun to 
utilize drones as a trafficking technique, the need for a 
                                                 
111  CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 8, p. 5, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx 
/fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf. 
112 Id. at art. 7.2(e); see also SCT announces new drone regulations, MEXICO 
NEWS DAILY (Apr. 30, 2015), http://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/sct-announces-
new-drone-regulations (“[drones] must not carry anything dangerous or illegal.”). 
113  CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7.2(g), p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/ 
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf. 
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comprehensive solution is imminent. This section proposes possible 
solutions to prevent drones from being used as tools by Mexican 
cartels for drug trafficking. This section will also discuss the 
regulation of drones in several other countries, and which policies, if 
any, should be adopted at the border.  
It should be noted that while there exist several different 
theories to reduce the incidences of drug trafficking into the United 
States,114 this comment focuses on methods that can be used to 
specifically prevent cartels from using drones to traffic narcotics. 
While alternative theories could undoubtedly decrease the overall 
incidences of narcotics trafficking into the United States, they will not 
be the focus of the discussion. 
A. Overview of Proposal 
The most important aspects of solving the drone crisis at the 
border are the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, the 
Merida Initiative, and the extradition treaty between the United States 
and Mexico. As discussed above, the FAA has been granted an 
extension to finalize their implementation of drones into the United 
States airspace.115 The FAA should utilize the extension granted in 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act to implement regulations 
for drone use at the border, and fill in any gaps not covered by the 
current regulations. The specifics of possible regulations will be 
discussed in subpart 1, below. These refined regulations within the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act should then be implemented 
into collaborative drone regulations with the Mexican government at 
the border. This can be accomplished through the Merida Initiative, 
and specifically, through the first three pillars, which focus on 
disrupting organized criminal groups, strengthening institutions, and 
building a twenty-first century border. Such collaborative drone 
regulations would be consistent with the goals of the Merida 
                                                 
114 See inter alia Mark Osler, SYMPOSIUM: DRUG POLICY REALITY 
AND REFORM: ASSET FORFEITURE IN A NEW MARKET-REALITY 
NARCOTICS POLICY, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 221 (2015). (proposing that attacking 
the “cash flow” of the cartels would disrupt their narcotics operations). 
115 Aviation Pros, supra note 65. 
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Initiative. As part of the Initiative, the Mexican government must 
work to honor any new regulations implemented in the United States 
through the FAA Modernization and Reform Act. Finally, any 
criminal violations of the collaborative regulations would permit the 
United States to prosecute any offenders located in Mexico, due to 
the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. In order 
for this proposal to be effective, both countries must work to honor 
the treaty while respecting the other nation’s sovereignty. With the 
basic framework of the proposal established, potential new drone 
regulations will be discussed below.116 
1. New Drone Regulations to be enacted through the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act.   
To begin, both the United States and Mexico must enact 
regulations that explicitly ban the use of drones as drug trafficking 
tools at the border. No such regulation currently exists in either 
country, so this proposal is intuitively the first step in solving this 
problem. It is significant that a number of states have already enacted 
legislation prohibiting the weaponization of drones.117 For this 
reason, a prohibition on the transportation of drugs would be feasible 
and consistent with existing drone regulations. 
Next, the United States and Mexico should create harsher 
penalties for offenders who use drones to transport narcotics across 
the border. While trafficking narcotics across the border is already 
illegal,118 a sentence enhancer for the use of drones would help deter 
future incidences of drone transportation, since the relatively small 
benefits of a single drone trafficking flight would not outweigh the 
potential enhanced sentence attached to such conduct. Such a 
sentence enhancer would also apply to those receiving the drone 
shipment within the United States. This proposal is closely related to 
                                                 
116 While it is not anticipated that the cartels will follow every regulation this 
comment proposes, such regulations may nonetheless help deter cartels from using 
drones as trafficking tools by making the penalties for such conduct outweigh its 
potential benefits. 
117 See inter alia N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-401.24 (2014). 
118 21 USC § 841. 
DOCUMENT3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2017 
2017 Shields 5:1 
229 
the first, however with slight differences. Whereas the previous 
proposal was an explicit ban on trafficking narcotics with drones, this 
proposal ensures a harsher penalty for those caught trafficking 
narcotics in this fashion. While the former is its own offense, the 
latter would attach to legislation already in existence. 
Additionally, the United States and Mexico should categorize 
the region extending the length of the border as a “no fly zone” for 
drones, thus prohibiting unauthorized drone flights within 5 miles of 
the border.119 This is accomplished by categorizing this region as 
“prohibited airspace,” in which no drone operations may take place 
in a designated region of the border without the express permission 
of the United States or Mexican governments.120 Any drone flights 
within this region, with the exception of drones currently controlled 
by the CBP,121 would be strictly prohibited, and those participating in 
unauthorized flights would be subject to severe penalties as well as 
confiscation of any drone and narcotics being transferred across the 
border.122 While such regions already exist, the border of the United 
States and Mexico is not included among these “no-fly zones.”123 As 
will be described below, several countries have adopted similar “no-
fly zones” to help regulate drone flights.124  
In conjunction with the prohibited airspace, all drone flights 
that fall outside of this region but nevertheless remain within 10 miles 
of the border must be operated within the line of sight of the 
operator – GPS and camera controlled flights should be strictly 
prohibited within this region. Adopting such a regulation would make 
it much more difficult for those attempting to traffic narcotics via 
                                                 
119 Bobby Sudekum, Don’t fly drones here, MAPBOX (July 22, 2014),  
https://www.mapbox.com/blog/dont-fly-here/ (Map of current no-fly 
zones for drones). 
120 14 C.F.R.§§73.81-73.83 (2011). 
121 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 54. 
122 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
123 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §334, 126 
Stat. 11, 76-77. 
124 Canada prohibits flights within restricted airspace, including near or over 
military bases, prisons, and forest fires. See Canadian Aviation Regulations, 
SOR/96-433 (Can.) available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-96-
433.pdf. 
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drones to remain hidden from authorities, and should make the risk 
of such a flight outweigh the potential benefits. This would also make 
drone trafficking flights less convenient, since they cannot be 
controlled through an automatic flight pattern with GPS coordinates 
or from a remote location via camera. To be effective, this regulation 
would also require the communities neighboring the border to be 
well informed of the regulation’s requirements.  
Finally, recall that the current United States and Mexican 
regulations categorize drones based on weight.125 However with 
reports that the cartels are engineering their own drones with larger 
engines to make transporting narcotics more efficient,126 regulations 
should be implemented prohibiting certain engine sizes for civilian 
drones. By limiting the engine size of drones that can be used for 
narcotics trafficking, such drones will be unable to carry greater 
weight, and thus will be unable to transport larger quantities of 
narcotics. Any drones seized that contain engine sizes exceeding the 
statutory limit will be subject to additional penalties. This regulation 
will help deter cartels from constructing their own drones with 
increased engine sizes, thus making drones an inefficient method for 
trafficking narcotics.   
2.  Additional Methods.  
In addition to the above regulations, the United States and 
Mexico should employ the use of geo-fencing technology. Put simply, 
geo-fencing is a virtual barrier that surrounds a geographical 
boundary through the use of a GPS.127 Geo-fencing technology could 
automatically prevent drones from entering a designated prohibited 
area. By designating the region extending the length of the border as 
                                                 
125 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §336, 126 
Stat. 11, 77-78; CO AV-23/10 R2, art. 7, p. 4, available at http://www.sct.gob.mx/ 
fileadmin/DireccionesGrales/DGAC/00-aeronautica/co-av-23-10-r2.pdf. 
126 Drug delivery drone crashes in Mexico, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30932395 (Stating that cartels hired 
engineers to manufacture drones to carry more weight than those that were 
commercially available.). 
127 DEFINITION: geo-fencing (geofencing), TECHTARGET (Sep. 2015), 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/geofencing. 
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prohibited airspace, as described above, the use of geo-fencing 
technology would ensure that GPS controlled drones do not fly 
within 10 miles of the border. This proposal is feasible, as U.S. 
lawmakers have recently suggested similar regulations.128 
The United States must also continue utilizing their own 
surveillance drones at the border to help identify any unauthorized 
drones in the border airspace.129 Since the drones utilized by the CBP 
already monitor the border for drug trafficking,130 extending their 
operation to monitor the skies is the next logical and necessary step 
in preventing narcotics trafficking. In fact, China is currently utilizing 
drones in their own efforts to prevent drug trafficking on the Indian 
border in Tibet and in Xinjiang and Yunnan regions.131 The use of 
such technology comes with its own weaknesses however, as drones 
utilized by the CBP may be susceptible to attacks.132 Increased drone 
                                                 
128 See Kim Kirschenbaum, Recreational Drones Present Enforcement Issues for 
FAA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.regblog.org/2015/09/23/kirschenbaum_recreational_drones/ (New 
York Senator Chuck Schumer recently announced his intentions to introduce an 
amendment mandating the use of geo-fencing technology on drones to restrict 
their flying capabilities.); see also Kaveh Waddell, Chuck Schumer Wants to Set Up No-
Drone Zones Around Airports, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/2015/08/19/chuck-schumer-wants-set-up-
no-drone-zones-around-airports (Geo-fencing technology proposals would create 
no-fly zones for “sensitive areas.”). 
129 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra Note 54. 
130 See Thompson, supra note 17. 
131 China deploys radars, drones on borders to curb infiltration, THE ECONOMIC 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ 
china-deploys-radars-drones-on-borders-to-curb-infiltration/articleshow/49688679 
.cms. 
132 See Scott Peterson & Payam Faramarzi, Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says 
Iranian Engineer, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-
hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video (Commentators have noted that 
the GPS guidance system that allows a UAS to fly free is highly susceptible to 
attack); see also Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Drone Hijacking? That’s Just the Start of 
GPS Troubles, WIRED (July 6, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom 
/2012/07/drone-hijacking/all/ (“There are already drones in use in the country 
that are plausible targets for jamming – think of the drones being used to monitor 
the border between the U.S. and Mexico for drug smuggling and border 
jumping.”). 
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security could protect CBP drones from being hijacked,133 and such 
techniques could then be used to ground unauthorized drones 
trafficking narcotics.134 
B.  Drone Regulations of Other Nations 
Numerous countries around the world have enacted their 
own unique drone regulations, the adoption of which may be useful 
to the United States and Mexico in their efforts to combat narcotics 
trafficking. The following discussion explores a number of drone 
regulations from several countries. While some of the outlined 
regulations may prove to be useful in the future of drone regulation 
at the border, others are included to provide a simple comparison. 
This discussion is intended to highlight how the regulations of 
Mexico and the United States compare to those of other nations, and 
discuss which regulations may be useful to help curb the incidences 
of drones being used to traffic narcotics across the border. The 
countries described below were selected based on a unique feature 
about their drone regulations, and provided a distinct basis of 
comparison to the drone regulations of Mexico and the United 
States. 
1.  United Kingdom. 
To begin, drone regulations in the United Kingdom are very 
similar to those of the United States. One notable difference is that 
the United Kingdom requires direct visual contact to be maintained 
at all times, and the operator may not use a monitor to conduct the 
                                                 
133 Bellow, supra note 86 at 615 (“The FAA should also require that all 
UASs come equipped with some sort of anti-drone-jacking technology.”). 
134 Josh Solomon, Uncertainties Remain as FAA Integrates Drones Into American 
Skies, MCCLATCHY DC (April 29, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013 
/04/29/189894/uncertainties-remain-as-faa-integrates.html (“Drones also are 
susceptible to communications jamming, leaving the operator unable to control the 
aircraft.”). 
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flight.135 A similar regulation should be enforced at the designated 10-
mile zone at the border, discussed above. This would prohibit GPS 
or camera operated flights, thus forcing pilots to keep the drone in 
their line of sight. In turn, this UK regulation would increase the risk 
that a potential trafficker will be identified. 
2. Canada.  
As previously noted, Canada prohibits flights within restricted 
airspace, including near or over military bases, prisons, and forest 
fires.136 A similar regulation could create a “no-fly zone” within five 
miles of the border, and impose severe fines or penalties for any 
violators caught operating an unauthorized drone in this region. 
Additionally, Canada prohibits operating a drone in a region that 
would interfere with first responders.137 A similar regulation could be 
implemented at the border, prohibiting drone flights that could 
interfere with drones currently being utilized by the CBP. 
3. Bangladesh.  
Contrary to the United States and Mexico, the Government 
of Bangladesh has banned all drones that did not have flight 
permission prior to December 2014.138 While an interesting approach 
to drone regulation, a similar approach would likely be far too drastic 
in the United States and Mexico, where demand for drones are 
skyrocketing, and would not directly solve the issue of drones used as 
trafficking tools. Nevertheless, the approach to drone regulations in 
Bangladesh is an interesting contrast to the regulations discussed in 
the United States and Mexico.  
                                                 
135 Above the Law: How Drone Laws Around the World Are Affecting Production, 
LITTLE BLACK BOOK LTD. (Sept. 2014), http://www.lbbonline.com/news/above-
the-law-how-drone-laws-around-the-world-are-affecting-production/. 
136 See Canadian Aviation Regulations, supra note 124. 
137 Id. 
138 No drone allowed in country’s airspace, THE DAILY STAR (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www.thedailystar.net/no-drone-allowed-in-countrys-airspace-57769; see also 
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, BANGLADESH, http://www.caab.gov.bd (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2016). 
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4. Brazil.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Brazil does not have 
any restrictions on drone usage within their country.139 The country 
intended to implement new drone legislation before the 2016 
Olympics,140 however such measures were largely unsuccessful.141 
While not a practical solution by any means, this laissez faire approach 
to drone regulation is interesting in the context of the rising drone 
market across the globe.  
5. Austria.  
Austria requires that potential drone users either have a pilot 
license or pass an exam about Austrian air law.142 While such a 
regulation may seem harsh, it undoubtedly would increase the 
security of the border, permitting only trained pilots or those with 
requisite knowledge to pilot drones. While such a regulation may not 
directly have any deterring effects on the trafficking of narcotics into 
the United States via drones, this regulation would increase the safety 
of the communities at the border by enhancing notice of the no-fly 
zones and applicable drone laws prohibiting trafficking.  
6. The Netherlands.  
The final, and most outlandish, method of drone regulation 
in a foreign country is found in the Netherlands. While not exactly a 
regulation, it is worth mentioning that the Dutch National Police 
                                                 
139 Above the Law: How Drone Laws Around the World Are Affecting Production, 
LITTLE BLACK BOOK LTD. (Sept. 2014), http://www.lbbonline.com/news/above-
the-law-how-drone-laws-around-the-world-are-affecting-production/. 
140 Brazil to Unveil New Drone Legislation ahead of 2016 Olympics, PANAM POST 
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://panampost.com/panam-staff/2015/04/17/brazil-to-
unveil-new-drone-legislation-ahead-of-2016-olympics/. 
141 Russell Brandom, How Brazil is trying (and failing) to keep drones away from the 
Olympics, THE VERGE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/8/ 
12402972/olympics-rio-2016-anti-drone-jamming-public-safety. 
142 BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBl No. 
253/1957, as amended by Bundesgesetz [BGBl] No. 96/2013, art. 4, § 24 (Austria). 
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Corps has begun a new initiative using eagles to capture unauthorized 
drones from the sky.143 The eagle responds to the drone as it would 
its normal prey, snatching the drone mid-flight and carrying it to the 
ground. It has been explained that “these birds’ animal instincts . . . 
offer an effective solution to a new threat.”144 While this technique 
may seem impractical, one cannot deny the poetic justice of seeing a 
bald eagle protect the American border by snatching a shipment of 
illicit narcotics from the sky. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The use of drones to traffic narcotics into the United States 
from Mexico is an increasing phenomenon that is contributing to the 
United States’ drug epidemic. Drones are becoming more widely 
available, and the current regulations cannot keep up with this 
expansion. The need for a solution is imminent as we move into 
2017. The current drone regulations of Mexico and the United States 
are insufficient to solve this crisis, however the pieces of a solution 
have been put into place. The United States needs to utilize the 
recent extension of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act to 
ensure that new regulations are enacted to help prevent future 
incidences of drug trafficking into the United States. Potential 
regulations include explicit bans on using drones as trafficking tools 
as well as sentence enhancers for such uses, categorizing the border 
as prohibited airspace or a “no-fly zone,” and limitations on drone 
engine sizes. These regulations could be promulgated through the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act, and implemented into 
Mexico’s own drone legislation through the Merida Initiative. Once 
these two nations have collaborative drone regulations at the border, 
they should continue to honor the extradition treaty they signed in 
1978. In addition to the above framework, both countries should 
utilize geo-fencing technology, thus creating virtual barriers for any 
GPS piloted flights. The United States CBP should continue using 
                                                 
143 Mindy Weisberger, Drone-hunting eagles can snatch devices out of the sky, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-hunting-eagles-can-
snatch-the-devices-out-of-the-sky/. 
144 Id.  
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their own drones at the border to not only identify potential 
traffickers on foot, but to monitor the skies for any unauthorized 
drones. It is important that the CBP ensure these drones are 
equipped with anti-drone-jacking technology, and should not hesitate 
to use such technology to ground unauthorized drones. Finally, 
various regulations (or lack thereof) from the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Bangladesh, Brazil, Austria, and the Netherlands provide a 
unique dialogue on regulations that the United States and Mexico 
could potentially implement at the border.  
While drones may not currently be the primary method for 
Mexican cartels to traffic narcotics into the United States, this reality 
could change if the United States and Mexico do not take steps to 
prevent its continued use in the future. The use of drones at the 
border has implications beyond drug trafficking,145 however their use 
as trafficking tools can no longer be ignored. With an extension 
granted to the FAA for the promulgation of new regulations, only 
time will tell if this new drug trafficking method can be grounded 
before it finally takes off.  
 
                                                 
145 See Bellow, supra note 86, at 609 (“[T]hose with nefarious purposes could 
turn large-scale UASs into projectile weapons against the American people or 
attempt to weaponize UASs and open fire on the public.”). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government 
has faced the ever-evolving challenge of combating foreign terrorists. 
The capture of a suspected terrorist by United States forces presents 
several legal issues, including, questions over the nature of the 
terrorism suspect’s capture, subsequent treatment and afforded 
rights.1   
Additionally, United States Government officials face the 
controversial decision about what to do with captured terrorism 
suspects: either detain them as enemy combatants at Guantanamo 
Bay to face a military tribunal, or try them before a civilian court in 
the United States.2 Since the attacks of September 11th and the 
beginning of the War on Terror, terrorism suspects have been tried in 
military tribunals as well as civilian courts. However, under the 
current administration, the preferred method has been to seek justice 
in civilian courts.3 
Recently, suspected ringleader of the 2012 Benghazi terrorist 
attack,4 Ahmed Abu Khatallah,5 has been subjected to this policy, and 
                                                 
1 See Steve Vladeck, Kidnapping Is Legally Dubious, But It’s Also The Best Way 
To Get Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014 (presenting legal issues regarding 
rendition of terrorist suspects). 
2 For arguments promoting both sides in one particular case, see Karen 
DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi Suspect In Secret 
Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014. 
3 See Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi 
Suspect In Secret Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014. 
4 For more information on the Benghazi attack, including background on 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah as well as details of the attack from several witnesses close 
to Abu Khatallah and present on the night of the attack, see David D. Kirkpatrick, 
A Deadly Mix In Benghazi, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi. 
5 While the English spelling of his name sometimes differs based on the 
source, from ‘Khattala’ to ‘Khatallah,’ this comment uses the spelling ‘Khatallah,’ 
which is used in the formal Indictment filed by the United States Attorney’s Office 
for the District of Columbia. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Abu Khatallah, 
No.14-141 (2014). 
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is being tried in a civilian court in Washington D.C.6 Charged in 
relation to the September 11th, 2012, attack on the United States 
diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in which Ambassador J. 
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management 
Officer Sean Patrick Smith, and CIA Security Officers Tyrone 
Snowden Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty were killed,7 suspected 
leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Ahmed Abu Khatallah, was captured by a 
team of United States Special Forces in mid-June, 2014.8 After his 
capture in Libya, Ahmed Abu Khatallah was immediately transported 
to an American military vessel, the USS New York, which transported 
Khatallah across the Atlantic Ocean to face trial in federal court in 
the District of Columbia.9  
The capture and subsequent handling of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah implicates several legal questions surrounding United States 
policy regarding the capture of suspected terrorists.10 Despite 
questions surrounding the handling of Abu Khatallah, the decision by 
the Obama administration to transport Abu Khatallah back to the 
United States on an American military ship was both deliberate and 
strategic.11 By choosing to transport Abu Khatallah by military ship,12 
                                                 
6 See Karen DeYoung and Ann E. Marimow, Benghazi Suspect Ahmed Abu 
Khattala May Be Brought To U.S. On Navy Ship, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014. 
7 See Government’s Motion For Pretrial Detention at 7, United States v. 
Abu Khatallah, No.14-141 (2014). 
8 See Id. at 10. 
9 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, USS New York, Carrying a Benghazi Suspect, Has 
Gone Dark, WASH. POST, June 25, 2014. 
10 See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror Suspect Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014. 
11 The reasoning for doing so primarily revolves around the rather dubious 
nature of the capture of the suspect by extraordinary rendition. The difficulty in 
finding countries willing to allow suspects who have been subject to rendition to 
pass through their sovereign territory during the process of transporting the 
suspect to America makes transportation by way of military ship extremely 
convenient, if not necessary. See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror 
Suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014. 
12 Whether the United States is legally able to use the military for purposes 
of law enforcement is a separate, distinct legal question. Under the Posse Comitatus 
Act, the armed forces are restrained from aiding civilian law enforcement 
authorities in keeping the peace and arresting felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1978). 
See also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1981) (requiring the Department of Defense to prescribe 
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the Obama administration had several days to question and search 
Abu Khatallah before the vessel reached the United States.13 Further, 
because much of the trip from Libya to the United States involved 
crossing the Atlantic Ocean, in international waters, FBI agents were 
able to search Abu Khatallah without a warrant and question him 
without reading him his Miranda rights.14  
This article will argue that the current Administration’s 
practice of searching individuals without a warrant by way of 
transporting suspected terrorists15 on military ships through 
international waters is in direct conflict with the Fourth16 
Amendment.17 On its face, this practice appears to comply with 
                                                 
regulations ensuring that the U.S. Navy, among others, does not directly participate 
in civilian law enforcement absent authorization by law). The Department of 
Justice maintains the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside of the territory of 
the United States, and as such, for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed 
that the United States Government’s practice of using military vessels in a law 
enforcement capacity for suspects bound for civilian courts is itself legal. See Int’l 
Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The Commanders 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.3.1, p. 3-13 (2007). 
13 See Evan Perez and Holly Yan, Controversy Swirls Over Handling Of Benghazi 
Suspect Abu Khatallah, CNN, June 29, 2014 (Ahmed Abu Khatallah questioned 
aboard ship for two weeks). 
14 See Michael Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo, Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, Trial 
Secondary As U.S. Questions a Libyan Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014. 
15 Ahmed Abu Khatallah is not the first suspected terrorist held aboard 
military vessels pending transfer to the United States. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests 
New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011 
(describing the handling of Somali Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame aboard the USS 
Boxer); Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy 
Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013 (Libyan Abu Anas al-Libi aboard the USS San 
Antonio). 
16 The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
17 Again, recognizing that contravention of the Fourth Amendment is likely 
only a collateral benefit and not the official reasoning for the use of military ships 
to transport suspected terrorists, see Note 11 supra. Additionally, this discussion will 
be limited to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Abu Khatallah, as well 
as similarly situated suspected terrorists. Questions surrounding Miranda and the 
Public Safety Exception, while extremely important and relevant to Abu Khatallah, 
DOCUMENT4 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
242 
numerous Supreme Court cases establishing the extraterritorial reach 
of the Fourth Amendment.18 However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boumediene v. Bush19 raises questions regarding the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment on a United States military vessel, even if the 
ship is located in international waters.  
To answer these questions, it is necessary to first understand 
the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution. Part II of this 
article will describe the extraterritoriality of the United States 
Constitution. Part III will explore the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Boumediene and its impact on the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution. Part IV will examine the United States’ position on the 
jurisdiction surrounding American military vessels. Part V discusses a 
few policy considerations implicated by the analysis of Parts II-IV.  
II.  THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
The extraterritoriality of the Constitution can be broken 
down as it applies to three main categories of individuals: (1) non-
United States citizens present within the territory of the United 
States, (2) United States citizens outside of the territory of the United 
States, and (3) non-United States citizens outside of the territory of 
the United States.  
Section A will give a brief overview of the applicability of the 
Constitution to the first two categories, non-United States citizens 
within the United States and United States citizens abroad. Section B 
will give a more in-depth look at the category in which Ahmed Abu 
                                                 
as well as other similarly situated suspected terrorists, are too much to address here 
and will be saved for another time. 
18 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to foreign citizens in foreign territories); INS V. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assuming illegal aliens in the United States 
have Fourth Amendment rights); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitutional 
provisions applicable to United States citizens abroad); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763 (1950) (no extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment). 
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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Khatallah falls, a non-United States citizen located outside of the 
United States. 
A.  Applicability to non-United States Citizens within the United 
States, and United States Citizens Abroad. 
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,20 the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether a Chinese national lawfully living in the United 
States could be detained without first receiving notice of the charges 
levied against him, while further denying the individual any 
opportunity to voice their opposition to the detention.21 The 
Supreme Court held that non-United States citizens present within 
the United States are afforded constitutional protections.22 In 
deciding the case, the Court stated the “well-established” principle 
that, if an alien is lawfully present in the United States, he is within 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process.23  
The Supreme Court first addressed whether the Constitution, 
and more specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, apply to 
United States citizens outside of the United States in Reid v. Covert.24 
In Reid, the Court addressed the issue of whether military trials of 
civilian spouses of servicemen stationed abroad were constitutional.25 
Upon rehearing and reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed 
their earlier decision26 and held that civilian spouses of servicemen 
                                                 
20 344 U.S. 590 (1953). 
21 Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 595. 
22 Id. at 600. 
23 Id. at 596. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., 
concurring) (“Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our 
borders.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-771 (1950) (Mere lawful 
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him 
certain rights.). 
24 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
25 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. 
26 See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 487 (1956) (holding that Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments do not protect American citizens tried by the American 
Government for crimes committed and tried in a foreign land). 
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stationed abroad could not be tried by a military tribunal.27 Trying a 
civilian in a military tribunal was held to be in violation of the 
civilian’s Fifth28 and Sixth29 Amendment rights.30   
The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the United States’ 
power and authority is solely created by the Constitution, the 
Government must act within constitutional limitations.31  The Court 
rejected the argument that only fundamental constitutional rights 
protect Americans abroad.32 Instead, the Court found in favor of 
extending every provision of the Constitution to American citizens, 
either at home or in another land.33  
Kwong Hai Chew and Reid thus begin to define the breadth and 
limits of constitutional applicability. Instead of universal applicability, 
the Constitution applies to United States citizens, in the United States 
as well as abroad, and to foreign nationals that are lawfully within the 
territory of the United States. However, one question remains: do the 
provisions of the Constitution restrain the United States when it acts 
against a foreign national outside of the territory of the United 
                                                 
27 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. 
28 The Fifth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “No person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger... nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. V. 
29 The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
30 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.  
31 Id. at 6 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180 (1803)). 
32 Reid, 354 U.S. at 9. 
33 Id. at 9. However, courts have since limited the extent to which some 
constitutional provisions apply to citizens outside of the United States. See e.g., In re 
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment 
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2nd Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by 
U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”). 
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States? The Supreme Court first addressed this question in United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.34   
B.  Applicability to non-United States Citizens Outside the United 
States. 
For decades, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Verdugo has stood as the guidepost for determining whether foreign 
citizens located outside of the United States have rights under the 
United States Constitution. In Verdugo, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was violated 
when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents searched the 
defendant’s house without a search warrant.35 The Court ultimately 
held that because the defendant was a Mexican national, and the 
property searched was located in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply.36  
The defendant in Verdugo, a citizen and resident of Mexico, 
was apprehended by Mexican authorities based on an American 
arrest warrant issued in connection with narcotics distribution.37 The 
Mexican citizen was transported to the Mexican-American border 
where he was delivered to United States Marshals for arrest.38 
Following the arrest, DEA agents, in conjunction with Mexican 
Federal Judicial Police Officers searched the defendant’s properties in 
Mexicali and San Felipe and seized evidence of the defendant’s 
narcotics trafficking.39   
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of 
California suppressed the seized evidence, concluding that the Fourth 
Amendment applied to the search and that there had been no 
justification for searching the premises without a warrant.40 The 
                                                 
34 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
35 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 261. 
36 Id. at 274-75. 
37 Id. at 262. 
38 Id. 
39 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 262. 
40 Id. at 263. 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although divided, affirmed 
the District Court’s ruling by relying on Reid.41 On further appeal, in a 
6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply to the defendant because at the time of the search, the 
defendant “was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary 
attachment to the United States, and the place searched was located 
in Mexico.”42  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion, 
examined the function of the Fourth Amendment compared to the 
Fifth Amendment, which was at issue in Reid.43 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that while constitutional violations of the Fifth 
Amendment occur at trial, violations of the Fourth Amendment are 
“fully accomplished” at the time of the search.44 Therefore, even if 
there was a constitutional violation of the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, it occurred solely in Mexico.45 Remedial exclusion 
of the evidence is a separate question and does not touch on the 
existence of a constitutional violation in and of itself.46  
The Chief Justice, in an effort to determine whether the 
Fourth Amendment was meant to apply to foreign nationals, 
analyzed the language and history of the Fourth Amendment.47 First, 
the language of the Fourth Amendment, using the term of art ‘the 
people,’ refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.”48   
Second, the history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that 
its provisions were meant to protect the American people against 
arbitrary action by the United States Government, and not intended 
to restrain the actions of the United States Government against aliens 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 274-75. 
43 Id. at 264. 
44 Id.  
45 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 265. 
48 Id.  
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outside American territory.49 As an example, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that in 1798 Congress passed an act allowing commanders of 
both public and private armed vessels of the United States to 
“subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel . . . on the high 
seas.”50 While some commanders were held liable for seizures beyond 
the scope of Congress’ grant of authority,51 the Supreme Court never 
suggested the Fourth Amendment restrained commanders from 
conducting such seizures authorized by Congress.52  
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at previous case law to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the DEA 
search conducted in Mexico.53 The opinion in Verdugo stated that the 
Court of Appeals’ global application of the Constitution goes against 
precedential cases, known as the Insular Cases.54 As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist points out, the Insular Cases55 held that not every 
constitutional provision applies to Government activity, even when 
the United States may have sovereign power, and that only 
fundamental constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of 
unincorporated territories of the United States.56 Because the 
Constitution “does not, without legislation and of its own force” 
apply to territories ultimately governed by Congress, the claim that 
                                                 
49 Id. at 266. 
50 Id. at 267. See also §§ 1-2 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of 
the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578-9. 
51 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (1804); cf. Talbot v. 
Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 31 (1801) (seizure of neutral ship lawful where American 
captain had probable cause to believe vessel was French). 
52 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268. 
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 
91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines); 
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in 
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (jury trial and indictment by 
grand jury provisions inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico). 
56 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148). 
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protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign 
nations is especially weak.57   
In addition to the Insular Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist found 
support for holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
foreign nationals in foreign territories in Johnson v. Eisentrager.58 The 
Chief Justice emphasized that while some constitutional provisions 
extend beyond the citizenry of the United States, the Eisentrager 
opinion emphatically rejected the extraterritorial application of the 
Fifth Amendment, as the extraterritorial application of organic law is 
a practice that every modern government is opposed to.59  
In contrast to the Insular Cases and Eisentrager, the Chief 
Justice distinguished Verdugo from the Reid decision relied on by the 
lower courts.60 In quoting from the Reid decision, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist emphasized that, “when the government reaches out to 
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provided to protect his life and liberty 
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another 
land.”61 While the lower courts interpreted such language as 
constraining federal officials under the Fourth Amendment wherever 
and against whomever they act, the Chief Justice stated that Reid dealt 
with United States citizens abroad and that the holding of Reid is 
therefore not applicable to the case at hand.62  
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly rejected the contention that 
case law dealing with the application of the Constitution to foreign 
nationals within the United States63 applies to the case at hand 
because the defendant in Verdugo had no voluntary connection with 
the United States, and foreign nationals can only avail themselves of 
                                                 
57 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149). 
58 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (rejecting the claim that enemy aliens imprisoned in 
Germany after World War II are entitled to habeas corpus writs in federal courts 
on the ground that their war crimes convictions were violations of the Fifth 
Amendment and other constitutional provisions). 
59 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784). 
60 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270. 
61 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6). 
62 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270. 
63 See Kwong Hai Chew, supra note 21. 
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the protections of the Constitution when they come within the 
territory of, and develop substantial connections with, the United 
States.64 In response to Justice Stevens’ concurrence,65 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 
should not turn on the “fortuitous circumstance” that the foreign 
national had been transported to the United States prior to the 
search. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that only voluntary 
presence in the United States invokes constitutional protections for 
foreign nationals.66  
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that in addition to 
the reasoning of the Chief Justice, practicality concerns also weigh in 
favor of the Fourth Amendment not having any application to 
searches of foreign nationals in foreign territories.67 Justice Kennedy 
reasoned that due to the absence of local magistrates or judges in 
foreign territories that have the authority or ability to issue American 
search warrants, as well as the “differing and perhaps unascertainable 
conceptions of reasonableness” in foreign territories, the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment should not apply in foreign 
territories as it does in the United States.68 Likewise, Justice Stevens 
concurred with the majority opinion that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply, primarily because American magistrates have no 
authority to authorize searches in foreign territories.69  
                                                 
64 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271. (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) 
(“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are universal in their application, 
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction…”) (emphasis in original); Kwong Hai Chew, 
344 U.S. at 596(“But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our 
borders”) (emphasis in original)). 
65 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that aliens lawfully present in 
the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether 
they are present voluntarily or, as in the case at hand, involuntarily. Verdugo, 494 
U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
66 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 272. However, the voluntary presence standard failed 
to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court and is therefore dicta. 
67 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
68 Id. Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed that the Warrant 
Clause does not apply and searches conducted abroad are subject only to the 
reasonable aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
69 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
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Applying the Supreme Court’s previous analyses of the scope 
of the Constitution to the Government’s actions in dealing with 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah, it seems that the Constitutional protections 
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply. First, Abu Khatallah is not a 
citizen of the United States, and therefore cannot avail himself of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections on the grounds of citizenship. 
Second, the search of Abu Khatallah did not occur in the territory of 
the United States, but rather occurred in international waters, 
eliminating the protections of the Fourth Amendment afforded non-
citizens within the United States. Lastly, while an argument can be 
made that Abu Khatallah was in the possession of the United States 
when he was searched, the Chief Justice’s “voluntary connection” 
language from Verdugo suggests that because Abu Khatallah had no 
connection to the United States other than his capture and 
subsequent rendition to justice, which is most certainly not a 
voluntary connection, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  
Following the Verdugo holding, the United States could have 
viably searched, without a search warrant, not only Abu Khatallah’s 
physical person in international waters, but also any properties owned 
by Abu Khatallah outside of the United States (i.e., his house in 
Libya). However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush 
raises questions as to whether the Constitution in fact does apply to 
Abu Khattallah, and whether the Government’s search of Abu 
Khatallah was legal. 
III.  BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND DE FACTO JURISDICTION 
THROUGH EXCLUSIVE CONTROL 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court dealt with several issues 
revolving around foreign national enemy combatants held at 
Guantanamo Bay.70 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay could avail 
themselves of the constitutional protection of the Writ of Habeas 
                                                 
70 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732. 
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Corpus.71 The Supreme Court in Boumediene denied the Government’s 
argument that the foreign nationals were held in territory outside of 
the Nation’s borders, which therefore leaves the detainees without 
constitutional rights,72 and concluded that foreign nationals detained 
as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may invoke the 
protections of habeas corpus.73 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
created a functional test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the 
Constitution.74  
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that 
pursuant to the agreement between Cuba and the United States, Cuba 
retains “ultimate sovereignty,” while the United States exercises 
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.75 Because 
of this division of power, Justice Kennedy stressed that while Cuba 
has de jure jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, the United States 
nonetheless has de facto jurisdiction.76 This distinction ultimately lead 
Justice Kennedy to conclude that “[i]n every practical sense 
Guantanamo [Bay] is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction 
of the United States.”77 Because of the “complete and total control” 
of the United States over Guantanamo Bay, foreign detainees held 
there could avail themselves of the constitutional protections of 
habeas corpus.78  
Justice Kennedy found support for the holding in the lack of 
prudential concerns previously preventing the extension of habeas 
corpus to territories under the sovereign control of a different 
nation.79 Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that there was no reason 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 739. 
73 Id. at 798. 
74 Id. at 764. 
75 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval 
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418. 
76 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755. 
77 Id. at 769. 
78 Id. at 771. 
79 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. See generally King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834 (As a 
territory that was not a part of England, yet controlled by the English monarch, the 
writ of habeas corpus was never extended to Scotland); R. Sharpe, The Law of 
Habeas Corpus 191 (2d ed. 1989). See also Note on the Power of English Courts to 
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to believe that a federal court’s order would be disobeyed at 
Guantanamo Bay, and that no other law besides that of the United 
States applies to the naval base.80  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy attempted to reconcile his 
functional holding with previous case law. First, in addressing the 
Insular cases, Justice Kennedy found that by utilizing the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation,81 the Court devised a functional approach to 
the application of the Constitution.82 This approach served as a 
foundation to the functional approach established by the Supreme 
Court in Boumediene.83  
Second, Justice Kennedy found support for his holding in the 
practical concerns that influenced the Court in Reid.84 Justice 
Kennedy read Reid to rely not on the citizenship of the petitioners, 
but instead on the petitioner’s place of confinement and trial.85 
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter’s and Justice Harlan’s 
concurrences in Reid, Justice Kennedy noted that Reid rejected a rigid 
rule in favor of analyzing the circumstances of each particular case 
when applying the Constitution extraterritorially.86  
                                                 
Issue the Writ of Habeas to Places Within the Dominions of the Crown, But Out 
of England, and On the Position of Scotland in Relation to that Power, 8 Jurid. 
Rev. 158 (1896). 
80 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. 
81 Under the doctrine of territorial incorporation, utilized in the Insular cases, 
the Constitution is fully incorporated and applies only to territories destined for 
statehood. For unincorporated territories (those not destined for statehood) the 
Constitution only applies in part, determined by the situation of the territory and its 
relationship to the United States. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143. 
82 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. See also Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312. 
83 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. 
84 Id. at 759. 
85 Id. at 760. 
86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. In his concurrence to Reid Justice Harlan 
rejected a “rigid and abstract rule,” reading the Insular cases to mean that 
constitutional provisions’ extraterritorial effect depends on the particular 
circumstances, particularly whether judicial enforcement would be “impracticable 
and anomalous.” Reid, 351 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). See also 
Reid, 351 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). 
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Lastly, to reconcile his holding with the holding of Eisentrager, 
Justice Kennedy distinguished Landsberg prison from Guantanamo 
Bay on the basis that, while both are located outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States, Guantanamo Bay is under the exclusive 
control of the United States, whereas Landsberg prison was under 
the control of the combined Allied Forces.87 In an attempt at further 
reconciliation, Justice Kennedy noted that nothing in Eisentrager 
stated that de jure sovereignty has ever been the only consideration in 
determining the reach of the Constitution.88 Justice Kennedy thus 
concluded that “a common thread” used to determine “questions of 
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not 
formalism[,]” and thus unites the Insular cases, Eisentrager, and Reid.89  
However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in 
Boumediene, the majority completely missed the mark with Eisentrager, 
which “conclusively establishes the opposite” of a functional test for 
extraterritoriality.90 Quoting Justice Jackson in Eisentrager, Justice 
Scalia noted, “in extending constitutional protections beyond the 
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the 
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the judiciary 
power to act.”91 From the language in Eisentrager, Justice Scalia 
concluded that Eisentrager “held beyond any doubt - that the 
Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United 
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”92  
The Insular cases, Reid, and Eisentrager, do in fact stand for the 
same idea, as observed by the majority. However, the majority 
interpreted these cases incorrectly. Instead of standing for a 
functional approach to extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia pointed out 
that, like Eisentrager, the Insular cases stand for the proposition that 
aliens outside of United States sovereign territory do not have 
                                                 
87 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 768. The United States was therefore “answerable 
to its Allies” for all activities occurring at Landsberg prison. Id. 
88 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. at 770-71). 
92 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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constitutional rights.93 Quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico,94 Justice Scalia 
stated that, “The Constitution of the United States is in force in 
Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that 
government is exerted.”95 Moreover, all of the Justices of the Reid 
majority, save one, limited their analysis to the rights of citizens 
abroad.96   
The Insular cases dealt with territory that was a part of the 
United States’ sovereign territory,97 the Reid Court addressed the 
rights of citizens abroad, and Eisentrager specifically declined to 
extend constitutional privileges to foreign nationals outside of United 
States sovereign territory. Functional approach or not, the idea that 
the Constitution applies to foreign nationals outside of the United 
States’ sovereignty can not be found in any of the Supreme Court’s 
previous opinions. Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s ultimate holding in 
Boumediene, Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence that, while 
the “deck of a private American vessel . . . is considered for many 
purposes constructively as territory of the United States . . . persons 
on board such vessels . . . cannot invoke the protection of the 
provisions [of the Constitution] until brought within the actual 
territorial boundaries of the United States.”98 Thus, the functional de 
jure versus de facto sovereignty approach adopted by the majority in 
Boumediene is not only judicially created, but is a blatant 
misconstruction and revision of the Court’s previous case law in a 
weak attempt at justification. 
                                                 
93 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Justice Kennedy cited this case in concluding that 
the Insular Cases created a functional test for the application of the Constitution to 
American territories. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758. 
95 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Balzac v. Porto 
Rico, 258 U.S. at 312.) (emphasis added). 
96 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 
(plurality opinion of Black, J., Harlan, J., and Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). 
Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice in the majority that did not limit the 
analysis to American citizens abroad. However, Justice Frankfurter went a step 
further and limited his analysis to civilian dependents of American military abroad, 
an even narrower class. 
97 See Boumediene, 553. U.S. at 839; Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268; Reid, 354 U.S. at 
13 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). 
98 Reid, 354 U.S. at 55-6. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
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Although Boumediene seems to have rewritten the Insular cases, 
Reid, and Eisentrager, and did not overrule Verdugo despite being in 
direct contradiction to it, it is still controlling law. Therefore, there is 
a rather gray area of law regarding the application of the Constitution 
to foreign national terror suspects held aboard American military 
vessels that are located in international waters. Under Eisentrager and 
Verdugo, the Fourth Amendment would not apply to the search of a 
foreign-national terrorism suspect, so long as the search occurs 
outside of the territory of the United States, where the United States 
lacks de jure sovereignty. Under Boumediene, however, the Fourth 
Amendment seemingly applies to a search of such foreign-national 
terrorism suspects if conducted within an area where the United 
States exercises de facto sovereignty through ‘complete and total 
control,’ in addition to searches conducted within the de jure 
sovereignty of the United States. While the Eisentrager/Verdugo and 
Boumediene rules may lead to the same result in some cases, such as if a 
search of a foreign-national terrorism suspect occurred within the 
sovereign territory of the United States, the same cannot be said 
when the search is conducted where the United States only exercises 
de facto, and not de jure sovereignty. 
Such a situation is in fact presented by the handling of 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah by the United States Government. By 
searching Abu Khatallah on a military vessel in international waters, 
the United States searched Abu Khatallah in a location where the 
country certainly lacks de jure jurisdiction (by virtue of being in 
international waters), yet arguably exercises de facto jurisdiction (by 
virtue of being on an American military vessel). Applying the 
Boumediene holding to the actions of the Government in dealing with 
Abu Khatallah, his search would not be legal, absent a warrant, if the 
military vessel on which the search occurred can be equated to being 
under de facto sovereignty of the United States. 
One significant question thus arises: was Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah within the ‘complete and total control’ of the United States 
when he was searched while being held on the American military ship 
in international waters? The answer to this question may dictate not 
only the legality of the Government’s actions with Abu Khatallah, 
but also may impact the future course of conduct of the United 
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States in dealing with similarly-situated terrorism suspects that have 
been captured. 
IV.  DOES THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE DE FACTO 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS? 
In determining whether an American military vessel in 
international waters is equivalent to Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene 
purposes, several sources may help shed light on how the vessel 
should be treated. One such source is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.99  
Designed to define the rights and responsibilities of nations 
regarding the world’s oceans, the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
states that, “[s]hips have the nationality of the State whose flag they 
are entitled to fly,”100 and that, “ships shall sail under the flag of one 
State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas.”101 Additionally, the Convention goes further in specifying 
that warships on the high seas “have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.”102 Lastly, the 
Convention mandates that every State shall “assume jurisdiction 
under its internal law over each ship flying its flag.”103  
Following the language in the Convention of the Law of the 
Sea and the rule laid down in Boumediene, a search of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah aboard an American military ship in international waters 
would be subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
99 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
100 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
102 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 95, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
103 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243. 
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Because he was searched on an American military vessel, the ship 
carries the nationality of the United States and is subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The “internal law” that the 
Convention subjects the ship to as an American vessel most certainly 
refers to the United States Constitution, including the provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea do 
not bind the United States because the United States has not become 
a signatory party to the Convention.104 However, customary 
international law echoes the rule eventually adopted by the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Predating the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated 
in The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey)105 [hereinafter “the Lotus 
case”], “a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the 
State the flag of which it flies.”106 Furthermore, the Lotus case points 
out that “a ship is placed in the same position as national territory,” 
and that “what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be 
regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the 
ship flies.”107  
While the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea may not 
bind the United States, the Lotus case does bind the United States 
absent conflicting domestic law.108 Because neither Congress nor 
                                                 
104 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 163 (2014). But see Id. at n. 
13 (describing support for US ratification, including support from former 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush). 
105 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 
(Sept. 7). 
106 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
¶ 65 (Sept. 7). 
107 Id. 
108 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary 
international law is binding on the United States in the absence of conflicting 
domestic law). On the other hand, courts have held that customary international 
law is not controlling where Congress has specifically enacted a law on the issue. See 
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other 
grounds, 946 F.2d 1481 (1991) (holding that the customary norm of safe haven in 
times of civil war was preempted by the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 and 
the executive act of voluntary departure). 
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courts have directly dealt with the territorial characteristics of military 
vessels, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations is perhaps the most important tool in analyzing the way 
the United States Government views its military vessels, as well as the 
jurisdictional laws surrounding them. It is therefore helpful in 
determining whether an American military vessel can be equated to 
Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene purposes of applying the 
Constitution to foreign nationals. 
According to the Commander’s Handbook, which provides 
guidance for American military officers “on the rules of law 
governing naval operations in peacetime and during armed 
conflict,”109 United States Naval policy requires warships to assert the 
rights of sovereign immunity.110 The privilege of sovereign immunity 
entitles all U.S. warships and United States ships (USS) to “exclusive 
control over persons onboard such vessels with respect to acts 
performed onboard.”111 More importantly, the Commander’s 
Handbook states, “U.S. law applies at all times aboard U.S. vessels as 
the law of the flag nation and is enforceable on U.S. vessels . . . 
anywhere in the world.”112  
Similar to the Commander’s Handbook, the Judge Advocate 
General’s Operational Law Handbook, which acts as a “how to” 
guide for military lawyers113 declares that state craft, including 
warships, are “absolutely immune on the high seas.”114  
                                                 
109 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, p. 3 (2007). 
110 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.2.2, p. 2-2 (2007). 
111 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.1, p. 2-1 (2007). 
112 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The 
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.2.1, p. 3-10 
(2007). 
113 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. i (2014). 
114 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & 
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 174 (2014) (citing article 
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Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law 
Handbook strongly suggest that American military ships in 
international waters are essentially United States territory abroad, and 
certainly under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United 
States. Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law 
Handbook thus can be said to equate an American military ship in 
international waters to Guantanamo Bay, for de facto jurisdictional 
purposes. Similar to the Boumediene reasoning of “complete and total 
control” that the United States holds over Guantanamo Bay, the 
Commander’s Handbook gives the United States “exclusive control” 
over military vessels such as the one used to transport Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah. 
Moreover, the Commander’s Handbook specifically states 
that U.S. law applies at all times on American flagged vessels. Surely, 
U.S. law refers to the whole Constitution including the Fourth 
Amendment. Therefore, the United States Government must abide 
by the Fourth Amendment when it searches terrorism suspects like 
Ahmed Abu Khatallah aboard an American military vessel, even if 
the vessel is located in international waters. 
V.  RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTENDING FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HELD ABOARD 
AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. 
The practice of extending the provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment to foreign nationals held aboard an American military 
vessel in international waters raises several important policy 
considerations. Firstly, who has the jurisdiction to issue warrants for 
such searches? Could any federal judge in the United States issue 
such a warrant? Or would it be limited to judges within a certain 
jurisdiction? And if so, which jurisdiction? Similarly, what court can 
hear challenges to such warrants? Would it be the district court to 
which the suspect is ultimately brought? Or would it be a special 
court created specifically for such purposes? 
                                                 
95 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea). See also Id. at 171 (providing complete 
sovereign immunity for State vessels). 
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The second policy consideration implicated by such a 
decision is what effect that decision will have on future dealings with 
captured terrorism suspects. The United States can easily defeat 
having to grant the protections of the Fourth Amendment to a 
foreign suspect by delaying the suspect from reaching an American 
vessel. Capturing forces could take the time to search and interrogate 
the suspect in the nation where the capture takes place before 
transporting the suspect back to the United States. However, this 
would result in added delay, and most likely added risk for both the 
capturing forces and the captured suspect, who would have to spend 
more time in a likely hostile environment. The consequences of 
extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to foreign 
suspects aboard American ships in international waters could 
therefore result in a failure to even prevent a search of the suspect 
without a warrant, while at the same time place American citizens, 
and even the foreign suspect himself, at greater harm. 
A third important policy consideration is the likelihood of 
compliance with such a rule. Compliance with such a rule ultimately 
relies on whether the information resulting from a search would later 
be used or excluded from the trial of the captured terrorism suspect. 
Exclusion of ill-gotten information would most likely help ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
However, if the Government already has a strong enough case (and if 
the Government is going to exercise its rendition powers, it likely has 
a strong enough case already) then exclusion of the information 
resulting from the search would not be of much consequence. 
Searches would be conducted more for intelligence value rather than 
evidentiary value during a subsequent prosecution, and the threat of 
future exclusion of information gained would therefore not stop 
searches when a warrant is unable to be obtained. The rule requiring 
a warrant would thus prove toothless, all the while unnecessarily 
restricting the later prosecution of the captured suspect. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the history of decisions regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution, from Eisentrager to Verdugo, seems to 
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suggest that the United States Government’s search of Ahmed Abu 
Khatallah aboard a ship in international waters is legal, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Boumediene challenges that theory.  
Following the Verdugo holding and Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in Reid, the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable 
to foreign nationals held aboard American ships in international 
waters. However, following the more recent Boumediene holding, 
because the American military vessel on which he was searched is 
subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States, 
despite being in international waters and outside United States 
territory, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would seemingly 
extend to Abu Khatallah just as the protections of a habeas corpus 
petition extended to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in 
Boumediene. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would protect 
Abu Khatallah because an American military ship in international 
waters is “not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the 
United States.”115  
Regardless of the lack of value and heavy burden produced 
by such a rule, in light of Boumediene, the Fourth Amendment, as well 
as the rest of the Constitution, likely applies to foreign terrorism 
suspects held aboard American military vessels, even if the ships are 
located in international waters. This unintended consequence of the 
Boumediene decision leaves the United States Government operating in 
a dubious zone of legality when it searches terrorist suspects aboard 
military vessels absent a warrant, and may ultimately necessitate a 
change in the way the United States deals with captured terrorism 
suspects in the future. 
 
                                                 
115 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 769; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 
(2004). 
